For nearly five years, discussions surrounding the legitimacy of Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan have largely revolved around international recognition, women’s rights, economic isolation, and security concerns. Yet a recent intervention by Afghan scholar Sheikh-ul-Hadith Muhammad Usman Tariq has revived a far older and potentially more consequential debate: whether the Taliban’s government possesses the religious legitimacy it frequently claims.
The significance of the argument lies not in the identity of the scholar alone but in the framework he employs. Rather than approaching the issue through the language of international law, democracy, or human rights conventions, he draws upon the Quran, Hadith, and Hanafi jurisprudence, the same legal tradition frequently cited by the Taliban in defense of their policies.
According to the scholar, Islamic governance cannot derive legitimacy solely from military victory or territorial control. Rather, legitimacy is linked to public consent, justice, accountability, protection of life and property, and the fulfillment of obligations toward citizens. If those conditions are absent, he argues, coercive control alone cannot transform power into legitimate authority.
This distinction is critical because it separates the concepts of power and legitimacy, terms often used interchangeably but understood differently within Islamic political thought. Throughout Islamic history, rulers frequently emerged through conflict and political upheaval. However, classical jurists rarely treated military success as sufficient in itself. Instead, they evaluated rulers according to their conduct, their treatment of subjects, and their ability to maintain justice.
The Taliban’s supporters often point to the movement’s victory over foreign forces and the collapse of the previous Afghan government as evidence of its right to rule. Critics counter that military triumph establishes control but does not automatically resolve questions regarding legitimacy. The debate, therefore, is not about who governs Afghanistan today. It is about whether governance alone is enough.
Many classical Hanafi scholars emphasized that rulers bear responsibilities as well as privileges. The protection of life, property, and dignity occupied a central place within discussions of governance. Justice was not viewed as an optional virtue but as an essential requirement. Consultation, accountability, and the welfare of society were likewise recurring themes in Islamic legal literature.
The current debate emerges against a backdrop of growing frustration among many Afghans. Political participation remains limited. Independent opposition is virtually absent. Civil society has contracted dramatically. Economic hardship continues to affect millions. Restrictions on education and employment opportunities have generated criticism both domestically and internationally.
While the Taliban maintain that their policies are rooted in Islamic principles, some scholars increasingly argue that the issue is not whether Islamic governance should exist but whether existing policies meet the standards established by Islamic jurisprudence itself.
The Difference Between Obedience and Consent
One of the most sensitive aspects of the discussion concerns the concept of public consent. Historically, Islamic scholars have differed regarding how consent should be expressed and measured. Yet many agreed that governance could not be reduced to simple domination.
The pledge of allegiance, or bay’ah, occupied an important place in classical discussions of political authority. Although interpretations varied across centuries and circumstances, the principle reflected the idea that rulers and subjects existed within a reciprocal relationship involving rights and obligations.
This is where critics believe contemporary Afghanistan faces a legitimacy dilemma. If citizens have little ability to participate in political processes, influence public policy, or peacefully advocate reform, can meaningful consent be said to exist?
The question becomes even more significant when viewed alongside the scholar’s argument that governments which systematically restrict rights and close peaceful avenues for change may lose their claim to religious legitimacy.
The Taliban are unlikely to accept such conclusions. They have consistently maintained that their governance model is both Islamic and legitimate. Yet the growing willingness of some scholars to challenge that claim using Islamic jurisprudence rather than secular political theories creates a different type of debate.
Unlike criticism from foreign governments, these arguments emerge from within the same religious tradition that the Taliban frequently invoke. That makes them harder to dismiss as merely political or ideological attacks.
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s legitimacy debate may increasingly revolve around a question that transcends military victories, diplomatic recognition, and international pressure. The issue is whether power alone is sufficient or whether governance must also satisfy the religious and ethical standards that Islamic jurisprudence places upon rulers.
As more scholars engage with that question, the debate over Afghanistan’s future may become less about who controls the state and more about what constitutes legitimate authority in the first place.
