The talks between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban began on October 25 and are now in their fourth day. These discussions should have reached a mutually agreed conclusion by now, but they continue without any concrete result. The question arises: why did the talks have to be held in Qatar first, then in Turkey, instead of Kabul or Islamabad? Pakistan and Afghanistan are like two rooms of the same house; their problems should be resolved at home. When third parties like Qatar and Turkey step in, their involvement should at least yield some results.
Pakistan has long claimed to have shared proof with Kabul; videos, photographs, drone footage, showing infiltration attempts, organised formations of militants crossing from Afghan soil into Pakistan. These are not small groups; sometimes fifty to seventy individuals cross together. Pakistani officials presented this evidence to the Afghan delegation in Istanbul, including identification details, addresses, and parentage of those involved in attacks inside Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Turkish and Qatari officials also reviewed this heap of evidence. Turkey’s intelligence is known for its sharpness; it understands what is happening on the ground.
What is happening on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is not happening on the borders Afghanistan shares with Iran, China, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan. These realities have intensified cross-border tensions and infiltration attempts. Until yesterday, many claimed that the negotiations had failed, but technically, talks fail only when both sides officially end the process and return home. The fourth day of negotiations began with discussions on several issues. The most significant point already achieved is the ceasefire, which both sides are now considering extending. Afghanistan reports that talks are focused on trade, cross-border movement, visa facilities, and the status of refugees. Pakistan, however, wants a written assurance that Afghan soil will not be used by Pakistani militants, not just verbal commitments.
Much of the Afghan media, unfortunately, reports negatively on these developments. There are elements within Afghanistan that do not want these negotiations to succeed. Certain forces hostile to the Taliban—and to Pakistan—thrive on poor relations between the two countries. The Pakistani militants hiding in Afghanistan also want no agreement because any accord between Islamabad and Kabul would threaten their survival. Hence, negative propaganda and baseless claims on Afghan social media sabotage the peace process.
When Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that failure of these talks would mean “open war” with Afghanistan, it underlined the gravity of the situation. That is why high-level delegations, including defence and intelligence chiefs from both sides, first met in Qatar and are now in Istanbul. From the Taliban side, Anas Haqqani is part of the delegation, which makes sense because many Pakistani militants operate in provinces where the Haqqani group is influential, such as Paktika, Paktia, Khost, and Nangarhar. Another delegate, Rehmatullah Najib, is close to Kandahar and trusted by the Taliban’s supreme leader, Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada.
Yet, neither delegation has full authority to make decisions. Both must constantly consult their respective leaderships—Islamabad on one side, Kabul and Kandahar on the other. That is why, during the talks, both sides kept pausing for instructions. This should not be seen negatively; it shows that both are careful to stay aligned with their higher leaderships.
The internal politics of the Taliban also affect the situation. Differences of opinion exist among their leaders on issues like girls’ education and women’s employment. Sheikh Hibatullah insists on following a strict legal system, and all orders ultimately flow from him. Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub Mujahid, the son of Mullah Umar, believes he deserves greater power because his father founded the movement. Sirajuddin Haqqani, as Interior Minister, commands significant authority and influence, especially through provincial governorship and administrative control. This power struggle between the Kandahar and Haqqani factions shapes the Taliban’s internal dynamics, just as party politics and provincial rivalries do in Pakistan.
There is also talk that the Taliban want the United States to act as a formal guarantor of any agreement. If true, it would be a matter of shame for them. After fighting the United States for two decades on ideological grounds, seeking its guarantee now would be a complete U-turn and the beginning of their downfall. This would contradict the very basis of their so-called “Islamic struggle.” Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar—all Muslim countries—should be enough to resolve matters as brothers.
If this issue prolongs or escalates into border clashes or renewed conflict, it will be shameful for both Pakistan and the Taliban. This is the best opportunity for them to support each other, to use their shared potential. Millions of Afghan refugees still live in Pakistan, and both countries are rich in minerals. They must fight their common enemies together, not each other.
India’s role in this crisis is clear. Delhi wants tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban to persist so it can exploit the gap. When Pakistan-Afghan tensions rose, India strengthened ties with Kabul, announcing scholarships and aid during Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to Delhi. India seeks regional space because no South Asian country—neither China, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, nor Pakistan—stands with it. Only Afghanistan remains open to it. This, the Taliban must think about seriously. They are strengthening ties with a country whose military aggression and hostility toward Muslims are no secret.
Russia, which once invaded Afghanistan, has now officially recognised the Taliban government, becoming the only country to do so. Meanwhile, those nations that advocated for the Taliban, including Pakistan, remain unacknowledged. Pakistan played a key role in the U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement and supported Afghanistan in every major phase—from the Soviet war to post-2001 instability. Whenever war comes to Afghanistan, where do millions of Afghans flee? Pakistan. They cannot go to Iran, China, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan, and India is too far. In times of hardship, their first destination is always Pakistan. The Taliban must remember this.
Both governments; Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Kabul, and Kandahar, should think with calm minds about the opportunities they can share. When Muslims complain that non-Muslims are united against them, they should first look inward. The organisations that claim to fight for Islam are instead fighting against Muslims. If they truly believe in jihad, why don’t they go to Palestine to fight Israel or to Kashmir to fight India? These groups, created in the name of jihad, have turned their weapons against their own Muslim brothers. That is the greatest tragedy of all.
