A country that was once dismissed as a “forgotten war” has again slipped toward the margins of international attention. Yet the warning signs are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: growing armed resistance to Taliban rule, deepening humanitarian suffering, the systematic exclusion of women and girls from public life, political fragmentation, and continuing concerns over the presence of international terrorist networks and foreign militants on Afghan soil.
The international community has seen this pattern before.
The history of Afghanistan since the 1990s cannot be separated from September 11. During that decade, Afghanistan became synonymous with civil war, political fragmentation and the rise of the Taliban. As the Taliban consolidated control over much of the country, Al Qaeda established a major presence there, exploiting Afghanistan as a base for international terrorist activity.
The world largely looked away.
That changed irrevocably on September 11, 2001. The attacks in the United States transformed Afghanistan from a distant humanitarian and political crisis into the center of a global security emergency. The subsequent international military intervention removed the Taliban from national power and led to two decades of international engagement, enormous financial investment and the creation of Afghan security and political institutions.
Yet five years after the Taliban’s return to power, many of the conditions that once made Afghanistan a source of profound international concern are again visible. This does not mean that history is repeating itself in precisely the same way. Afghanistan today is a different country, and the international environment is fundamentally different.
But the lesson of 9/11 remains highly relevant: when Afghanistan is abandoned to political extremism, instability and international terrorism, the consequences do not necessarily remain inside Afghanistan.
Against this backdrop, armed resistance to Taliban rule is expanding. The latest major movement to enter the conflict is the Afghanistan United Front (AUF), which reportedly began its military campaign in August. According to information cited by opposition sources, the group has conducted more than one attack per day, significantly increasing the pace and geographical reach of military activity. Some of the AUF’s most ambitious attacks have reportedly targeted areas in Kandahar and Helmand, in southern Afghanistan and within the Taliban’s traditional heartland.
The strategy appears intended not merely to inflict casualties or seize territory, but to challenge the Taliban’s assertion that it exercises uncontested authority throughout Afghanistan. The message is straightforward: Taliban control does not mean Taliban legitimacy, and territorial control does not eliminate political resistance. The AUF is reportedly led by former Afghan army general Sami Sadat, who has networks among former members of Afghanistan’s security forces.
Another significant armed opposition movement, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), is led by former Afghan military chief Yasin Zia. The organization has reportedly maintained resistance in parts of northeastern Afghanistan, including areas of Badakhshan, despite Taliban military pressure.
The National Resistance Front (NRF), meanwhile, has been active for longer and is led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the legendary Afghan resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by terrorists on September 9, 2001 just two days before the attacks of September 11.
That historical connection gives today’s resistance movement an especially profound resonance. Massoud’s assassination and the attacks of September 11 occurred within days of one another, marking the beginning of one of the most consequential transformations in modern Afghan and international history. Twenty-five years later, his son is leading a movement challenging the same Taliban political order that once provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda.
The emerging resistance is not solely military. A significant group of Afghan Islamic clerics and scholars has reportedly issued a fatwa challenging the Taliban’s religious legitimacy and supporting resistance against its rule. The scholars have accused the Taliban of presenting a deceptive interpretation of Islam and have argued that Afghans have a religious duty to oppose what they describe as an extremist and heretical political order.
Their intervention is particularly significant because the Taliban has consistently sought to present itself as the legitimate Islamic authority governing Afghanistan. The challenge from Afghan religious scholars therefore strikes at the ideological foundation of Taliban rule. It also raises a critical question for the international community: If large numbers of Afghan religious scholars reject the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam and its claim to religious legitimacy, why should the Taliban’s political monopoly be treated as inevitable?
The growth of armed opposition creates both an opportunity and a danger. The various resistance movements broadly share several objectives: ending Taliban political domination, creating a government based on the consent of the Afghan people, protecting women and minorities, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for international terrorism.
These are significant objectives. But Afghanistan’s history also provides a warning. If the opposition remains divided, competing commanders could eventually fight one another as readily as they fight the Taliban. New military leaders could be joined by former warlords seeking to reclaim political influence, territory and economic resources.
The result could be a fragmented conflict reminiscent of Afghanistan’s earlier civil wars. The international community therefore has an opportunity and a responsibility to help ensure that opposition to Taliban rule develops into a political alternative rather than another cycle of factional warfare.
Afghan political leaders, civil society organizations, women’s groups, religious scholars and opposition figures have attempted to develop platforms for political dialogue and consensus. The Vienna Process, together with other Afghan-led initiatives and annual meetings in Cambridge, has provided space for competing political actors to discuss their differences and attempt to develop common roadmaps for Afghanistan’s future.
But these initiatives have struggled without sustained international political and financial support. The absence of meaningful international sponsorship risks leaving Afghan opposition forces divided and politically marginalized. Western governments should therefore reconsider policies that treat Afghanistan principally as a problem of migration, humanitarian aid or border management. Turning Afghan refugees away without addressing the conditions that force people to flee does not constitute an Afghanistan policy. Neither does diplomatic disengagement.
The human cost of Taliban rule is immense. Millions of Afghans continue to experience poverty, food insecurity and severe humanitarian hardship. The Taliban’s restrictions on women and girls have fundamentally altered the lives of half of Afghanistan’s population.
Women and girls have been excluded from education, employment and many areas of public life. Restrictions affecting healthcare training, including the preparation of future midwives, have generated particular concern in a country already facing severe maternal-health challenges. Afghanistan was once among the world’s most dangerous places for women to give birth.
There is now a real danger that the country is moving backward toward conditions that existed under the Taliban’s previous administration in the 1990s. The question for Western governments should be unavoidable: Where is the sustained international mobilization against the systematic oppression of Afghan women? The relative silence surrounding Afghanistan’s women is particularly striking given the enormous international attention devoted to the country following September 11.
The most serious reason for renewed international attention, however, extends beyond Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. It concerns international security. Afghanistan’s return to Taliban rule has generated continuing international concern over the presence and activities of terrorist organizations and foreign militants. Reports alleging that Al Qaeda maintains a presence in Afghanistan, including in or around Kandahar, and accounts describing former international military facilities near Kabul being used by foreign fighters, require serious international scrutiny.
These allegations should not be dismissed. Nor should they automatically be treated as proof of an imminent repetition of 2001. But after September 11, the international community has no excuse for ignoring warning signs. The lesson of 9/11 was not simply that terrorists can attack from Afghanistan. The deeper lesson was that international neglect can allow a dangerous ecosystem of extremism, political isolation, weak governance and terrorist networks to develop without sufficient scrutiny.
It took a catastrophe on September 11 for the world to recognize the consequences. The international community should not wait for another catastrophe before paying attention.
Twenty-five years after September 11, Afghanistan once again requires a serious international strategy. That strategy should neither consist of another open-ended military intervention nor of complete disengagement. It should begin with political recognition of a basic reality: the future of Afghanistan cannot be determined solely by the Taliban.
Millions of Afghans including women, minorities, religious scholars, political organizations, civil society groups, former security personnel and communities inside and outside the country — have a legitimate stake in determining the country’s future.
The international community should therefore create political space for Afghan opposition forces and civil society to organize and develop a common political vision. It should support an inclusive Afghan political dialogue involving representatives from across the country’s political, ethnic, religious and social spectrum, while encouraging cooperation among non-Taliban political movements so that armed resistance does not develop into another destructive contest among rival factions.
The international community should also support Afghan religious scholars who advocate interpretations of Islam compatible with political participation, human dignity and fundamental rights. It should protect the rights of Afghan women and girls and maintain international pressure for their access to education, employment, healthcare and public life.
Humanitarian assistance to Afghans must continue, while ensuring that aid does not become a substitute for a political strategy. The international community should monitor terrorist organizations operating from or seeking sanctuary in Afghanistan, with particular attention to any credible evidence of renewed international terrorist infrastructure.
Afghan civil society and political actors in exile should also be engaged rather than treating Afghanistan’s diaspora exclusively as a migration issue. Mechanisms such as the Vienna Process and other Afghan-led initiatives that can help build consensus around a political alternative should receive greater international attention and support.
Above all, the international community needs to develop a long-term strategy for Afghanistan rather than reacting only when the country becomes an immediate security crisis. In the 1990s, Afghanistan was a forgotten war. Then came September 11. The world learned, at terrible cost, that Afghanistan’s crises could have consequences far beyond its borders. Today, twenty-five years after 9/11, the international community has the benefit of hindsight.
It knows what political isolation can produce. It knows what happens when extremist movements acquire uncontested space. It knows the danger posed by international terrorist organizations operating from unstable territory. It knows the consequences of ignoring humanitarian catastrophe. And it knows the human cost when Afghan women are abandoned to political repression. The question is whether the world will act on those lessons.
The emergence of the Afghanistan United Front, the continuing activities of the Afghanistan Freedom Front and National Resistance Front, and the appearance of additional locally supported armed movements demonstrate that Afghanistan’s political crisis is evolving. This moment should not be romanticized. Armed conflict carries enormous risks for Afghan civilians and could produce another devastating period of civil war.
But neither should the growth of resistance be dismissed. It is a signal that Afghanistan’s political future remains contested. The international community should use this moment to create space for political organization, dialogue and a credible national alternative before Afghanistan once again descends into a conflict in which armed actors, extremists and terrorist organizations fill the vacuum.
