Arshad Aziz Malik
The killing of a key militant figure in Peshawar has brought to light a disturbing picture of a terrorist network that was allegedly preparing for another wave of attacks across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The man, identified as Imran alias Abu Bakr, was reportedly wanted in around 20 cases and had a government-announced reward of Rs1.2 million for his capture. His death during a counter-terrorism operation could now provide investigators with an important opportunity to trace the wider network behind a series of deadly attacks and uncover plans that may have been aimed at religious scholars, politicians and sensitive civilian institutions.
The significance of the operation lies not simply in the elimination of one militant. It lies in what the investigation has revealed about the structure, methods and ambitions of a network allegedly associated with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The group appears to have relied on small, highly mobile cells, sophisticated communication methods, recruitment of vulnerable individuals and a logistical chain capable of moving people and equipment between different districts.
Most importantly, the operation reportedly came at a critical moment. Intelligence suggested that the network was preparing additional attacks in Peshawar. Religious scholars were allegedly among the intended targets, while churches, schools and imambargahs were also reportedly being considered as possible targets. Some political figures were allegedly under threat as well. Had the network succeeded in carrying out even one of these attacks, the consequences could have extended far beyond the immediate loss of life, potentially triggering fear, sectarian tension and further instability.
The killing therefore raises an important question for Pakistan: how many tragedies can be prevented when intelligence agencies identify terrorist networks before they reach their intended targets?
The answer could determine the effectiveness of the country’s future counter-terrorism strategy. One of the most troubling features of the network was its alleged reliance on small cells. Instead of operating as a large organisation with dozens of militants gathered in one place, members reportedly worked in groups of only two, three or four people. Such a structure is extremely difficult to detect because the arrest or killing of one cell does not necessarily expose the entire organisation.
Small cells can relocate quickly, maintain limited contact with other members and avoid creating obvious patterns. One person may be responsible for recruitment, another for transportation, another for weapons and another for identifying a target. The people carrying out the final attack may not even know the complete structure of the organisation behind them.
This makes the alleged role of Imran alias Abu Bakr particularly important. He was reportedly not simply an ordinary foot soldier. He was described as a facilitator and alleged mastermind who helped recruit individuals, arrange logistics, provide weapons and support those involved in terrorist activities.
If investigators can establish these links through evidence, his death could still become an important starting point for dismantling the wider network. Documents, digital material and other evidence reportedly recovered during the operation may help identify additional members and understand how the organisation functioned.
The network associated with the slain militant has been linked to a number of attacks involving political figures and religious scholars. Among those mentioned in connection with previous attacks are Senator Hidayatullah, Maulana Khan Zaib and Rehan Zaib. Religious scholars in Bajaur were also repeatedly targeted, with Daesh claiming responsibility for several such attacks.
The pattern is deeply disturbing because the targeting of religious scholars is not simply an attempt to eliminate individuals. Extremist organisations understand that influential religious figures can represent powerful voices against radicalisation and violence. Killing them can create fear within entire communities while attempting to silence people capable of challenging extremist ideology.
The targeting of scholars associated with JUI and the broader Deobandi community also highlights the way extremist organisations attempt to exploit religious differences. Groups such as Daesh do not merely attack people outside their ideology; they frequently target Muslims and religious scholars whom they consider opponents. This is one of the most dangerous dimensions of terrorism in Pakistan. The objective is often to transform differences within society into permanent conflict. A murdered scholar can create fear. An attack on a religious gathering can create anger. An attack on a minority place of worship can create communal tension. The terrorists benefit when society becomes divided.
Bajaur appears to have played a central role in the network’s activities. The area was reportedly used as a base for planning and recruitment, while operatives were subsequently sent to other locations. The network’s alleged involvement in attacks on religious scholars and the 2023 JUI gathering in Bajaur illustrates how the area became associated with a continuing campaign of violence. But the significance of Bajaur extends beyond individual attacks. It demonstrates how terrorist networks can use one location as a base while conducting operations far beyond it. Planning can take place in Bajaur, recruitment can occur elsewhere, equipment can be moved through Nowshera and an attack can ultimately be carried out in Peshawar, Rawalpindi or another city.
This makes conventional geographic thinking inadequate. Security agencies cannot simply focus on the location where an attack occurs. They must trace where the attackers came from, who trained them, who supplied them, where they stayed and how they communicated. Every terrorist incident must therefore be treated as a possible doorway into a much larger network.
The most alarming element of the case is the alleged plan for Peshawar. Information gathered by security agencies reportedly indicated that the network was preparing to target religious scholars in the city. There were also concerns that churches, schools and imambargahs could be attacked. These targets reveal the broader strategy of extremist violence.
An attack on a church would place the Christian community at risk and could provoke communal tensions. An attack on an imambargah could inflame sectarian divisions. An attack on a school could produce mass casualties and long-term psychological trauma. The assassination of religious scholars could intimidate entire communities. The terrorists do not need to destroy an entire city to create instability.
One carefully selected target can be enough. That is why the reported intelligence breakthrough in Peshawar is so significant. If the militants were indeed preparing an attack, disrupting the network before the operation was completed may have prevented a major tragedy.
The investigation also reportedly uncovered connections involving suicide jackets and other equipment used in terrorist attacks. A suicide jacket was allegedly ordered from Bajaur, while Nowshera was reportedly involved in the movement or preparation of such equipment. Equipment connected with an earlier incident in Rawalpindi was also reportedly traced to Nowshera.
This reveals how complicated the logistical side of terrorism can be. The person carrying a suicide jacket may have no involvement in manufacturing it. Someone else may have acquired the material. Another person may have transported it. A facilitator may have stored it. Eventually, it reaches an individual selected to carry out the attack. Such compartmentalisation makes terrorist networks difficult to dismantle.
It also explains why eliminating one operative is only part of the job. The state must trace the entire chain. Who supplied the equipment?
Who transported it?
Who paid for it?
Who provided the location?
Who recruited the attacker?
Who selected the target?
Answering these questions is what turns an individual counter-terrorism operation into a network-dismantling operation.
The recruitment of vulnerable people is another major challenge. Extremist organisations know how to exploit frustration, poverty, unemployment, social isolation and personal grievances. Pakistan’s economic difficulties do not automatically produce terrorism millions of people experience hardship without turning to violence but extremist recruiters can deliberately exploit vulnerable individuals.
They can offer money, status, identity, belonging or a distorted sense of purpose. The recruitment process can begin gradually. An individual may first encounter extremist propaganda, then establish contact with a recruiter, become increasingly isolated from alternative viewpoints and eventually be persuaded to participate in violence.
By the time the person is ready to carry out an attack, the recruitment process may have taken months. This is why Pakistan cannot rely solely on arrests and operations. Counter-terrorism must also address prevention. Education, economic opportunity, community engagement, responsible religious leadership and counter-radicalisation programmes are all part of the long-term answer.
Security operations can remove terrorists. Prevention can stop people from becoming terrorists in the first place.
The network also reportedly demonstrated an understanding of modern technology. Militants were said to use different digital applications and to change communication platforms regularly. They allegedly avoided relying on common communication channels and used coded language to conceal their activities.
This is a major challenge for modern counter-terrorism agencies. Terrorism is no longer organised exclusively in remote areas through face-to-face meetings. Recruitment, propaganda, communication and operational planning can increasingly take place through digital platforms.
Telegram and other applications have been used by extremist networks to maintain communication and distribute propaganda. As a result, Pakistan needs a stronger digital intelligence capability. Traditional surveillance remains important, but investigators increasingly require digital forensics, data analysis, cyber intelligence and the ability to connect online activity with real-world movements. The challenge is not merely to intercept a message. It is to understand the network behind the message.
Who is communicating?
Who is receiving instructions?
Who is providing money?
Who is moving between locations?
Who is searching for targets?
The answers can reveal the structure of a terrorist organisation long before an attack takes place. The most important lesson from the Peshawar operation is the value of intelligence-led counter-terrorism. There is an enormous difference between responding to a terrorist attack and stopping one. After an explosion, authorities can investigate, arrest suspects and dismantle parts of a network. But the dead cannot be brought back and the psychological damage cannot easily be reversed. Before an attack, the state has a window of opportunity.
It can identify the terrorists.
It can monitor their movements.
It can protect potential targets.
It can intercept weapons.
It can disrupt communications.
It can eliminate the threat before innocent people are killed.
This is why intelligence should remain at the centre of Pakistan’s national security strategy.
The reported operation in Peshawar illustrates the value of acting while terrorists are still planning rather than waiting until their plans become reality. Another major challenge is the number of militant organisations operating in and around Pakistan. Daesh has demonstrated a particular interest in sectarian, religious and minority targets. The TTP has frequently targeted security forces and state institutions. Al-Qaeda-linked elements have maintained their own networks and relationships.
These groups are not identical, and their objectives and methods can differ considerably. But from the perspective of national security, their presence creates a complex environment in which intelligence agencies must track several threats simultaneously. The state cannot afford to concentrate exclusively on one organisation while another quietly expands. This makes intelligence sharing more important than ever.
Pakistan has multiple security and intelligence institutions, including the Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, provincial police, Special Branches and the National Counter Terrorism Authority. Each institution has different responsibilities and capabilities. But terrorists do not respect institutional boundaries. A suspect may travel from Bajaur to Peshawar. A weapons supplier may operate in Nowshera. A recruiter may have contacts in another district. A facilitator may maintain links with people across the country.
One agency may possess information about a suspect’s movements, another about his communications and another about his associates. If those pieces of information remain separate, the terrorist benefits. If they are combined, a much clearer picture emerges. This is why NACTA’s coordination role is so important. Counter-terrorism cannot become a competition between institutions. It must become a coordinated national effort.
The role of ordinary citizens is equally important. Militants sometimes return to their home villages, visit relatives, spend a night or two in familiar locations and then leave again. Local communities may notice unusual behaviour before security agencies do. But public cooperation cannot be forced.
It must be earned through trust. Citizens need safe mechanisms to report genuine suspicious activity. They must also be confident that their information will be handled responsibly and that innocent people will not be subjected to arbitrary suspicion. A strong relationship between communities and law enforcement can make it significantly harder for terrorist cells to operate unnoticed.
The cross-border dimension of terrorism adds another layer of complexity. Some militants operate inside Pakistan, while others have connections to networks based in Afghanistan. Recent violence in areas including South Waziristan and Kurram demonstrates the continuing nature of the challenge. Pakistan cannot expect the Afghanistan issue to be resolved quickly.
It is a long-term security and diplomatic problem. But Pakistan can strengthen its own defences through better border management, stronger intelligence cooperation, improved surveillance and faster coordination between civilian and military institutions. The country may not control what happens across the border, but it can strengthen its ability to identify and disrupt threats once they emerge inside Pakistan.
There are reasons for cautious optimism. The frequency of major terrorist attacks has appeared lower in some recent periods compared with earlier phases of intense violence, suggesting that intelligence operations and targeted counter-terrorism actions may be disrupting militant networks. But a reduction in attacks should never be mistaken for the elimination of the threat.
Terrorist organisations adapt. They change communication methods. They recruit new members. They move their personnel. They identify new targets. They wait for weaknesses. A network that appears quiet today may be planning an attack tomorrow. That is why the killing of a key militant figure should not lead to complacency. It should trigger deeper investigation.
The approximately 20 cases reportedly registered against Imran, the Rs1.2 million reward announced for his capture, his alleged involvement in attacks on political figures and religious scholars, his reported role in recruitment and logistics, and the alleged plans for future attacks make the case particularly important. His death may prevent him from facing questions in court, but the investigation into his network must continue. Authorities should examine every document recovered during the operation, every digital connection, every financial trail and every known associate.
The objective should be to identify the people who recruited militants, those who supplied weapons, those who arranged transportation, those who provided safe locations and those who selected targets. One dead militant does not mean one destroyed network. The network must be dismantled piece by piece.
Pakistan has experienced enough terrorist violence to understand that the true measure of counter-terrorism success is not the number of operations conducted. It is the number of lives saved. If a church suicide bomber is stopped before reaching a crowded gathering, hundreds of lives may be saved. If a terrorist cell is dismantled before attacking a school, children return home safely. If a church is protected before an attack, an entire community is spared fear.
If an imambargah is secured before a planned assault, another cycle of sectarian violence may be prevented. If a religious scholar is protected from assassination, an entire community can continue to hear a voice against extremism. This is the real value of preventive intelligence.
The killing of Imran alias Abu Bakr should therefore not be viewed simply as the elimination of one militant. It should be seen as a potential window into a much wider network—one that allegedly operated across districts, exploited religious divisions, recruited vulnerable people, used modern technology, moved weapons and prepared targets. The next phase is crucial. Every lead must be followed. Every document must be examined. Every digital connection must be investigated. Every financial trail must be traced. Every facilitator must be identified.
Because terrorism is rarely the work of one individual. It is a chain of people, resources, ideas and logistics. Break one link, and the chain may survive. Break the entire chain, and lives can be saved. Pakistan’s future counter-terrorism strategy must therefore be built around one central principle: do not wait for terrorism to strike. Find it while it is still planning .The most successful counter-terrorism operation is not necessarily the one that produces the biggest headline.
It is the one that prevents the headline from ever being written. And if the intelligence operation in Peshawar has indeed prevented a planned attack against a religious, political or civilian target, then its greatest achievement may never be fully visible. The people who would have been killed will never know how close they came to becoming victims. That is what effective counter-terrorism should look like—not merely responding to tragedy, but stopping tragedy before it begins.
