Irfan Khan
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is once again standing at a dangerous crossroads. The province is confronted with a worsening crisis of peace and security, with terrorist incidents, militant activity and attacks on security personnel and civilians creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty across several districts. At the same time, the political landscape remains dominated by protests, rallies, political campaigns and partisan confrontation. This growing contrast raises a fundamental question that can no longer be avoided: who is taking ownership of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security crisis?
The situation demands more than political statements and expressions of concern. The most basic responsibility of any government is to maintain law and order, protect its citizens and preserve peace and security. When terrorism continues to threaten communities, the government cannot afford to appear distracted by political battles. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa need their elected leadership to demonstrate that the security of the province is a central responsibility rather than a secondary concern.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is not an ordinary province confronting an ordinary law-and-order problem. It has been at the centre of Pakistan’s struggle against terrorism for decades. Its people have experienced suicide attacks, targeted killings, bomb blasts, military operations, displacement and the destruction of public and private property. Its police force, FC personnel, soldiers and civilians have made enormous sacrifices. In such an environment, political leadership cannot treat security as an issue to be addressed only after another attack has taken place. Security has to remain a continuous responsibility of government.
The question of ownership is therefore fundamental. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security is not somebody else’s problem. The provincial government has a responsibility to maintain order, support law-enforcement institutions, protect citizens and coordinate with federal and security institutions. The chief executive of the province cannot remain detached from a security crisis that affects the lives of millions of people.
The province has an Apex Committee precisely because terrorism cannot be dealt with by one institution in isolation. The committee provides a mechanism through which political, administrative and security leadership can sit together, examine the situation and establish policy guidelines. Its chair is the chief executive of the province, making political ownership particularly important. When terrorist incidents increase and the security environment becomes more dangerous, such a forum should become more important, not less.
The central question, therefore, is straightforward: what is the government’s policy for dealing with the internal and external security challenges facing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? If there are repeated attacks, what policy decisions are being taken? If militant networks are expanding their activities, what instructions have been issued? If particular districts are becoming vulnerable, what measures are being adopted to protect them? And if the situation is deteriorating, why is the province not visibly demonstrating a comprehensive and sustained response?
A provincial action plan has also been prepared, but the existence of a plan is meaningful only if it is implemented effectively. A security plan cannot remain confined to official documents. It has to translate into intelligence coordination, effective policing, protection of vulnerable communities, prosecution of terrorists, control of militant financing and timely action against emerging threats. Policies are measured by results, not by announcements.
This creates a troubling contradiction. On one hand, the provincial government says it is serious about terrorism and security. On the other hand, terrorist incidents continue to occur and large parts of the province remain under considerable security pressure. When a government claims seriousness, the public has the right to ask what that seriousness looks like in practical terms.
Ownership is not simply a political expression. It is visible in decisions, institutions and conduct. It means convening the relevant authorities when the situation demands it. It means standing behind the police and security forces. It means appearing alongside families who have lost loved ones. It means communicating clearly with the public. And it means demonstrating that the provincial government regards the security of its citizens as its own responsibility.
There have been periods in the past when militant groups attempted to establish themselves in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the provincial government visibly took ownership of the situation. Political leaders stood firm, addressed the public, held press conferences and made it clear that the government regarded the security of the province as its own responsibility. Press conferences alone cannot defeat terrorism, but political visibility and institutional confidence matter during a security crisis. A government must communicate to citizens and adversaries alike that there is no political vacuum and that the state is present.
The present security environment makes such ownership even more necessary. The situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has become increasingly tense, with serious incidents reported in Kohat, Hangu, Kurram, Mohmand, South Waziristan and North Waziristan. The security situation in several of these areas has become extremely difficult, and the continuing attacks demonstrate that the threat is neither isolated nor temporary.
Kohat has experienced serious violence, while Hangu and the Kurram sector have also remained vulnerable. Mohmand, South Waziristan and North Waziristan continue to face major security challenges. These areas are connected by geography, history, militant networks and the wider border environment. The problem therefore cannot be addressed through isolated responses to individual attacks.
The question is whether there has been a meaningful change in the provincial government’s policy toward terrorism. If the threat is changing, policy must change with it. A government cannot continue to respond to every attack with condemnation and then return to normal political activity. Counterterrorism requires a sustained strategy involving intelligence, policing, administration, prosecution, border coordination, protection of vulnerable communities and political leadership.
There is also a difficult political reality that cannot be ignored. Political rallies, processions and protests generate political energy. They strengthen party loyalty, create narratives and provide opportunities for political mobilization. Security policy, by contrast, is complicated, expensive and often produces little immediate political reward. A government may spend months strengthening security institutions and still find that one terrorist attack dominates the public conversation.
That is precisely why political leadership is tested during a security crisis. Responsible governance requires leaders to prioritize security even when it does not provide an immediate political benefit.
There has been a claim that from January 2026 through September 2026, more than 4,200 terrorist attacks occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. That figure requires careful verification because contemporary official reporting has cited a different number. Federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar stated on September 25 that 2,456 terrorist incidents had occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2026, while 19 suicide attacks had also been recorded. The difference may reflect different definitions, categories or sources of data.
But the disagreement over the precise number should not obscure the central reality. Whether the figure is 4,200 or 2,456 under the respective methodologies, the province is experiencing a grave and sustained terrorist threat.
Statistics matter because governments need accurate data to formulate policy. But behind every statistic is a human tragedy. Every attack means a community disrupted, a family frightened, a police officer placed in danger or a civilian potentially losing a loved one. The public therefore deserves both accurate statistics and a clear explanation of what the government is doing to reduce the violence.
Condemnations alone are not enough.
When a police officer, soldier, FC personnel or civilian is killed, the state must demonstrate that the sacrifice is recognized. Political leaders should stand beside grieving families and communities. They should be present when funerals take place and when the province mourns. Such presence cannot bring anyone back, but it demonstrates that the victims matter to the state.
A government cannot defeat terrorism merely by issuing statements after every attack. Condemnation is necessary, but it is not a security policy. A serious strategy requires prevention, intelligence, policing, prosecution, border management, protection of vulnerable districts and political leadership.
The Afghan dimension of the crisis makes the situation even more complicated.
There have been claims that during the period under consideration, 260 terrorists killed in security operations were identified as Afghan nationals. There has also been a claim that of the 19 suicide attacks between January and September 2026, 12 suicide attackers were from Afghanistan. Such figures must be documented and independently verified, but the broader question of Afghan nationals and Afghan territory in Pakistan’s terrorism problem has become an increasingly prominent national-security concern.
Federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar has separately stated that Afghan nationals were involved in the suicide bombings recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2026. The issue therefore cannot simply be dismissed as a political argument. It requires evidence, investigation and a clear state policy.
If terrorist organizations are using Afghan territory to organize, train, finance or launch attacks against Pakistan, the issue becomes one of national security and defence rather than merely provincial law and order. It also becomes a matter that requires the provincial government to coordinate closely with federal authorities and security institutions.
The province should therefore have a clear position on cross-border terrorism. If attacks are being planned or launched from Afghan territory, the demand for those attacks to stop should be unequivocal. Afghan authorities should be asked to prevent their territory from being used against Pakistan and to take action against organizations responsible for terrorist violence.
Silence cannot be a strategy.
The situation has reached the point where Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security cannot be separated from Pakistan’s broader national-security policy. The provincial government has responsibilities, but so do the federal government, military institutions, intelligence agencies and diplomatic authorities. None can simply transfer the entire burden to another institution.
The responsibility must be shared.
At the same time, the provincial government must own everything that falls within its authority. It must protect its police force. It must strengthen intelligence coordination. It must improve administration in vulnerable districts. It must support victims’ families. It must ensure that terrorist suspects are prosecuted. And it must make full use of institutional mechanisms such as the Apex Committee and the provincial action plan.
The situation along the Afghanistan border has now made the challenge considerably more dangerous. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have entered an exceptionally difficult phase. Terrorism has continued to be a central point of disagreement, while Pakistan has increasingly responded through military action against what it describes as militant targets in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has argued that militant organizations operating from Afghan territory are responsible for attacks inside Pakistan. Afghan authorities have rejected Pakistani accusations and have condemned Pakistani military action on Afghan soil. The result is an increasingly dangerous cycle in which terrorism inside Pakistan produces military action across the border, which in turn risks further escalation.
The question is therefore no longer simply whether negotiations are taking place. The more important question is whether diplomacy can prevent the relationship from descending into a sustained cycle of retaliation.
Pakistan has used multiple diplomatic channels in its efforts to communicate its concerns to the Afghan authorities. China, Iran, Qatar, Türkiye and Russia have all had roles or interests in the wider regional diplomatic environment surrounding Afghanistan. These countries have different relationships with Kabul and Islamabad and different reasons for wanting regional stability.
The message from Pakistan has been consistent: Afghan territory must not be used by terrorist organizations to conduct attacks against Pakistan.
That message can be communicated once, twice or repeatedly. It can be communicated directly and through third countries. It can be communicated through diplomatic channels over one year, two years, three years or even four years if necessary. But the ultimate objective remains the same: terrorist organizations operating from Afghan territory must be stopped.
The danger arises when diplomatic pressure fails and military retaliation becomes the dominant instrument.
Pakistan has already demonstrated that it is prepared to strike militant targets in Afghanistan. Recent operations have been described by Pakistan as responses to terrorist attacks and as efforts to target militant infrastructure.
The situation has therefore moved beyond diplomatic accusations.
There is now a real possibility that another major terrorist attack in Pakistan could produce another military response across the border. That possibility should not be treated as a prediction, but the logic of escalation is clear. A major attack can generate pressure for retaliation; retaliation can provoke another response; and a series of responses can quickly become much more difficult to control.
The reported targeting of a compound in Kandahar was particularly significant because Kandahar is closely associated with the senior leadership of the Afghan Taliban. A strike on a location associated with senior Taliban leadership would represent a substantial escalation in the confrontation and could have consequences far beyond the immediate military operation.
The concern is therefore not only that there may be further strikes. The greater concern is that the next round of violence could be more dangerous than the previous one.
The sequence is already visible. A terrorist attack occurs in Kohat, Hangu, Kurram or elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan attributes responsibility to militant organizations operating from across the border. Pakistan conducts strikes. Afghanistan condemns those strikes. The possibility of retaliation increases. Pakistan then faces pressure to respond again.
That cycle is dangerous for everyone, but particularly for the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
They live closest to the consequences.
They experience the attacks directly. They experience the funerals. They experience the economic disruption. They experience the fear. And they are also exposed to the consequences of tensions along the Afghan border.
This is why the province cannot afford political paralysis.
The political leadership must demonstrate that it understands the scale of the challenge. If another major attack occurs, the state must be prepared not only to respond militarily but also to protect communities, communicate with the public and prevent panic.
There are difficult questions that require clear answers. Where is the comprehensive provincial counterterrorism strategy? How frequently is the Apex Committee meeting? What decisions have been taken? How is the provincial action plan being implemented? What additional resources have been provided to the police? How are vulnerable districts being protected? How is intelligence being coordinated with federal institutions? How are families of victims being supported? What is the government’s position on terrorism allegedly originating from Afghan territory? And what is its vision for the future of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations?
These are not partisan questions. They are governance questions. There is nothing wrong with political rallies, protests or democratic mobilization. Democracy depends on political competition and public participation. But government has another obligation: it must govern. A province experiencing terrorism cannot afford a situation in which political mobilization becomes more visible than security governance. The real test of leadership is not the size of a rally.
It is whether citizens feel protected when their community is attacked. The real measure of political seriousness is not the strength of a social-media campaign. It is whether police officers have the resources to do their jobs. It is whether intelligence reaches the relevant authorities before an attack.
It is whether terrorists are prosecuted after arrest. It is whether victims’ families receive support. And it is whether political leaders stand with the people when there is no immediate political benefit in doing so.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa needs ownership. That ownership does not mean that the provincial government can solve every dimension of terrorism alone. It cannot. Defence and foreign policy involve federal and national institutions. Cross-border military operations are not matters that a provincial government can conduct independently.
But provincial leadership can and must own the responsibilities that fall within its constitutional and administrative authority. It can convene the Apex Committee. It can implement its action plan. It can strengthen the police. It can improve coordination.
It can protect vulnerable communities. It can support the families of victims. It can speak clearly about terrorism. And it can make security a permanent priority rather than an issue that receives attention only after the next tragedy.
The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have already sacrificed too much. They have buried sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, brothers and colleagues.
They have watched police stations, markets, roads and public buildings become targets. They have lived with the fear that another explosion may occur at any moment. They should not also have to wonder whether political leaders are more concerned with the next rally than the next attack.
The province cannot afford a crisis in which terrorism becomes routine while political confrontation becomes the dominant story. It cannot afford institutions blaming one another while militants exploit the gaps between them. It cannot afford a policy that consists primarily of condemnation after every attack.
And it cannot afford an uncontrolled escalation with Afghanistan in which each terrorist attack produces a military response and each military response produces another escalation. What Khyber Pakhtunkhwa needs is a coordinated strategy in which provincial and federal authorities understand their respective responsibilities and work together. It needs effective policing, accurate intelligence, political ownership, functioning institutions and a clear national policy toward Afghanistan. It also needs honesty.
If the number of terrorist incidents is 4,200 according to one dataset and 2,456 according to another, the state should explain the methodology and establish an authoritative record. If 260 militants are identified as Afghan nationals, the evidence should be documented. If 12 of 19 suicide attackers are identified as Afghans, the relevant evidence should be presented. If militant organizations are operating from Afghan territory, Pakistan should make the case through diplomatic and international channels. If military action becomes necessary, its objectives and consequences should be understood.
Facts matter. Accountability matters. But above all, lives matter. The fundamental issue is not which political party can produce the strongest narrative. It is whether the state can protect its citizens.
The fundamental question is not who can hold the largest rally. It is who can provide the clearest security policy. The fundamental test is not who can win the next political confrontation. It is whether the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can live without fear.
The province is at a critical moment. The security crisis is intertwined with politics, governance, national defence and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The consequences of failure will not be borne by political leaders alone. They will be borne by ordinary citizens, police officers, soldiers, families and communities. That is why the political leadership of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa must demonstrate ownership now—not after another attack, not after another funeral and not after another escalation along the Afghan border. The people need their government to be present. They need institutions to function.
They need policies to be implemented. They need leaders to stand with them. And they need a state that treats their security not as a political talking point, but as its most fundamental responsibility. For Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ownership is not a slogan. It is the first test of governance. And at a time when terrorism is once again threatening the peace of the province, that test cannot be postponed.
