There were some positive signs after the Urumqi talks.
For a brief moment, it appeared that the difficult and strained relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan was beginning to move toward stability. The statements emerging after the China-hosted talks suggested progress. It seemed the Afghan Taliban had started to understand the seriousness of Pakistan’s concerns, while Pakistan’s diplomacy appeared to be producing results.
There are indications, though unconfirmed publicly, that action has been taken against Pakistani terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. According to sources linked to these groups, some of their members have been arrested and shifted to GDI centres rather than ordinary prisons. Reports further suggest that Afghan nationals involved in or facilitating terrorist attacks in Pakistan have also been detained.
The Afghan Taliban are unlikely to admit this openly. Public acknowledgement would amount to a major confession that Pakistani terrorist groups have indeed been operating from Afghan soil, something they have consistently denied. Instead, when casualties occur in Pakistani strikes, the explanation often shifts, with claims that those killed were refugees or displaced people from Waziristan.
This contradiction lies at the heart of the current crisis.
On one side, there are positive diplomatic signals and constructive statements from key Afghan officials like Amir Khan Muttaqi. On the other, there are fresh clashes along the border.
The first major flash-point emerged in Angoor Adda, South Waziristan, where mortar shells were reportedly fired from across the border, injuring civilians, including women. Pakistan responded by targeting and destroying the gun position allegedly used in the attack.
Tensions also flared at the Chaman-Spin Boldak border crossing, where casualties were reported on both sides, including the martyrdom of Pakistani security personnel.
Then came the reported attack on Jamaluddin Afghani University in Kunar’s Asadabad. Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of carrying out the strike, and Pakistan’s diplomatic representative in Kabul was summoned and handed a formal protest.
Pakistan categorically denied the allegation, stating it had carried out no land, air, or drone strike in Kunar.
That denial raises a critical question: if Pakistan did not carry out the attack, then who did?
This incident requires a joint and transparent investigation. It is entirely possible that hostile elements are attempting to create misunderstandings between two neighbours whose relations had shown signs of improvement after the Urumqi talks.
There may be forces that benefit from worsening ties between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan’s ongoing Operation Ghazab Lil Haq remains active. The state has publicly claimed to have eliminated hundreds of terrorists, destroyed hostile positions, and targeted infrastructure used by anti-Pakistan elements inside Afghanistan. In previous cases, Pakistan has acknowledged operations in Kabul, Kandahar, and eastern provinces when it believed legitimate terrorist targets were struck.
Had Pakistan carried out the Kunar university strike, it is reasonable to assume it would have said so.
This is why the Afghan Taliban should approach the matter calmly and investigate before escalating rhetoric.
If reports of arrests of Pakistani terrorist elements are true, then it becomes even clearer why some actors may wish to sabotage improving Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Improved ties would mean the end of safe havens, training centres, recruitment pipelines, and operational freedom for anti-Pakistan terrorist groups.
Such groups have every reason to create chaos.
And there is another factor.
The word “proxy” cannot be ignored in this discussion.
According to the United Nations, between 5,000 and 7,000 terrorists are present in Afghanistan, particularly in eastern provinces. Russia has claimed there are as many as 23,000 foreign terrorists in the country.
These groups require food, shelter, money, logistics, and operational support. Thousands of armed men cannot survive without networks sustaining them.
Questions naturally arise about who funds them and who benefits from their continued existence.
India’s RAW is frequently named in such discussions, and in the current geopolitical climate, it is difficult to ignore the possibility of proxy warfare. If Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China move toward a stable understanding, it would undermine efforts aimed at keeping Pakistan destabilised through violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.’
India cannot afford direct confrontation after its humiliating defeat in May 2025, so proxies remain a likely tool.
The worsening situation can only improve if both sides adopt restraint.
The negative use of social media is worsening the crisis. Exaggerated claims, inflammatory narratives, and propaganda are adding fuel to the fire.
Afghan media increasingly portrays Pakistan in hostile terms, often ignoring the reality that Pakistan itself remains one of the biggest victims of terrorism. Pakistan has endured attacks on mosques, imambargahs, schools, roads, bridges, health centres, and security installations. The Army Public School tragedy remains one of the darkest examples.
Pakistan has repeatedly shared evidence that leaders of TTP, BLA, Gul Bahadur Group, Itehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and Lashkar-e-Islam are present in Afghanistan.
Operation Ghazab Lil Haq is not against Afghanistan, its people, or even the Afghan Taliban. It specifically targets terrorists using Afghan soil to launch attacks inside Pakistan.
Even many Afghans are reportedly frustrated. Voices on social media from Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, and Kandahar increasingly argue that these terrorists should be arrested, expelled, or handed over to Pakistan.
Pakistan’s issue with Afghanistan is not trade. It is not cross-border movement. It is not refugees.
The issue is security.
Because of this unresolved issue, borders remain closed, trade is suffering, and both countries are paying the economic and political cost.
China’s diplomatic process has undoubtedly suffered a setback, but it is not over.
The Urumqi process will continue because influential tribal elders, religious scholars, and political figures on both sides still want peace. China, as host and mediator, is also deeply invested in ensuring the process survives.
However, repeated border clashes and provocative statements, such as threats of revenge over the university incident, can delay progress and deepen mistrust.
The same applies internally.
Jirgas and meetings alone cannot solve the crisis.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen multiple jirgas in tribal districts, the provincial assembly, and the Chief Minister’s House. Yet the fundamental question remains: how many of their decisions were implemented?
Responsibility cannot be placed solely on the KP government. Nor can the federal government, the military, the FC, police, or CTD solve the problem alone.
This is a national challenge.
It requires unity, coordination, and one clear policy.
Without collective intent and implementation, we will continue to play the same game of jirga jirga the way we have been doing so far.
