Twenty-five years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, al-Qaeda has once again turned to the legacy of its founding generation, releasing a lengthy propaganda production that places the image and voice of Hamza bin Laden, son of former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, at the centre of its latest media narrative.
Al-Qaeda’s media arm, As-Sahab, released a roughly 52-minute video in September 2026 marking the 25th anniversary of 9/11. The production contains previously unseen footage of Hamza bin Laden, alongside archival material and footage involving former al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The appearance is particularly significant because the United States announced in 2019 that Hamza bin Laden had been killed in a counterterrorism operation, while al-Qaeda itself had not publicly confirmed his death or issued the type of formal eulogy it had used for other senior figures.
The release therefore does more than revisit the history of 9/11. It places a member of the bin Laden family back at the centre of al-Qaeda’s public messaging and raises renewed questions about how the organization intends to preserve its historical identity while operating under a dispersed and increasingly fragmented global structure.
The timing of the video is notable. Released around the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the production draws heavily on al-Qaeda’s historical narrative, revisiting Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the events that shaped the organization during the past quarter-century.
The inclusion of Hamza is particularly striking. Rather than relying solely on archival images of Osama bin Laden, the video introduces a younger member of the bin Laden family into the narrative, effectively connecting the organization’s founding generation with a potential second-generation image.
Analysts have consequently examined the appearance as an attempt to reinforce continuity between al-Qaeda’s historical leadership and its contemporary messaging. Recent analysis has described the video as an effort to bring Hamza back into public view at a moment when the organization has gone years without publicly identifying a new leader.
The footage does not, by itself, establish Hamza bin Laden’s current status, role or whereabouts. However, his inclusion in the production is significant because it demonstrates the continuing propaganda value of the bin Laden name for al-Qaeda. For al-Qaeda, the bin Laden name carries considerable historical weight. Osama bin Laden transformed the organization from a relatively small militant network into a globally recognized terrorist organization and became its most recognizable figure.
Ayman al-Zawahiri subsequently assumed the leadership following bin Laden’s death in 2011 and remained a central figure in al-Qaeda’s ideological and organizational structure until his death in a U.S. drone strike in Kabul in July 2022. The new As-Sahab production brings these figures together through archival footage while placing Hamza bin Laden within the same historical narrative. The result is a deliberate visual and ideological bridge between al-Qaeda’s past and its present.
The organization has survived the deaths of its founding leaders, the loss of territorial safe havens, sustained international counterterrorism operations and the fragmentation of its wider network. Its affiliates continue to operate across several regions, allowing al-Qaeda to maintain a decentralized structure despite the disappearance of its most prominent historical leaders.
The development also brings renewed attention to the long and complex relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. That relationship dates back to the 1990s, when the Afghan civil war and the rise of the Taliban created an environment in which al-Qaeda established a significant presence in Afghanistan. The relationship continued through the Taliban’s first period in power, the September 11 attacks, the subsequent U.S.-led intervention, two decades of insurgency and the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.
The death of Osama bin Laden did not end the relationship, nor did the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in 2022 resolve questions surrounding al-Qaeda’s continued presence in Afghanistan. United Nations reporting has repeatedly raised concerns regarding al-Qaeda’s continued presence and activities in Afghanistan. A UN Monitoring Team report stated that al-Qaeda provides ideological guidance to various groups and can act as a source of training, advice and logistical support. The report also assessed that the Taliban continued to host and support al-Qaeda, while Taliban authorities continued to reject claims that al-Qaeda maintains an operational presence in the country.
These competing positions remain central to the broader debate surrounding Afghanistan’s security environment.
The issue extends beyond al-Qaeda itself. UN reporting has documented the presence and activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant organizations operating from or maintaining networks inside Afghanistan. Earlier UN reporting also described cooperation and interaction involving al-Qaeda, TTP and other militant actors.
Al-Qaeda’s regional branch, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), has also been identified in UN reporting as maintaining a presence in Afghanistan. Previous UN assessments estimated AQIS at approximately 180–200 fighters and identified its presence across several Afghan provinces.
These assessments highlight a security environment in which militant organizations do not necessarily operate as isolated entities. Instead, networks can overlap through ideological influence, training, logistical assistance, personal relationships and organizational affiliations.
The timing of the new al-Qaeda video is also significant in another respect. Five years have passed since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. During that period, Taliban authorities have repeatedly rejected allegations that Afghanistan is being used as a base by foreign terrorist organizations.
At the same time, international monitoring bodies have continued to express concerns about the presence and activities of terrorist organizations inside the country.
The issue remains particularly sensitive because Afghanistan’s political transformation has fundamentally altered the environment in which these organizations operate. The Taliban are no longer solely an insurgent movement fighting an international military presence; they are the de facto authorities governing Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, no longer possesses the same centralized structure and global visibility associated with the era of Osama bin Laden. Its contemporary model is more dispersed, with affiliated and aligned groups operating across South Asia, Africa and other regions.
The emergence of Hamza bin Laden in al-Qaeda’s latest media production therefore carries significance beyond the footage itself. Osama bin Laden is dead. Ayman al-Zawahiri is dead. Mullah Mohammad Omar, the founder of the Taliban, is also dead. Yet the names associated with the founding generation continue to appear in the political, security and propaganda narratives surrounding Afghanistan and the wider militant landscape.
Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, has emerged as a senior figure within the Taliban government and serves as Afghanistan’s defence minister. The continued prominence of members of the founders’ families illustrates how personal lineage and historical associations remain intertwined with the region’s political and militant narratives.
Al-Qaeda’s decision to place Hamza bin Laden in its latest anniversary production adds another dimension to that generational story.
The significance of Hamza’s appearance does not necessarily depend on whether he currently occupies a formal leadership position within al-Qaeda. His value to the organization may instead lie partly in what his name represents.
Osama bin Laden remains one of the most recognizable figures in the history of modern jihadist terrorism. By bringing his son into a major anniversary production, al-Qaeda can invoke that historical identity without relying exclusively on its deceased founder.
The video consequently raises a broader question about how terrorist organizations preserve their narratives after the deaths of their founding figures: Can a movement maintain its ideological identity by transferring its symbols, names and historical narratives from one generation to another?
That question is particularly relevant to al-Qaeda, which has experienced significant organizational change since 2001.
The appearance of Hamza bin Laden illustrates the broader challenge confronting al-Qaeda and similar organizations: maintaining continuity while adapting to a radically different strategic environment. The organization that carried out the September 11 attacks operated in a world dramatically different from the one it faces today. Its leadership has been repeatedly targeted, its senior figures eliminated, its communications disrupted and its network fragmented into regional affiliates.
Yet its propaganda continues to draw heavily on its historical legacy. The latest As-Sahab production demonstrates that the organization still considers the events of September 11 and the legacy of Osama bin Laden central to its messaging. At the same time, the prominence given to Hamza indicates an apparent effort to connect that history with a younger generation.
Whether this represents a broader organizational strategy, a propaganda exercise built around symbolism, or an indication of a deeper role for the younger bin Laden remains a matter for further intelligence and analytical assessment.
Twenty-five years after 9/11, the militant landscape has changed substantially but the ideological narratives that emerged during that period have not disappeared. The return of Hamza bin Laden to al-Qaeda’s propaganda narrative serves as a reminder that terrorist organizations can preserve historical symbols long after their original leaders have disappeared.
For Afghanistan and the wider region, the issue is further complicated by the continued presence of multiple militant networks and the unresolved debate over the relationship between these groups and the country’s de facto authorities. The central question is therefore no longer simply who leads al-Qaeda.
It is whether the organization’s names, networks, narratives and ideological legacy can survive another generational transition. The founders are gone. Their era has passed. But twenty-five years after 9/11, al-Qaeda is once again placing the son of its most famous founder before its audience suggesting that, at least in its propaganda narrative, the story of the first generation is far from finished.
