Serious concerns have emerged over the continuing presence and activities of international and regional militant networks in Afghanistan, with United Nations monitoring reports cited by former US intelligence officer and South Asian security analyst Will Selber indicating that Al-Qaeda training camps are operating across 14 Afghan provinces.
In a revealing interview with Pakistan TV Digital’s programme Across the Line, Selber, a former US Air Force lieutenant colonel, delivered a stark assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan, warning that the Afghan Taliban have neither severed their longstanding relationships with Al-Qaeda nor demonstrated any genuine willingness to take decisive action against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
His remarks come at a particularly critical time, as tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban continue to escalate, cross-border hostilities intensify, and Pakistan faces persistent terrorist attacks that it attributes to militant networks operating from Afghan territory.
Selber’s assessment challenges the Taliban’s repeated assurances that Afghan soil will not be used against other countries, raising serious questions about Kabul’s commitments, counterterrorism obligations and willingness to prevent armed groups from using Afghanistan as a sanctuary.
Addressing the possibility of Pakistan persuading the Afghan Taliban to take meaningful action against the TTP, Selber offered little encouragement.
“Good luck. It’s not going to happen,” he said, expressing deep scepticism about the prospects of any substantial Taliban action against the Pakistani militant group.
According to Selber, the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP is not simply a matter of political convenience or temporary cooperation. Rather, it is rooted in longstanding ideological, organisational and personal connections.
He described the relationship as one involving close ties, with the Taliban viewing these fighters as allies and members of their extended militant family.
While the Afghan Taliban may seek to prevent militant activities that could directly threaten their own interests, Selber argued that this should not be mistaken for a willingness to dismantle the TTP’s presence or prevent it from operating inside Afghanistan.
His assessment suggests that Pakistan’s security concerns cannot be addressed through diplomatic assurances alone unless Kabul demonstrates a measurable commitment to preventing cross-border terrorism.
Selber also rejected claims that Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan represents a recently developed security problem.
He maintained that the Taliban had preserved their connections with Al-Qaeda despite nearly two decades of US and NATO military operations in the country.
To substantiate his assessment, he referred to the discovery of one of the largest Al-Qaeda training camps in southern Afghanistan by US forces in 2015, when American troops were still deployed in the country.
He argued that the group’s infrastructure and operational presence in Afghanistan had existed long before the Taliban returned to power in August 2021.
Selber further recalled that, following the September 11 attacks, the Taliban had been given opportunities to surrender Osama bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaeda figures but refused to do so.
Drawing a parallel between that history and the Taliban’s present-day denials regarding TTP activities, he observed that the current situation reflects a longstanding pattern rather than a fundamental change in the group’s approach. “This is not that different,” he said.
The references to Al-Qaeda’s continued presence and the reported existence of training facilities across 14 Afghan provinces underscore the importance of independently verifying the scale of militant infrastructure and assessing its implications for regional and international security.
Selber argued that the Taliban have become increasingly confident since regaining control of Afghanistan in 2021.
He pointed to Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban administration and expanding diplomatic engagement by several other countries as developments that have strengthened the group’s international position without requiring meaningful concessions on its policies or relationships.
In his assessment, the international community’s expectation that the Taliban would moderate their conduct after assuming power has largely failed to materialise.
Instead, he argued, the Taliban have retained their hard-line ideological outlook while consolidating their military capabilities and gaining access to substantial quantities of Western military equipment left behind during the US withdrawal.
This combination of political consolidation, military resources and continuing relationships with militant organisations presents a complicated security environment for neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan.
Commenting on Pakistan’s military capabilities and the possibility of deterring the Afghan Taliban through military pressure, Selber cautioned against underestimating the group’s confidence and determination.
“They defeated the United States,” he said, noting that many within the Taliban movement believe they can withstand or defeat any adversary.
His remarks highlight the limitations of relying exclusively on military superiority to influence the Taliban’s strategic calculations.





