(Mushtaq Yusufzai)
Few bilateral relationships in South Asia are as consequential and as complicated as that between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bound together by geography, history, culture, trade, and millions of cross-border family ties, the two countries have also been trapped in a cycle of mistrust, insecurity, and conflicting strategic calculations. Today, that relationship appears to be at one of its most delicate moments since the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021.
The expectations in Pakistan were significantly different nearly five years ago. Many believed that the end of the two-decade conflict in Afghanistan would usher in an era of regional stability. There was optimism that the new authorities in Kabul would ensure that Afghan territory would not be used against Pakistan. Instead, relations have steadily deteriorated, border tensions have intensified, security concerns have multiplied, and terrorism has once again emerged as one of the defining challenges confronting Pakistan.
The present reality demands more than emotional rhetoric or political point-scoring. It requires a sober assessment of why bilateral relations have deteriorated, how militant groups have evolved, and what both Islamabad and Kabul must do if they genuinely seek peace and regional stability.
When the Taliban assumed power in Kabul in August 2021, many in Pakistan viewed the development through the prism of opportunity rather than crisis. The assumption was simple: with ideological affinity and historical engagement between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, security cooperation would improve, particularly against anti-Pakistan militant groups. That expectation, however, has not translated into reality.
Instead of witnessing improved cooperation, Pakistan has repeatedly expressed concern over attacks allegedly launched by militant groups operating from Afghan territory. Relations have become increasingly strained, and border management has become one of the most contentious issues between the two neighbours. The deterioration is reflected not only in diplomatic exchanges but also in practical realities. Border crossings have faced repeated closures, disrupting commerce, separating families, and damaging local economies on both sides of the Durand Line. Every closure carries significant economic and humanitarian consequences, particularly for ordinary Afghans who rely heavily on trade with Pakistan.
This situation benefits neither country. Pakistan remains Afghanistan’s most important trade corridor to the sea, while Afghanistan represents an important regional market and strategic partner for Pakistan’s vision of regional connectivity. Stable relations are therefore not merely desirable they are economically indispensable.
One principle remains universally accepted in international relations: no state’s territory should be allowed to serve as a launching pad for attacks against another state. This principle is central to Pakistan’s concerns. Islamabad has consistently argued that militant organizations, particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), continue to enjoy operational space inside Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that unless these sanctuaries are dismantled, military successes inside Pakistan alone cannot produce lasting peace. From Pakistan’s perspective, the issue is straightforward.
If militant leaders enjoy safe havens, uninterrupted financing, logistical networks, and freedom of movement across borders, security operations inside Pakistan merely address symptoms rather than root causes. Whether Kabul accepts Pakistan’s assessment entirely or not, the broader reality remains that confidence between the two countries cannot improve unless both sides address each other’s security concerns seriously.
The Afghan Taliban also face their own complex set of challenges. Despite controlling Afghanistan since 2021, they have yet to secure broad international recognition. The country continues to suffer severe economic hardship, sanctions-related constraints, declining foreign investment, humanitarian crises, and dependence on international aid. These circumstances inevitably shape Kabul’s foreign policy calculations. Observers argue that Afghanistan’s leadership sometimes feels frustrated by what it perceives as insufficient international engagement despite bringing an end to decades of war.
Yet international legitimacy cannot emerge solely from military victory. Recognition depends upon responsible governance, adherence to international commitments, protection of basic rights, and constructive regional diplomacy. No country today can afford prolonged diplomatic isolation. For Afghanistan, improved relations with immediate neighbours including Pakistan remain one of the quickest pathways toward greater regional integration.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the present situation is that terrorism threatens both Pakistan and Afghanistan. While Pakistan continues to suffer from attacks targeting civilians and security personnel, Afghanistan itself faces security threats from various militant organizations operating within its borders. Extremism has historically respected neither borders nor political ideologies. Groups frequently cooperate when tactical interests converge, even when their ideological objectives differ substantially. Understanding this distinction is essential.
One of the most important security developments highlighted by analysts is the apparent operational convergence between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and elements associated with Baloch militant organizations, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Although these organizations pursue fundamentally different political objectives, they increasingly appear capable of tactical cooperation.
The distinction matters. The TTP seeks to overthrow Pakistan’s existing constitutional order and replace it with its own interpretation of governance based on its ideological worldview. The BLA, on the other hand, pursues a separatist nationalist agenda, rejecting Pakistan’s sovereignty over Balochistan. Their visions for the future could hardly be more different. Yet both view the Pakistani state as their principal adversary. That shared adversary creates incentives for cooperation in training, logistics, intelligence-sharing, and operational coordination. History offers numerous examples where ideologically incompatible militant organizations have collaborated against common targets despite holding contradictory long-term objectives.
Security analysts have argued that militant cooperation extends beyond ideological solidarity. One area of concern is the transfer of tactical expertise. According to several assessments, militant organizations possessing years of insurgency experience may have shared expertise in areas such as:
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Guerrilla warfare tactics
- Ambush planning
- Operational security
- Recruitment methods
- Cross-border movement
Such exchanges significantly enhance the operational capabilities of otherwise smaller organizations. If such cooperation continues, Pakistan’s security environment becomes increasingly complex because law enforcement agencies must confront interconnected rather than isolated threats.
Another important observation concerns local acceptance. Militant organizations cannot sustain prolonged insurgencies without varying degrees of local facilitation. Analysts have frequently noted that the TTP struggled historically to establish enduring influence in parts of Balochistan because it lacked meaningful grassroots support. Similarly, experience in Pakistan’s former tribal districts demonstrated that sustained public rejection significantly weakened militant networks over time. Communities eventually recognized that harbouring militants invited military operations, violence, displacement, and economic hardship.
Local populations increasingly refused to provide shelter, food, or logistical assistance. This shift played a major role in reducing militant influence in several regions. The lesson is clear. Counterterrorism is not achieved through military operations alone. It also depends upon public trust, effective governance, economic development, and cooperation between citizens and state institutions.
Pakistan’s armed forces, Frontier Corps, police, intelligence agencies, and numerous other security institutions have made enormous sacrifices over the past two decades. Thousands of security personnel have lost their lives combating terrorism. Significant military operations succeeded in dismantling major militant infrastructure inside Pakistan.
Yet even the most successful military campaigns face limitations. Counterterrorism experts generally identify three essential enablers that allow militant organizations to survive:
First, financing.
Every insurgency requires continuous financial resources for recruitment, transportation, communications, propaganda, weapons, salaries, and operational planning.
Second, safe havens.
Militant groups become significantly harder to eliminate if they enjoy sanctuary beyond the immediate reach of security forces.
Third, logistics.
Weapons, ammunition, medicines, communications equipment, transportation, food supplies, and movement networks enable organizations to sustain long-term insurgencies.
Unless these three pillars are disrupted simultaneously, military operations alone rarely produce permanent success. This principle has been demonstrated repeatedly across multiple conflict zones worldwide. Pakistan and Afghanistan possess shared security interests whether political disagreements acknowledge them or not. Terrorist organizations exploit diplomatic tensions. Whenever bilateral relations deteriorate, militant networks often gain operational space.
Conversely, whenever intelligence cooperation improves, militant groups find it increasingly difficult to exploit border regions. Regular intelligence exchanges, coordinated border management, joint verification mechanisms, and sustained diplomatic engagement remain among the most effective tools available to both governments. Security cannot be achieved through unilateral measures alone.
Another issue frequently discussed within Pakistan’s strategic community concerns Afghanistan’s evolving engagement with India. Some recent public statements by Afghan figures have generated debate regarding the future trajectory of Kabul’s regional partnerships. Every sovereign nation possesses the right to establish diplomatic and economic relations with countries of its choosing.
Afghanistan is no exception. However, Pakistan’s principal concern remains consistent regardless of which external partners Afghanistan develops. Islamabad expects that Afghan territory should not be used by hostile actors to facilitate attacks against Pakistan. This expectation aligns with accepted international norms governing relations between neighbouring states.
The issue, therefore, is not Afghanistan’s right to diversify its foreign relations. The issue is ensuring that no external rivalry transforms Afghan territory into another arena for proxy competition. South Asia has already paid an enormous price for decades of geopolitical rivalry. The region can scarcely afford another cycle.
Modern conflicts are fought not only with weapons but also through narratives. Social media has amplified misinformation, emotional propaganda, and inflammatory rhetoric capable of deepening mistrust between neighbouring societies. A relatively small number of highly active voices can create the impression of widespread hostility. This should concern policymakers. Pakistan and Afghanistan share centuries of religious, linguistic, cultural, commercial, and familial connections. Millions of Afghans have lived, studied, worked, and built businesses in Pakistan over the past four decades. Likewise, countless Pakistanis continue to express deep affection for the Afghan people despite political disagreements. These human relationships should not become casualties of political tensions.
Perhaps the most important distinction often overlooked in heated debates is the difference between governments and ordinary citizens. Political disagreements between states should never translate into hostility toward entire populations. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees over several decades one of the largest and longest refugee-hosting experiences in modern history. Afghan traders, labourers, students, entrepreneurs, and professionals continue contributing to Pakistan’s social and economic life. Similarly, many Pakistanis maintain close personal and family relationships across the border.
Ordinary people frequently demonstrate greater wisdom than political discourse suggests. Markets, neighbourhoods, universities, and workplaces across Pakistan illustrate that coexistence remains entirely possible. This human dimension deserves protection.
History repeatedly demonstrates that neighbours cannot relocate. Pakistan and Afghanistan will continue sharing geography regardless of political disagreements. The only question is whether that geography becomes a bridge or a battlefield. Diplomatic engagement must therefore remain continuous—even during periods of severe tension. Regular high-level dialogue, intelligence cooperation, border coordination, trade facilitation, refugee management, and counterterrorism mechanisms should not become victims of political disagreements. Strong diplomatic institutions exist precisely to manage difficult relationships. Silence rarely solves strategic disputes. Dialogue often does.
Pakistan’s prosperity cannot be fully realized without a stable Afghanistan. Similarly, Afghanistan’s long-term economic recovery will remain difficult without constructive relations with Pakistan. Regional connectivity projects linking Central Asia, South Asia, and the Arabian Sea require trust between Islamabad and Kabul. Trade, energy corridors, transit routes, and infrastructure projects all depend upon security cooperation. Both governments therefore possess powerful incentives to rebuild confidence. Neither country benefits from escalating hostility. Neither benefits from terrorism. Neither benefits from closed borders. Neither benefits from proxy conflicts.
Pakistan and Afghanistan stand at a pivotal moment. The choices made today will shape not only bilateral relations but also the broader security architecture of the region. The challenge is undeniably serious. Terrorist violence, diplomatic mistrust, border tensions, and competing regional interests have complicated one of South Asia’s most important relationships. Yet history also demonstrates that crises can become turning points if leaders possess the political will to pursue dialogue over confrontation.
For Pakistan, ensuring national security remains non-negotiable. For Afghanistan, achieving stability, international legitimacy, and economic recovery requires responsible engagement with its neighbours. These objectives are not mutually exclusive they are complementary. The central principle should remain simple and universally accepted: no country should allow its territory to be used against another. If this commitment is translated into practical cooperation, many of today’s security concerns can gradually be addressed.
Ultimately, the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan share far more than the politics that occasionally divide them. They share history, faith, commerce, language, culture, and an enduring geographic destiny. The future of the region will not be determined by militant organizations or inflammatory rhetoric. It will be shaped by whether Islamabad and Kabul choose confrontation or cooperation. The stakes could not be higher.
