Abdul Basit
Pakistan’s latest counterterrorism operation in Balochistan, where security forces eliminated BLA terrorists in Quetta and Kachhi, is only the most recent chapter in a long, grinding war. Similar intelligence-based operations are being carried out almost daily across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, targeting banned outfits such as the TTP, BLA, BLF and their affiliates.
From Bajaur to Bannu, from North and South Waziristan to Tank, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Upper Dir and Lower Dir, and from Quetta to Dera Bugti and the remote belts of Balochistan, security forces continue to disrupt terrorist networks, neutralise key operatives, dismantle hideouts and recover weapons and explosives. The cost, however, remains heavy. Terrorist retaliation continues in the form of suicide attacks, IED blasts, targeted killings and assaults on security installations.
There is little room for doubt on one point. Pakistan’s security forces are doing their job, and doing it effectively. The steady elimination of senior terrorist leadership stands as evidence. In recent months alone, figures such as Mazahim, the second-in-command of the banned TTP after Noor Wali Mehsud, along with Zubair, Kama Masli, Umar Marri alias Dakashi and other senior operatives of Balochistan-based terror outfits, have been neutralised.
Equally undeniable is the role of the people. In the most terror-affected regions, the population is not a passive spectator.
When the People Become the Frontline
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, tribes from Bajaur’s Tali and sub-tribes of Salarzai, to Bannu’s Hati Khel and Takhti Khel, and communities across North and South Waziristan, Lakki Marwat, Karak and Dir, have repeatedly stood against terrorism. In Balochistan, Bugti, Lango, Chakrani and other tribes have formed lashkars and aman committees, sharing intelligence, resisting terrorist influence and, in many cases, paying a heavy price for their defiance.
A recent viral video from Balochistan captures this reality vividly. Armed tribesmen are seen guarding far-flung areas, filling gaps where terrain and distance stretch security resources thin, and openly challenging terrorists from outfits such as the BLA and BLF. It is a rare and powerful image of a society refusing to surrender.
Taken together, the picture is clear. Security forces are striking hard. The people are standing firm. Terrorist leadership is under sustained pressure. And yet, the war drags on.
This leads to the unavoidable question.
Why is Pakistan’s war on terror taking so long?
Rather than offering conclusions, it may be more honest, and more responsible, to frame the problem as a set of questions for national reflection.
Internally, are terrorist groups still benefiting from facilitators and sympathisers embedded within society, logistics networks or local power structures? Is the persistence of terrorism a sign that while fighters are eliminated, support systems remain resilient?
Does political confrontation play a role, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the PTI governs the province while PML-N leads at the centre, and relations between major political forces remain deeply adversarial? Does political polarisation weaken coordination, messaging and long-term counterterrorism policy?
Are governance gaps, development delays and unresolved grievances in former merged districts and remote parts of Balochistan creating spaces that terrorists continue to exploit, despite military pressure?
Externally, is Pakistan’s war on terror prolonged because India, even after nearly eight decades, remains unwilling to accept Pakistan as a sovereign, resilient and independent state, a country that cannot be taken for granted or coerced, and must be dealt with on equal footing? Is New Delhi’s persistent denial, hostility and use of covert means, including sponsorship and facilitation of terrorism, a central reason why Pakistan continues to face security challenges despite sustained internal successes?
Or, is the war dragging on because Afghanistan, under the Afghan Taliban, has once again become a hub of terrorism, posing a threat not only to the region but to global security?
For Pakistan, is the evidence not stark enough, in the form of terrorist sanctuaries across the border, operational freedom for banned outfits, and a Kabul regime that increasingly appears aligned with Indian interests rather than regional stability?
Or is Pakistan entangled in a wider geopolitical contest, where regional and global players have an interest in keeping the country strategically distracted, economically strained and internally preoccupied with security challenges?
These questions do not offer easy answers, nor should they. What they do offer is a framework for public debate.
Pakistan’s war on terror is not failing. By most operational measures, it is succeeding. But its length, its cost and its persistence demand deeper examination, not in the language of blame, but in the spirit of accountability and strategic clarity.
Perhaps the real question for Pakistan today is not whether it is winning, but why, despite unity, sacrifice and success, the finish line still feels so distant.
