Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions are likely to continue escalating, and I believe Pakistan’s airstrikes inside Afghanistan will increase in the coming days. The fundamental reason is that the Afghan Taliban are still unwilling to accept what various countries, international organizations and forums, including the United Nations and the European Union, have repeatedly highlighted: Afghan soil is being used by terrorist groups to launch attacks against Pakistan and other countries.
There are more than two dozen terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan, and these groups are being backed, supported and sponsored by the Taliban regime and certain other countries, including India. This is not merely Pakistan’s position. It has become an international concern.
At the recent annual meeting of the United Nations, almost every country, with India being the exception, identified Afghanistan as a hub of terrorist organizations and expressed serious concern over the situation. China has been particularly vocal in raising these concerns, while the United States and Pakistan have also consistently highlighted the issue.
The international community is increasingly recognizing the threat posed by terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan. Yet the Taliban regime continues to refuse to address the problem in a meaningful way.
International Mediators Are Stepping Back
An important development in this context was the visit of the Turkish intelligence chief, who first traveled to Kabul and then to Islamabad.
An editorial in an English-language newspaper discussed the significance of this visit and suggested that the Turkish intelligence chief had advised Pakistan to deal with Afghanistan in its own way.
What does this indicate? It suggests that countries that had previously engaged with Pakistan as third parties or advisory groups are now stepping back from the process.
Some people have suggested that the Turkish intelligence chief visited the region to facilitate negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I do not agree with that interpretation.
Three reports were published in a single week by major international media organizations, including CNN, The New York Times and The Washington Post. According to the interpretation presented in those reports, the Turkish intelligence chief had traveled to Kabul to warn the Afghan Taliban government about the threat posed by terrorist organizations.
Turkey itself faces a serious challenge from Daesh-Khorasan, and the Turkish side was concerned about the activities of such groups and wanted the Taliban to bring them under control.
When the Turkish intelligence chief arrived in Islamabad, there may have been some discussion about Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. However, I can say with confidence that he did not ask Pakistan to settle its differences with Afghanistan through negotiations.
The real significance of the visit, in my view, was his meeting with Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir and the chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence.
The message conveyed during that meeting was that Turkey had reached the end of its efforts on this issue and that Pakistan would have to deal with the situation according to its own assessment.
Shortly afterward, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kunar and Paktika.
Pakistan’s Strikes Targeted Taliban Installations and Terrorist Hideouts
The strikes in Kunar and Paktika were extremely significant. In my assessment, their impact was even more devastating than the attacks carried out in Kabul.
The scale of destruction and the manner in which the targets were struck were particularly noteworthy.
There were two important aspects to these operations.
First, at around 4:05 p.m., an Afghan government depot was targeted. The facility reportedly included Mullah Sarai, the former residence of Mullah Muhammad Omar.
Second, reports emerged that the centers of two banned terrorist organizations were also targeted in the strikes.
A similar pattern was followed in Khost, where two locations associated with Noor Wali Mehsud were targeted. These were camps used by his group.
In Paktia, the same approach was adopted against the group led by Gul Bahadur, which had been involved in recent attacks inside Pakistan.
The operations in Khost and Paktia also targeted the armed depots of these groups.
The objective, as I understand it, was not limited to striking isolated locations. The operations were directed against the infrastructure, camps and weapons depots of terrorist organizations operating from Afghan territory.
Following the strikes, the Afghan Taliban responded by deploying drones. In my view, those drone activities were primarily intended to score political points and create an impression of retaliation.
However, the situation along the border had already been deteriorating.
Two or three days before the strikes, clashes had taken place in Kurram. Pakistani forces had also entered Afghan territory and captured two checkpoints, according to the information available to us.
A similar development was reported near Chaman, in the Gulistan area, where Pakistani forces had entered the area and captured two or three checkpoints.
These developments indicate that the confrontation is no longer limited to diplomatic exchanges or isolated incidents. It is becoming a broader security confrontation.
I believe Pakistan’s operations inside Afghanistan will continue and may increase in intensity.
Pakistan Has Set Three Priorities: TTP, Afghan Safe Havens and PTI
Last week, when Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir visited Peshawar, he gave clear instructions regarding three major issues.
The first was the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The second was the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan.
The third was PTI, a political party that has become a central part of the debate surrounding the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
This is the information available to us about the priorities outlined during the meeting.
The security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa cannot be understood without examining the relationship between the provincial government, the Taliban regime and terrorist organizations operating in the region.
PTI Government Has Become a Spokesperson for the Taliban, TTP
There are two major aspects to the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and I do not agree with the argument that the provincial government is merely disengaged from the issue.
My position is that the PTI-led provincial government has increasingly become a spokesperson for the Taliban regime, the banned TTP and other anti-Pakistan terrorist groups.
I believe there is a nexus between these elements.
Opposition parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the Awami National Party (ANP), have repeatedly argued that PTI is the political wing of the banned TTP.
I agree with that assessment.
The provincial government has not demonstrated a willingness to take ownership of the war against terrorism. Instead, its representatives have blamed the Pakistan Army for the prevailing security situation.
Even the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has made such allegations in public forums while holding a constitutional office.
The party’s jailed leader in Adiala had previously expressed admiration for the Afghan Taliban, and I believe his companions and followers continue to pursue the same ideological direction.
They also continue to propagate allegations against the security establishment that I consider baseless.
In my view, the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will continue to deteriorate as long as such elements remain in power and refuse to take responsibility for the fight against terrorism.
The provincial government should be addressing the security challenges faced by its people rather than blaming the military for the consequences of terrorist activity.
India Is Using the Taliban and TTP as Proxies Against Pakistan
India’s role in Afghanistan is another important factor in the regional security situation.
We have been sharing information about this relationship on our platform for a long time.
Even during the earthquake in Afghanistan, information emerged that raised questions about India’s involvement in supporting the Taliban regime and terrorist groups operating from Afghan territory.
Indian media reports have also acknowledged, at least indirectly, that drones were being sent to Afghanistan.
The assistance was not limited to the supply of finished drones. There were also reports of machinery, equipment and materials that could be used to manufacture drones locally.
When Kabul was attacked, reports also emerged that Indian drones and related equipment had been supplied to Afghanistan.
There were indications that drones had been sent to two or three manufacturing facilities.
Pakistan’s air defense system is highly effective, and there is no comparison between Pakistan’s capabilities and those of Afghanistan.
The broader issue, however, is India’s strategic approach toward Pakistan.
It is now on the record, in my view, that India believes it is more advantageous to use the Afghan Taliban interim government and the banned TTP as proxies against Pakistan rather than engage Pakistan directly in a conventional confrontation.
India is not merely supporting these two entities. It has also become one of the countries investing in Afghanistan through financial assistance.
After the United States and Qatar, India is among the countries providing financial support to Afghanistan.
There is no ideological similarity between India and the current Afghan Taliban government.
Their common ground is their shared objective of weakening Pakistan or putting it under pressure through these groups.
That is the central factor behind the relationship between India, the Taliban regime and the terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan.
New Military Intelligence Chief Could Intensify Pressure on TTP and PTI
The appointment of Major General Adil Warraich as the new chief of Military Intelligence is another significant development.
In North Waziristan and the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, he is known as Pashtun Khan or Pathan Khan.
He previously served as the General Officer Commanding in Waziristan and has extensive experience in the region.
Among the chiefs of Military Intelligence appointed so far, I consider him particularly knowledgeable about Afghanistan, militancy and the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
He has not only studied these issues from an intelligence perspective but has also led forces on the ground. He served in Miranshah for three to four years and has firsthand experience of the security challenges in the region.
His appointment is significant because Military Intelligence is closely involved in monitoring developments relating to Afghanistan, terrorist organizations and the former tribal districts.
I believe his arrival will increase pressure on PTI, its provincial government and the TTP.
The new Military Intelligence chief was also present during the meeting in Peshawar.
This is why I believe the state is preparing to adopt a tougher approach toward three fronts: Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, terrorist organizations such as the TTP, and PTI.
Pakistan’s Security Policy Is Likely to Become More Forceful
The overall direction of Pakistan’s security policy is becoming clearer.
Relations with Afghanistan are likely to deteriorate further, and Pakistan’s airstrikes against terrorist targets inside Afghanistan may increase.
At the same time, internal security operations in Pakistan are also likely to become more frequent and intense.
The primary reason remains the same: the refusal of the Afghan Taliban to act against terrorist groups operating from their territory, the continued presence of TTP safe havens in Afghanistan, and the political confrontation surrounding PTI’s position on the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The instructions issued by Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir regarding the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and PTI indicate that these issues are being treated as interconnected security challenges.
I believe the state will adopt a tougher approach in its dealings with Afghanistan, the Taliban regime, the TTP and PTI.
This tougher approach will not be limited to military operations. It will also be reflected in the tone of official statements, the development of the security narrative and the policies adopted in the coming period.
The coming days are therefore likely to bring increased pressure on terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan, more intensive security operations inside Pakistan and a sharper confrontation between the state and political forces that oppose its security policy.
