As the Taliban enters its sixth year in power, armed opposition to its rule remains active across multiple parts of Afghanistan despite the absence of a known territorial sanctuary or official state sponsor for the resistance groups involved.
During September, eight anti-Taliban resistance organisations claimed responsibility for 37 targeted operations across the country. According to the information compiled in the reporting, the majority of these operations consisted of ambushes and targeted attacks against individual Taliban personnel, while several incidents involved attacks on checkpoints, outposts, government facilities, and fixed Taliban positions.
The reported activity extended across Afghanistan, including the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul; eastern Nangarhar; southeastern Ghazni; northern Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Sar-e Pol; western Badghis; and central provinces including Kabul, Panjshir, Kapisa, and Ghor. Sustained engagements with Taliban forces were also reported in Badakhshan and Nuristan. The National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Massoud, reported two attacks during mid-September, both in Badakhshan, a province that has emerged as a significant area of anti-Taliban activity in recent months.
According to the NRF, the two operations resulted in 10 Taliban personnel being killed or wounded. The figures are based on the group’s own claims and have not been independently verified. An NRF-affiliated formation known as the Andarab Resistance Front, which operates in the Andarab Valley of Baghlan province, also reported a joint operation with the newly established New Horizon Organization on September 5.
The groups claimed that the attack in Andarab resulted in three Taliban personnel killed and three wounded. The NRF’s operational activity during September was comparatively limited when measured against previous months. The reduction reportedly came following the death of senior NRF commander Hasib Panjshiri, whom the Taliban said it killed on August 19 in northern Salang, in Parwan province north of Kabul.
On September 4, the NRF announced that Commander Mukhtar Shoresh, described as one of Panjshiri’s closest comrades, would succeed him. Further changes were announced later in the month. On September 25, the NRF announced the appointment of former Afghan parliamentarian Saleh Mohammad Registani as its general operational commander.
On the same day, the NRF released a video purportedly showing Registani inside Afghanistan and announcing his return to the country to continue fighting against the Taliban.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), led by former Afghan National Army Chief of General Staff Yasin Zia, claimed responsibility for seven targeted operations during September. According to the AFF, the operations were conducted in Kapisa near Kabul, Kunar, Badakhshan, Sar-e Pol, and Kabul, resulting in claims of 15 Taliban personnel killed and 13 wounded.
The AFF also reported sustained fighting in Badakhshan. In early September, the organisation claimed that it had repelled a Taliban assault against its fixed positions in the Zibak district of Badakhshan. According to the AFF, Taliban forces had attempted to attack its positions in Zibak repeatedly since late July.
On September 26, the AFF claimed that it had repelled a Taliban assault against its outposts in Nuristan. The following day, the organisation claimed to have liberated villages in Kamdesh district of Nuristan and Nari district of Kunar from Taliban control.
The AFF further claimed that 37 Taliban personnel were killed and 24 wounded during the reported fighting. The group also disputed videos circulating on X that Taliban supporters described as showing AFF fighters surrendering to Taliban forces. In response, the AFF challenged the authenticity or interpretation of those videos.
Additional footage subsequently circulated on X, purportedly showing AFF fighters positioned alongside captured outposts in Kamdesh, Nuristan. The competing claims and footage have not been independently verified.
The Afghan United Front (AUF), led by former commander of the Afghan National Army’s 215th Corps, Lieutenant General Sami Sadat, claimed to have carried out 21 attacks across Afghanistan during September. The AUF claimed that its operations resulted in 21 Taliban personnel killed and at least nine wounded.
Most of the AUF’s reported operations were ambushes or targeted attacks against individual Taliban personnel. A smaller number targeted Taliban outposts and checkpoints. The geographical distribution of the AUF’s reported activity was notable, with six operations in Kandahar and three in Helmand both strategically important southern provinces traditionally regarded as major Taliban strongholds.
The reported operational pattern indicates an effort by the AUF to maintain pressure on Taliban personnel and infrastructure beyond the traditionally contested northern areas.
One of the more notable incidents occurred on September 28, when the AUF claimed responsibility for an attack on the Taliban governor’s office in Ghor province. Afghan media reports indicated that the Taliban subsequently detained at least 10 people in connection with the attack.
The incident was significant because it targeted a government facility rather than an isolated Taliban member or routine checkpoint. On September 29, the National Mobilization Front (NMF) also claimed responsibility for the attack on the Ghor provincial headquarters.
At present, it remains unclear whether the AUF or NMF conducted the operation. The AUF, however, has demonstrated the reported capability to conduct attacks against Taliban government facilities during its two months of battlefield activity.
Other smaller resistance organisations also reported operations during September. The Afghan Green Trend, led by Amrullah Saleh, former First Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, claimed in mid-September that it had killed three Taliban personnel in Badakhshan.
The organisation also claimed responsibility for a separate attack in Panjshir province, in which it said that two Taliban vehicles were destroyed. The National Mobilization Front (NMF) reported an attack in Baghlan province on September 28, claiming that two Taliban personnel were killed. The organisation subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack on the Ghor provincial headquarters on September 29, creating uncertainty over whether the Ghor operation was conducted by the NMF or the AUF.
The Afghan Liberation Movement, a smaller resistance organisation primarily focused on southern Afghanistan, also claimed an operation during September. On September 11, the group claimed that a sniper attack in Helmand province killed two Taliban personnel.
The Afghanistan Republican Front (ARF), a relatively new anti-Taliban resistance organisation that reported its first attack in early August, also remained active during September. On September 4, the ARF claimed responsibility for a grenade attack against a Taliban checkpoint in Kabul’s 13th district. The group subsequently announced another operation targeting the Ghor provincial centre on September 12. The ARF is led by Tahir Zamir, a former governor of Bamyan province. Zamir surrendered to the Taliban in May 2023 before subsequently taking up arms again.
Unlike the other groups highlighted in the September activity, Qayyum Malang’s Homeland Soldiers Front did not claim any attacks during the month. Afghan media nevertheless reported that the Taliban dispatched a senior delegation to Badakhshan in an effort to persuade Malang to end his armed struggle. According to those reports, Malang rejected the offer. The Homeland Soldiers Front had previously demonstrated its ability to challenge Taliban control when it briefly captured the Yaftali Sufla district centre in Badakhshan on July 17.
That episode was notable because it represented the first reported loss of control of a district centre by the Taliban since it returned to power in August 2021. Despite the geographical spread of these operations, the anti-Taliban resistance does not currently represent an existential challenge to Taliban rule. The groups remain fragmented, lack a recognised territorial sanctuary, and have not demonstrated the capacity to mount a sustained nationwide campaign capable of threatening the Taliban’s overall control of Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, their continued ability to conduct attacks in geographically dispersed locations demonstrates that armed resistance remains an active feature of Afghanistan’s security environment. The pattern of reported attacks also demonstrates considerable variation in operational methods, ranging from sniper and grenade attacks to ambushes, assassinations, attacks on checkpoints and outposts, and operations against government facilities.
The resistance activity is occurring within a wider and increasingly complex security environment. The United Nations reported that security incidents in Afghanistan increased by 11 percent between May 1 and July 31 compared with the same period in 2025. Importantly, this overall figure encompasses not only attacks attributed to anti-Taliban resistance groups but also violence involving terrorist organisations, including Islamic State. Consequently, the increase in recorded security incidents should not be interpreted as being caused exclusively by anti-Taliban resistance activity.
September’s reported developments demonstrate that opposition to Taliban rule remains active despite the absence of a recognised territorial base or official state sponsor.
Eight anti-Taliban groups claimed 37 targeted operations during the month, with incidents reported across southern, eastern, northern, western, southeastern, and central Afghanistan.
Badakhshan and Nuristan remained particularly important areas of reported confrontation, while organisations such as the NRF, AFF, AUF, NMF, Afghan Green Trend, Afghan Liberation Movement, ARF, and Homeland Soldiers Front continued to maintain varying levels of activity.
The reported attacks, casualties, territorial claims, and battlefield developments remain subject to verification, as many of the figures originate from statements issued by the organisations themselves or from Taliban authorities.
Nevertheless, the continued occurrence of armed attacks across multiple provinces indicates that the Taliban’s return to power has not eliminated organised armed opposition, even though the current resistance lacks the scale and resources required to pose an immediate existential challenge to Taliban control.
