Talks held in Doha collapsed before the failure of the Istanbul talks between Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban-led Kabul administration, because Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif openly stated that the Afghan Taliban were unwilling to discuss the issues raised in Doha, and instead kept diverting the conversation. Regarding the Istanbul talks, Pakistan appears to have involved international players technically, to discuss the full range of issues and to present its case effectively, and even the mediators, Qatar and Turkey, acknowledged that Pakistan’s position was valid.
What complicated matters further was that the Taliban delegation in Istanbul was not a single, unified negotiating team, but rather representatives of three distinct groups, from Khost, Kandahar, and Kabul. Even deputy defence minister Anas Haqqani and others among them lacked the authority to finalize decisions. They repeatedly left the meeting room to inform Kabul or Kandahar about developments, and when they returned they began discussing the very points that had already been taken up. Some sources even suggest that external actors sitting outside the venue were providing them support.
In my view, the core reason behind the talks’ failure is the Taliban’s policy of deception and intransigence. Initially they refused to acknowledge the presence of foreign terrorist groups on their soil, yet Pakistan managed to establish that al Qaeda, the proscribed TTP, ISKP, Uyghur militants, and the Turkmen group Ansar al-Islam are indeed present. More alarmingly, Ahmad Massoud’s son, Tajik commander Ahmad Massoud, has openly said that the present Taliban policy is to export Talibanisation to neighbouring countries, using proxies to pressure or destabilize them. He accused the Taliban of sponsoring terrorism as a state policy.
From the outset, I believed these talks were unlikely to succeed. One major reason is the financier behind much of the process, India, and its intelligence agency RAW, along with proxy groups it backs. Reports indicate offers of large sums, even a billion dollars pledged for a dam, which points to deeper geopolitical maneuvering. The Taliban currently treat the proscribed TTP as political currency, seeking money, weapons, and fighting manpower from within Afghanistan to use as leverage against neighbouring states. In the midst of this, the Taliban delegation insisted that the United States must be part of the talks for negotiations to proceed, or that the process cannot succeed without U.S. involvement. Why they want Washington involved is clear, twofold: to revive counterterrorism funding under the pretext of cooperation, and to claim international recognition as a state actor if an American guarantor is present.
The interim regime in Kabul was installed with the backing of the U.S. and its allies, but those backers may not have foreseen what brand of terrorism they were enabling. The result is deeply troubling. Proxies for ISKP and other groups exist on Afghan soil, and regional states are alarmed. The Taliban are using TTP as a bargaining chip, they want to leverage Indian funds, and they seek to link any ceasefire or agreement to their own development and status claims, while courting U.S. assistance. This is a dangerous stunt, and internal divisions within the Taliban also contribute to the stalemate. They do not truly want the talks to succeed, sincerity is lacking. They discuss trade, the Durand Line, and transit, but avoid the TTP issue. This is not merely deception towards Pakistan it is a pattern of opportunism.
Worryingly, the Taliban have also blacklisted and then bypassed Chinese firms, cancelling agreements and awarding contracts to American companies. In one instance, Chinese staff were taken hostage and later freed after diplomatic intervention, yet projects were handed to U.S. firms. These actions suggest the current rulers in Kabul place money and power above ideological commitments, and are willing to align with India or the U.S. as suits them. This transformation is dangerous for the region, and the failure of negotiations is a regional concern. A new proxy war looks to be emerging, and the way India is being involved puts China on edge, given its strategic and economic stakes in Afghanistan. China has provided lists of Uyghur militants to Kabul, but those names have not been handed over. This indicates the Taliban are sheltering and supporting terror networks, using them as leverage, and taking funding from external patrons.
So, what should Pakistan do at this juncture, when it stands diplomatically strong and has improving relations with major powers like China, Russia, Iran, and the United States, as well as engagement with Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey? Pressure must be applied on these friendly states to ask the Taliban plainly why they are supporting terrorist groups. The U.S. must also be brought on board to ask why Afghan territory is being used to harbour groups that strike Pakistan, and why India is allegedly funding proxies. Pakistan can raise these matters in international forums, including FATF and the UN Security Council.
I do not believe war solves all problems rather, we should avoid conflict where possible and keep diplomatic channels open, because war harms both sides and the whole region. Dialogue is preferable, and Pakistan has engaged in talks before with the aim of peace. Our agenda for negotiations should be clear and limited: first, ensure the Afghan Taliban do not become India’s frontline proxy, and second, stop the use of Afghan soil by TTP and BLA elements. These are reasonable demands, and Afghanistan’s security forces could prevent many attacks if they chose to. If the Taliban refuse, that refusal signals complicity, and diplomatic as well as other measures will be necessary.
If Taliban policies do not change, Pakistan has several options. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has warned that persistent cross-border threats will result in strikes across the border. Pakistan can also raise these concerns at FATF and the UN, to highlight state sponsorship of terrorism by India through proxies, if evidence supports such claims. Islamabad’s diplomatic posture is currently strong, and military options remain on the table. Pakistan should seek to neutralize threats, disrupt financing channels, and press for international accountability.
At the same time, there are political complexities at home, with different provincial positions on how to handle security and negotiations. Some political actors oppose military operations and advocate dialogue instead. If they truly oppose operations, they should withdraw military requests made under Article 245 of the Constitution and present their alternative plans. The federal government also bears responsibility to strengthen law enforcement, invest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security infrastructure, and enhance CTD capabilities, taking into account the needs of merged districts. Coordination between the new provincial leadership and the federal center is essential, the chief minister should present a clear strategy or at least a set of conditions for any negotiations.
If Pakistan is willing to negotiate, it must state the preconditions and make clear it will not accept safe havens for groups that reject the Pakistani constitution and the state. Strengthening police and counterterrorism agencies is crucial otherwise, terrorism will persist. Where international players are sponsoring terrorist activity, military responses may be necessary, because when militants can strike the military effectively, it indicates robust backing.
Finally, Pakistan must craft a single, unified narrative and policy, and not be divided by conflicting rhetoric. Diplomatic, economic, and security levers must be coordinated. If talks fail, Pakistan’s earlier warning stands: attacks originating from Afghan soil will be met with strikes inside Afghanistan. Illegal refugees and proxies inside Afghanistan should be addressed, but first the genuine nature of these elements must be assessed, whether they constitute real networks or are being used as proxies by foreign handlers. The social media narrative, which in some quarters is being manufactured to suggest the Taliban are a formidable force ready to clash with Pakistan, ignores the damage such a reality would do to the Afghan people and the broader region.
In short, this is a dangerous gamble by the Taliban. Their current course risks regional destabilisation, and if they continue to sponsor proxies as instruments of state power, neighbouring countries like Pakistan, China, Iran, and the Central Asian states will be forced to take measures to protect their security. The world must ask who authorised the interim Kabul regime to flout international norms, and why the Taliban are sheltering and enabling terrorists. Pakistan’s response should be calibrated, combining pressure through allies, international forums, and measured defensive options, while keeping open the path for dialogue conditioned on verifiable actions, not empty promises. Only a unified regional response will prevent the spiral from turning into a wider conflict.
