The security challenge facing Pakistan today cannot be addressed merely by increasing the number of armed personnel, creating new committees or announcing another round of talks. The more fundamental question is whether the state has a clear chain of command, the authority to enforce its decisions and the institutional discipline necessary to ensure that those operating in the name of security remain within the law.
This question has become particularly important in parts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Tank, where the security environment remains complicated by the presence of terrorists, criminal networks, smuggling and competing local power structures.
The controversy surrounding so-called Aman Lashkars, or peace committees, therefore needs to be examined carefully. Community participation in counterterrorism is not inherently problematic. In fact, local knowledge can be extremely valuable in areas where residents know the terrain, recognize unfamiliar faces and understand the movement of people in ways that outsiders may not.
The problem begins when a community-based security arrangement ceases to function under the authority of the state and starts behaving as an authority of its own.
One State Cannot Have Two Chains of Command
There is an important distinction that must be maintained.
An Aman Lashkar operating as a locally recruited auxiliary force, when properly regulated, disarmed outside operations and deployed under the command of the police, can assist the state. Such arrangements have existed in different parts of the province, particularly since the rise of terrorism in the late 2000s. Their original purpose was to supplement the police by providing local knowledge and assistance during security operations.
But that model is fundamentally different from a situation in which individuals associated with such groups begin resisting transfers, refusing orders, occupying public or private property, blocking roads or asserting that government decisions cannot be implemented without their consent.
At that point, the issue is no longer simply about a peace committee.
It becomes a question of the writ of the state.
A police officer, regardless of his rank or local influence, remains part of a state institution. A government employee cannot simultaneously operate within the state’s security structure and refuse to recognise the authority of the same institution.
This is why the government must distinguish between legitimate community assistance and the creation of a parallel command structure.
If a police officer is transferred, there must be a lawful process for challenging that decision. If personnel have grievances, there are institutional channels through which those grievances can be addressed. What cannot become acceptable is the use of armed groups, road blockades or collective pressure to prevent the government from exercising its administrative authority.
The danger is particularly acute in districts already facing terrorist violence.
When terrorists are attempting to challenge the state, the state cannot afford ambiguity about who commands whom.
The police must know who gives the order. The auxiliary force must know who gives the order. The local administration must know who gives the order. And, above all, the public must know that there is only one legitimate authority.
That does not mean that every Aman Lashkar should simply be abolished overnight.
There may be genuine local volunteers who can make a useful contribution to counterterrorism. The sensible approach would be to bring such participation under a clearly defined legal and operational framework. Recruitment, vetting, weapons, deployment and command must all be regulated. Their role should be supportive, not sovereign.
The command must remain with the state.
Security Cannot Become a Negotiation Between Armed Groups
There is another reason why this issue deserves urgent attention.
Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is not operating in a vacuum. Terrorist organizations, including the TTP, continue to exploit difficult terrain, local grievances, criminal economies and gaps in state authority.
In such an environment, any division within the state’s security apparatus creates opportunities for terrorists.
If one group can refuse an official order, another can block a road, and a third can determine who may enter or operate in a particular area, the state gradually loses the very thing that counterterrorism requires most: coherence.
I therefore believe that the government’s response should be firm but intelligent.
Immediate confrontation between armed groups and armed police personnel could produce unnecessary bloodshed. The objective should not be to create another security crisis while trying to resolve the existing one.
The first step should be dialogue through lawful and credible channels. Local elders and jirgas can help explain the consequences of defying the state. Personnel involved should be given a clear choice: operate within the law and under the established chain of command, or face lawful disciplinary and legal action.
The second step should be disarmament and regulation wherever necessary.
The third should be accountability.
If allegations of criminal activity, smuggling, extortion or links with terrorists are established through proper investigation, the fact that an individual belongs to a security-related organisation cannot provide immunity.
The state must be particularly uncompromising about that point.
A person who is supposed to help fight terrorism cannot simultaneously provide space, information, protection or resources to terrorists.
That is not merely a disciplinary problem. It is a direct security threat.
Local Knowledge Is an Asset, Not a Substitute for the State
There is, however, a danger in portraying every local security volunteer as part of the problem.
The experience of Bajaur, Dir and other districts has shown that local people can play an important role in assisting law-enforcement agencies. A person who has lived in an area for decades may recognise an outsider immediately. He may know which routes terrorists use, which settlements they have attempted to penetrate and which movements appear abnormal.
This knowledge can save lives.
But local knowledge must feed into state intelligence, not replace it.
The solution is therefore not to eliminate the community dimension of counterterrorism. It is to put it where it belongs.
One command.
One operational plan.
One legal framework.
One accountable authority.
If community members are needed during an operation, they should be called in through the police or other authorized security institutions. They should know their precise role, operate under instructions and return to civilian life after the task is complete.
That model strengthens the state.
A parallel armed authority weakens it.
And in an area where terrorists are actively seeking opportunities to exploit divisions, that distinction can be the difference between intelligence and chaos.
The Same Principle Applies Across the Border
The question of state authority does not end at Pakistan’s western border.
It extends into the continuing dispute over the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and the repeated claims that action is being taken against its leadership and cadres.
For months, there have been reports suggesting that Afghan authorities have tightened restrictions on TTP members, arrested some individuals or relocated others away from Pakistan’s border. There have also been claims that families of TTP members have been moved and that surveillance has been increased.
These reports are significant if true.
But there is a crucial word here: if.
Pakistan cannot base its security policy on anonymous claims, media reports or verbal assurances. The history of the issue demands something much more concrete.
We have heard claims of action before.
We have heard that TTP members were arrested.
We have heard that restrictions were imposed.
We have heard that individuals were moved.
We have also seen situations in which arrests were followed by releases, restrictions were relaxed and the same individuals remained able to operate.
Therefore, the burden of proof now rests on those claiming that the situation has fundamentally changed.
If the Afghan authorities have genuinely arrested wanted TTP figures, Pakistan should be provided with verifiable evidence. If individuals wanted in connection with terrorism are in custody, there should be a mechanism for handing over those wanted by Pakistan under appropriate legal arrangements.
That would be more than an administrative step.
It would be a confidence-building measure.
Islamabad Needs Evidence, Not Another Assurance
The credibility problem is particularly serious because Pakistan has repeatedly raised the same core demand: Afghan soil must not be allowed to serve as a launchpad for terrorist attacks against Pakistan.
This is not an unreasonable demand.
If Kabul genuinely wants normal relations with Islamabad, it should be possible to demonstrate that commitment through action.
There is also a broader problem with the narrative surrounding the alleged relocation of TTP members.
Relocation is not the same thing as dismantling a terrorist network.
Moving a terrorist from one Afghan province to another does not eliminate the threat. It may simply move the problem geographically.
Arresting a few low-level individuals does not necessarily dismantle a network.
Nor does restricting movement for a limited period demonstrate a permanent policy shift.
What Pakistan needs to see is sustained action against the organizational infrastructure, leadership, financing, recruitment and operational capabilities of the TTP.
And this is precisely where past experience matters.
We should neither dismiss every report of Afghan action automatically nor accept every such report at face value.
Evidence must decide.
If Kabul has genuinely changed its policy, that change should become visible on the ground over time.
If it has not, the difference between words and actions will eventually become equally visible.
Trust Cannot Be Built on Contradictions
There is also a wider credibility issue.
On one hand, Afghan officials have questioned why Pakistan remains dissatisfied with their conduct. On the other, international and Pakistani assessments have repeatedly highlighted the continued presence and activity of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.
This contradiction cannot simply be wished away.
If Kabul believes that the allegations against it are unfounded, it has an opportunity to demonstrate that through transparent action.
If it claims that TTP members are no longer operating freely, then Pakistan should be able to observe measurable changes.
If it claims that terrorists have been arrested, then their identities, legal status and custody should not remain a matter of vague reporting.
And if it claims that terrorists have been relocated, the question remains: relocated where, under whose supervision and with what restrictions?
Security policy cannot operate on the principle of “trust us.”
Pakistan has already paid too high a price for taking assurances without sufficient verification.
The Real Test Is What Happens on the Ground
This brings the domestic and Afghan questions together.
At home, Pakistan needs one command.
Across the border, Pakistan needs verifiable action.
The two principles are actually part of the same security equation.
A state cannot defeat terrorism if its own institutions are divided, just as it cannot secure its population if terrorist networks enjoy safe space beyond its borders.
The answer is not necessarily more armed groups, more committees or more statements.
The answer is stronger institutions.
In Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Tank, the government must establish unequivocally that no armed group operating in the name of peace can function outside the state’s command.
At the same time, the police must be equipped, supported and held accountable. If officers are being asked to confront terrorists while lacking adequate resources, the government must address those deficiencies rather than allowing frustration to produce parallel structures.
Local communities should be partners in counterterrorism, not competing authorities.
Across the border, Pakistan should keep the door open to diplomacy, but diplomacy should be measured by results.
If the Afghan authorities have genuinely begun acting against the TTP, Islamabad should welcome that development. But welcoming it does not require abandoning verification.
In fact, verification would make genuine cooperation easier.
If arrests have occurred, hand over those wanted by Pakistan.
If relocation has occurred, establish where the individuals have gone and under what restrictions.
If surveillance has been increased, demonstrate its effectiveness.
If Afghan soil is no longer being used against Pakistan, the most convincing evidence will be a sustained reduction in terrorist attacks emanating from that territory.
That is the evidence that matters.
Pakistan’s Security Test Is Ultimately a Test of State Authority
Pakistan’s counterterrorism challenge has entered a stage where tactical operations alone cannot provide a permanent answer.
The state must regain and maintain institutional clarity.
There cannot be one command for the police, another for a locally armed group and another informal command exercised by people with political or tribal influence.
Likewise, Pakistan cannot build its western security policy around promises that are repeatedly contradicted by developments on the ground.
The message should therefore be straightforward.
Inside Pakistan, every legitimate security actor must operate under the law and within a single chain of command.
Outside Pakistan, every claim of action against terrorists must be backed by evidence.
That is not an unreasonable standard.
It is the minimum standard required when the lives of Pakistani civilians and security personnel are at stake.
For too long, the region has paid the price of ambiguity, proxy relationships and assurances that failed to survive contact with reality.
Pakistan now needs clarity.
At home, that means the writ of the state must be unquestioned.
Across the border, it means words must finally be matched by verifiable action.
Only then can the country move from managing the symptoms of terrorism to systematically dismantling the networks that sustain it.
