Pakistan’s counterterrorism performance in 2025 reflects a year of sustained resilience, strategic clarity, and operational effectiveness, as assessed through seven critical markers designed to measure the state’s ability to confront and contain terrorism. These markers evaluate not only battlefield outcomes but also societal resilience, territorial control, and the psychological dimensions of counterterrorism.
Terrorism fundamentally seeks visibility and psychological impact, operating largely within the cognitive domain to instill fear and undermine national confidence. Effective counterterrorism, therefore, requires insulating society from fear-based narratives while providing policymakers with original, Pakistan-specific, and comprehensive analysis. Using this framework, Pakistan’s performance in 2025 demonstrates measurable progress across all seven markers.
The first marker examines whether the state held its ground ideationally and operationally. In 2025, Pakistan successfully established narrative clarity by identifying terrorism as a foreign-sponsored fitna, eliminating long-standing ambiguity that previously hindered public understanding. Despite a significant influx of Afghan mercenaries into border regions, the threat was effectively contained within limited districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Major urban centers in Balochistan and mainland Pakistan remained secure, underscoring the state’s capacity to prevent strategic spillover.
The second marker evaluates societal resilience. Pakistani society decisively rejected terrorist and separatist ideologies, with voluntary recruitment into terrorist groups declining sharply. Terrorist organizations increasingly relied on paid Afghan mercenaries rather than local support, highlighting their ideological isolation. Notably, no tribe, clan, or family openly aligned with terrorists. In areas such as Lakki Marwat, Bannu, and Wana, tribal resistance played a critical role in denying space to extremist elements. As ideological failure deepened, terrorist groups increasingly turned to criminal activities, including kidnapping and extortion. Throughout this period, civil administration and law enforcement agencies maintained cohesion with the Army and Frontier Corps, reinforcing state authority.
The third marker focuses on whether terrorism succeeded in establishing permanent or near-permanent geographic sanctuaries. In 2025, no such sanctuaries emerged. Terrorist presence remained fragmented and confined to remote, inhospitable border regions. There were no declared or de facto no-go areas in either Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan, rendering comparisons with past Waziristan-era strongholds inaccurate and misleading.
The fourth marker assesses control over population centers. No town or city fell under sustained terrorist control during the year. Attempts to destabilize areas such as Bajaur, Malakand, Azam Warsak, and Tank were rapidly neutralized, with similar failures recorded across Balochistan. The state demonstrated consistent capacity to prevent terrorists from translating violence into territorial dominance.
The fifth marker evaluates the security of national mobility and communications. Throughout 2025, Pakistan’s major highways and communication arteries remained operational. While isolated incidents of banditry occurred, they were short-lived and unsustainable. Terrorist groups lacked the operational depth and manpower necessary to disrupt national movement or logistics networks.
The sixth marker examines the scale and severity of punishment imposed by the state. Terrorist losses in 2025 reached unprecedented levels in both frequency and scale. Numerous major attacks, including suicide bombings, were preempted through intelligence-led operations. A historically high number of terrorists were neutralized across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, significantly degrading militant operational capacity.
The seventh and final marker analyzes the nature of terrorist violence. More than 90 percent of attacks relied on cowardly, long-distance methods such as improvised explosive devices and sniping. Direct engagements with security forces were rare, reflecting a lack of confidence, capability, and willingness for close combat. This pattern underscores the defensive and increasingly desperate posture of terrorist groups.
In conclusion, despite sustained external support, 2025 proved to be a year of strategic failure and operational desperation for FAK and FAH. Pakistan successfully held its line across military, territorial, psychological, and societal domains. Alongside the principles of Azm-e-Haq, national confidence in Pakistan’s counterterrorism trajectory has strengthened, reinforcing optimism as the country moves into 2026.
