The recent round of Pakistan, Afghanistan negotiations in Turkey marks another chapter in a long and complicated relationship between two uneasy neighbours. While the talks were presented as a step toward de-escalation, the reality beneath the diplomatic smiles remains far more fragile. The key question before both sides is not merely about logistics or ceasefire clauses, it is about whether trust, long eroded by suspicion and missteps, can ever truly be rebuilt.
For nearly two decades, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been caught in a cycle of mistrust, allegations, and missed opportunities. The issue at the centre of this storm is militancy, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose violent campaign has caused immense suffering in Pakistan’s tribal and settled areas. Islamabad has consistently demanded that the Afghan Taliban prevent TTP fighters from using Afghan soil, while the Islamic Emirate insists it does not support or host anti-Pakistan elements. This tug of war has bred a dangerous stalemate, now exported to foreign capitals under the pretext of mediation.
The six-day Turkish talks, following earlier sessions in Doha, once again revealed how deeply embedded the trust deficit is. Both sides arrived with reservations, exchanged sharp words, and at several points seemed ready to walk away. Media reports in Pakistan even declared the negotiations “terminated,” a premature and unfortunate signal of impatience. Yet, in the end, they stayed at the table long enough to agree on a few broad principles: maintaining the ceasefire, preventing cross-border use of territory, and establishing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism involving third parties.
While these points sound promising, the reality is that such arrangements have been made before, and collapsed under the weight of political inertia and battlefield realities. The core problem is structural: Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to engage one another through foreign capitals like Doha or Ankara, when their problems are fundamentally local. Two immediate neighbours, bound by geography, ethnicity, and shared history, should not require mediators thousands of miles away to settle disputes that begin and end at their own border.
The insistence on internationalising this issue has weakened both sides. By seeking validation or arbitration from third countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan have allowed others to define their regional narrative. The Turkish government’s attempt to broker peace may appear noble, but it also exposes the inability of both nations to trust their own channels of communication. Real peace, as I have often said, must be negotiated through Peshawar, not Doha or Istanbul. Peshawar symbolises the heart of Pakhtunkhwa, a region that understands the pain, the culture, and the language of both sides. Within Pakistan’s tribal and border regions live individuals who have the credibility and social capital to mediate genuinely, people who are respected in Kabul as much as in Islamabad.
Another harsh reality is that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan does not fully control the TTP. The group operates independently, bound more by ideology than by hierarchy. The Afghan Taliban may share religious and historical ties with the TTP, but they lack the command authority to rein them in. Any direct confrontation between the Islamic Emirate and the TTP could ignite a broader civil conflict in Afghanistan, destabilizing not only Kabul but the entire region, including Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and beyond. For this reason, Islamabad’s expectation that the Emirate will “act” against the TTP may be unrealistic in the short term.
Yet, what is the alternative? Military solutions have failed repeatedly. Pakistan has fought several large-scale operations, cleared territories, and still the violence persists. The United States, with its enormous resources, fought the Taliban for twenty years and ultimately had to negotiate with them. If Washington could reach a political settlement after two decades of war, then surely Islamabad, too, must acknowledge that dialogue, however frustrating, is the only sustainable path.
This dialogue, however, should be direct, indigenous, and sincere. Pakistan must engage not only with the Islamic Emirate but also, at some point, with the TTP itself. This is not about legitimising terrorism; it is about acknowledging political reality. When your enemy is from within your own borders, from your own tribal belt, your own linguistic and cultural fabric, then the path to peace lies in talking, not in annihilation. Every war ultimately ends at a negotiating table. It is better to reach that table sooner, before more blood is spilled.
The reopening of the border for returning Afghan refugees offers a faint glimmer of cooperation, but it also highlights the contradictions in current policy. How can two countries claim to be negotiating peace while trade routes remain closed and ordinary people, traders, patients, families, are made to suffer? Borders between adversaries like India and Pakistan often remain open for commerce, even in times of crisis. Yet, the Pakistan, Afghanistan border, despite shared faith and fraternity, remains hostage to suspicion and sporadic closures. Such policies damage not governments, but the daily lives of people who depend on cross-border exchange.
If peace is to take root, both nations must shift from reactive diplomacy to proactive engagement. Pakistan must stop expecting immediate results from foreign-mediated talks, and Afghanistan must take responsibility for the militant networks that operate with impunity on its soil. More importantly, both sides must invest in local mechanisms of dialogue, jirgas, tribal councils, and community elders, who possess the wisdom and legitimacy to bridge divides that diplomats cannot.
Ultimately, the road to peace does not pass through Ankara or Doha. It winds through the mountains of Pakhtunkhwa, the valleys of Kunar, and the hearts of those who have suffered the most. These are the people who can build roads where none exist, literally and metaphorically. If Islamabad and Kabul can trust them, perhaps they can learn to trust each other again.
Only then will these negotiations cease to be an exercise in ceremony and begin to serve the purpose they were meant for: restoring lasting peace between two nations that cannot afford another generation of war.





