As NATO leaders convene for the 2025 Summit, the alliance faces a defining challenge that lies far beyond its traditional borders. While the war in Ukraine continues to dominate the European security agenda, another strategic confrontation is emerging in the Indo-Pacific one that could upend the global order if mishandled. The United States is increasingly focused on the possibility of conflict with China, particularly over Taiwan or disputes in the South China Sea and the Philippines. For NATO, the question is no longer whether it should be involved, but how.
Contrary to some assumptions, the goal is not to enlist European nations as front-line participants in an Indo-Pacific war. Rather, it is to ensure that NATO members play critical supporting roles that enhance deterrence, ease the burden on U.S. forces, and demonstrate alliance unity. To achieve this, NATO must move beyond vague declarations of concern over China and begin mapping out concrete strategies for political, economic, and security engagement.
Europe’s deep trade ties with China amounting to over $1.5 billion in daily commerce complicate any move toward a harder stance. The European Union continues to count China as its second-largest trading partner, a fact that tempers both rhetoric and policy. Additionally, geography naturally orients Europe’s focus toward Russia rather than China, limiting both the appetite and capacity for military involvement in Asia.
Even among NATO members, there is little consensus on how to approach China. While countries like the United Kingdom express alarm over Beijing’s influence, others such as Hungary actively nurture close relations. This divergence has long prevented NATO from presenting a coherent posture. However, the alliance has begun to shift since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, particularly as China has aligned itself with Moscow. NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept and the 2024 Summit communique marked a noticeable hardening in tone toward Beijing.
NATO’s partnerships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea the so-called IP4 highlight a growing recognition of Asia’s strategic importance. Japan, in particular, has emerged as a key interlocutor, participating in NATO ministerial meetings since 2020 and steadily deepening cooperation. These relationships lay the groundwork for a broader transatlantic-Pacific security framework, but meaningful European engagement will require more than symbolism.
If a conflict involving China erupts, the United States will need to rapidly shift resources to the Pacific theater. In such a scenario, European allies could make four essential contributions:
First, European nations can enhance deterrence through joint military exercises and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific. Even modest deployments, such as a British naval vessel or a German reconnaissance plane, carry significant political weight. If European forces are targeted, the resulting escalation would make it far more difficult for China to localize the conflict an outcome that would help deter Beijing from initiating hostilities in the first place.
Second, Europe can fill the vacuum left by redeployed U.S. forces elsewhere. This means stepping up in Ukraine by boosting arms production and delivering advanced systems. It also involves taking on more responsibility in the Middle East deterring Iranian aggression, supporting regional stability, and securing logistical access. U.S. allies in the Gulf should be encouraged to cooperate more closely with European militaries to facilitate this shift.
Third, European defense industries can be mobilized to support not just Ukraine, but also America’s Indo-Pacific allies. With U.S. military stockpiles stretched by simultaneous conflicts, Europe’s industrial base becomes a critical asset. European nations can supply weapons directly to Asian partners or replenish U.S. arsenals by covering European and Middle Eastern needs. Coordinated sanctions should also be part of the equation. NATO and the EU have previously aligned on economic measures targeting Russia and China, and similar mechanisms should be prepared in advance for future use.
Fourth, the presence of allies significantly strengthens political resolve within the United States. In a democratic society, public support is crucial for sustaining any prolonged military operation. Broad alliance participation gives U.S. leaders a stronger mandate to act, reinforcing both domestic and international legitimacy.
For too long, American calls for Europe to “do more” have lacked specificity. This approach not only causes confusion but also leads to mismatched investments and missed opportunities. The United States should clearly identify the capabilities it needs its allies to develop whether that involves logistics, intelligence, air defense systems, or force projection in adjacent regions. Once expectations are clarified, European states can align their defense strategies accordingly.
The size of Europe’s economies and populations gives it the potential to become a far more capable military actor. The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ramped-up spending, arms transfers, and extensive troop training demonstrates what Europe can achieve under pressure. These gains must now be institutionalized, not just for Ukraine, but to prepare for the broader demands of global conflict.
The NATO 2025 Summit represents more than a gathering of allies. It is a moment to shape the alliance’s posture for an era where threats are no longer confined to Europe’s borders. The United States may lead the response to a potential China crisis, but it cannot and should not face it alone. A strong, prepared, and globally minded NATO can deter conflict, manage escalation, and share the burdens of an increasingly complex world.
Europe’s role in Asia will not be defined by the number of ships or soldiers it sends to the Pacific. It will be defined by its willingness to step forward, fill strategic gaps, and stand with allies when it matters most. The planning for that must begin now.
