As Russia intensifies its summer offensive in Ukraine, the Kremlin hopes a cascade of drone strikes, battlefield gains, and geopolitical shifts will force Kyiv to submit. But behind the façade of strength lies a fragile campaign built on dwindling manpower, exaggerated recruitment figures, and a strategy that may, in time, backfire. If Russia fails to sustain its current momentum, this offensive could prove not a breakthrough but a breaking point.
On June 24, Russia unleashed a devastating drone assault on Dnipro, killing 16 civilians and injuring at least 279 more. The strikes obliterated educational institutions, medical centers, administrative buildings, and homes, further eroding the line between military targets and civilian life. Just weeks earlier, on the night of June 10, Kyiv and Odesa bore the brunt of a similarly ruthless attack. In Odesa, a maternity hospital was hit, killing three people. In Kyiv, a drone struck a residential high-rise, wounding multiple civilians.
Russian military bloggers celebrated these attacks as major victories. The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Rybar hailed the Kyiv strike as “the most large-scale” so far, boasting that it damaged industrial targets including the Kyiv Tank Armor Plant, the Artem defense facility, and other key enterprises in Borispol and Dnipro. However, such claims mask the reality on the ground. Russian troops have barely advanced, managing only to occupy a sliver of forestland near Orekhova territory even state-run Vzglyad admits holds no tactical value. Yet these minor movements are being sold domestically as a prelude to greater conquests in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
What triggered this intensified campaign was Ukraine’s own bold maneuver: Operation Spiderweb, launched on June 1, which targeted multiple Russian air bases using long-range drones. Western analysts estimate that the strike damaged up to 20 Russian aircraft, destroying at least 10, including strategic bombers. German military experts assess that around 10 percent of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet was crippled. The scale of the losses and the years Moscow will need to replenish them underscores why Russia responded with vengeance, launching nightly waves of drone strikes across Ukrainian cities while stepping up ground assaults in the east.
Yet Russia’s hopes for a decisive summer victory may be sabotaged from within. President Vladimir Putin, in a May speech, claimed that recruitment had nearly doubled to 1,800 new contract soldiers per day. But investigations by the independent outlet Important Stories tell a different tale. By analyzing regional bonus payouts, journalists revealed a marked decline in enlistment rates. In Kemerovo, spring 2025 figures fell to half of those seen in late 2024. In Kabardino-Balkaria, recruitment dropped by a third. Similar declines were observed throughout Central Russia. These findings suggest that Putin’s figures are not only inflated—they are dangerously out of touch with ground realities.
Without a reliable stream of manpower, Russia’s strategy becomes dangerously one-dimensional. It is true that Moscow, backed by Iranian and Chinese drone production, shows no signs of running short on unmanned systems. But drones cannot hold territory. The war is no longer just a contest of firepower but of endurance and here, Russia is exposed.
Even voices within the Russian pro-war sphere are growing uneasy. Military Review, a publication with close ties to the defense ministry, has warned that Ukraine may be preparing an offensive on Crimea. Others, like the radical Tsargrad outlet, fear renewed incursions into Russia’s own border regions namely the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. In response, Moscow has begun rushing to fortify key sites, constructing concrete aircraft shelters across Crimea and other regions including Yeysk, Krimsky, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kursk, Lipetsk, and Adygeya. But Ukrainian defense analysts argue these defenses are futile, asserting that Ukraine possesses the capability to destroy both makeshift and hardened shelters alike.
Simultaneously, geopolitical shifts complicate Ukraine’s defense. U.S. arms aid appears to be reaching its limit. And with Donald Trump poised to return to the global stage, Kyiv may face an American administration hesitant to confront the Kremlin. Political scientist Dmitry Suslov, a known Kremlin ally, has voiced concern that Trump’s feud with Elon Musk could fracture Republican unity, inadvertently opening the door to more aggressive anti-Russia sanctions from hardline GOP factions. This anxiety reflects Moscow’s awareness that its window of opportunity may be narrowing.
Meanwhile, Russia’s long-term intentions are becoming increasingly clear. Kremlin-affiliated political analyst Andrey Pinchuk has already floated the idea of a “temporary peace” not as a path to lasting resolution, but as a tactical pause. Under this plan, Russia would regroup, rearm, and resume hostilities under the pretext that Ukraine violated any ceasefire agreement. This strategy mirrors the Kremlin’s earlier playbook. In January 2022, weeks before the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian defense adviser Oleksandr Danylyuk warned that had Ukraine recognized the pro-Russian puppet regimes in Donbas, the Kremlin would have used it as a pretext for a broader assault. The same logic could apply again if Russia pauses now, only to restart the war later under more favorable terms.
As such, any diplomatic overture from Moscow must be viewed with caution. Russia has demonstrated time and again that peace, for Putin, is not a goal but a tool. A temporary truce may simply serve as cover for reconstituting forces and seeking a stronger justification for renewed aggression.
Ultimately, the fate of Russia’s summer offensive hinges on two critical variables: Ukraine’s drone production capacity and Russia’s ability to replace its mounting losses. The Kremlin’s war of exhaustion may soon exhaust its own ability to endure. If Ukraine holds the line, and if international support remains steady, this offensive may prove not a pathway to victory for Russia, but the beginning of strategic collapse.
