As Afghanistan reels from the fallout of U.S and allied troop withdrawals, one militant group has emerged more emboldened, brutal, and ideologically rigid than ever before: the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). A branch of the Islamic State operating in Central and South Asia, ISKP poses a grave and growing threat not only to Afghan civilians but also to the fragile Taliban-led government. With its roots in local militancy and ideology inspired by the Islamic State’s core in Iraq and Syria, ISKP is determined to ignite sectarian violence, undermine Taliban legitimacy, and assert its vision of a transnational caliphate through terrorism and bloodshed.
ISKP’s origins are steeped in defection and ideological extremism. It emerged in 2014 when disaffected fighters from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al Qaeda, and the Taliban joined forces, catalyzed by emissaries from the Islamic State’s central command. By January 2015, ISKP was officially founded with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appointing Hafiz Khan Saeed a former TTP commander from Orakzai as its first emir. Saeed’s deep ties in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) provided ISKP with vital recruitment channels. Several high-ranking TTP commanders pledged allegiance early on, giving the fledgling group strategic footholds across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
From its inception, ISKP pursued violent expansion. It launched attacks against Afghan security forces, foreign militaries, and even rival jihadist groups like the Taliban. Notably, Taliban leader Akhtar Mansour urged unity under the Taliban banner in 2015, only for tensions to escalate into open warfare. The Taliban’s elite “Red Unit” commandos launched fierce offensives, particularly in Jowzjan Province, where ISKP fighters surrendered by 2018. Yet, despite tactical defeats, ISKP retained the ability to inflict carnage and even forged murky ties with elements of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban faction. In 2018, the Afghan Ministry of Defense alleged that Haqqani operatives executed an attack falsely claimed by ISKP, hinting at clandestine coordination between supposed rivals.
The group’s resilience has also been tested by international pressure. U.S and former Afghan government forces targeted ISKP strongholds, eliminating key leaders. In March 2020, Afghan forces captured ISKP leader Aslam Farooqi and senior commanders Qari Zahid and Saifullah (Abu Talaha). Meanwhile, Iran collaborated with the Taliban to secure its border and prevent ISKP infiltration. Nonetheless, ISKP adapted. It shifted tactics and leadership, surviving through transformation. In May 2019, the Islamic State announced new provinces in Pakistan and India, slicing away ISKP’s former reach. Yet, in June 2020, Shahab al-Muhajir a former Haqqani Network commander and ISKP urban warfare planner took the reins as emir.
Al-Muhajir ushered in a brutal phase. Under his leadership, ISKP carried out horrifying attacks, including a May 2020 assault on a Kabul maternity ward that killed 24 and a November 2020 massacre at Kabul University that claimed 22 lives. Despite losing territorial control, ISKP retained lethal capabilities through semi-autonomous cells in Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces. By mid-2021, the UN estimated ISKP’s core fighters numbered between 1,500 and 2,200. They may lack the strength to govern, but they retain the power to kill most gruesomely illustrated in the August 26, 2021, suicide bombing at Hamid Karzai International Airport that killed 170 Afghans and 13 U.S personnel.
ISKP’s ideological foundation is rigid and exclusionary. As a wilayah (province) of the Islamic State, it aims to establish a “pure Islamic State” governed by sharia. In 2016, it formalized this vision in its publication Aqidah wa Manhaj al-Dawlah al Islamiah fi al-Takfir, which declared anyone rejecting sharia a kafir (apostate) deserving death. Unlike al Qaeda, ISKP fixates on both the “far enemy” (the West) and the “near enemy” (local apostates). It has repeatedly targeted Afghanistan’s Hazara Shia community, stoking sectarian tensions.
ISKP also harshly criticises the Taliban for engaging in peace talks with the United States. In a 2020 issue of al-Naba, it denounced the Taliban as allies of “crusaders.” By 2021, ISKP propaganda openly called for revenge against the Taliban for their negotiations with the U.S. The group’s ideological doctrine, particularly its commitment to tawhid al-hakimiyyah the belief that only full implementation of sharia law legitimises governance leads it to brand the Taliban as “filthy nationalists” who forsake Islamic unity for ethnic and territorial compromise.
ISKP’s organisational structure is hierarchical. It is led by an emir currently Shahab al-Muhajir who oversees a Shura Council and regional commanders. While earlier leadership consisted mostly of former TTP fighters, today’s ISKP command includes veterans of the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. These men bring battlefield experience and local knowledge. Though ISKP’s ranks include some foreign fighters, the influx from Iraq and Syria has been minimal. Financially, ISKP draws on extortion, local donations, support from Islamic State’s core leadership, and hawala networks in cities like Kabul and Jalalabad.
Tactically, ISKP favors suicide bombings, remote explosives, and mass shootings. From January 2020 to July 2021, the group carried out 83 attacks, killing 309 people. These included attacks on civilians (35), security forces (28), and Taliban fighters (13). Particularly notorious were its attacks on Eid prayers at a Kabul mosque on May 14, 2021, and the execution of Hazara deminers in Baghlan Province on June 8, 2021. A heat map of ISKP attacks since 2017 shows clustering in Kabul, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Jowzjan Provinces each with varying targets and strategic goals.
What makes ISKP particularly dangerous now is the strategic vacuum left behind by U.S. and NATO withdrawals. No longer facing a powerful foreign counter terrorism presence, ISKP is likely to escalate operations against both civilians and Taliban officials. Its August 2021 airport bombing—the deadliest attack since 2018 suggests a renewed effort to exploit Afghanistan’s instability and inflame sectarian divisions. It will also continue efforts to delegitimize the Taliban by painting them as compromisers and nationalist sellouts.
Looking ahead, ISKP’s trajectory depends on the Taliban’s ability to consolidate power, mount an effective counterinsurgency, and gain legitimacy among Afghanistan’s diverse population. It also depends on how regional actors especially Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian states coordinate their responses to ISKP’s cross-border aspirations. ISKP’s ideological zeal, brutality, and operational resilience make it a uniquely potent threat in Afghanistan’s militant landscape. With civilians caught in the crossfire, and the Taliban struggling to transform from insurgents to administrators, ISKP stands poised to capitalise on chaos and reassert itself through terror.
