Aqeel Yousafzai
The recently released figures by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police, claiming that more than 8,000 terrorists are present in the province, have once again brought the debate on militancy and cross-border terrorism to the forefront. While these figures are alarming, I believe they underestimate the actual scale of the problem. My own assessment suggests that the number of active militant operatives and sympathizers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could be far higher, possibly surpassing 14,000 when factoring in the groups working under different banners.
A significant portion of these militants estimated at around 6,500 were initially brought from Afghanistan under certain conditions and resettled in tribal districts. For a brief period, there appeared to be a lull in hostilities, but with the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 2021, the equation shifted drastically. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) not only found ideological and logistical space across the border but also received fresh supplies of weapons, funding, and leadership. This revival emboldened them, allowing for regrouping, recruitment, and expansion of attacks deep inside Pakistan.
The responsibility of the Afghan Taliban government cannot be ignored. Despite repeated visits by Pakistan’s leadership both the prime minister and the foreign minister to Kabul, no meaningful steps have been taken to stop militants from using Afghan soil against Pakistan. On the contrary, Afghan officials have publicly denied that their territory is being exploited for terrorism, even as Pakistan buries its soldiers and civilians martyred in cross-border attacks. The interview of Afghan Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob to the BBC, in which he shifted the blame entirely onto Pakistan’s security apparatus, highlights Kabul’s unwillingness to cooperate sincerely.
This attitude has drawn concern not only in Islamabad but also among regional stakeholders. China, which has facilitated dialogue between the two countries, has privately expressed its displeasure over Kabul’s contradictory posture: taking two steps forward in talks, only to retreat four steps back in actions. India’s own refusal to host Afghan delegations adds another dimension to Kabul’s regional isolation, but unfortunately, Pakistan bears the brunt of its policies in the form of terrorism.
Meanwhile, the cost of this militancy is borne most directly by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Recent reports by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) confirm that more than 138 civilians have lost their lives in attacks in just the last year. Militants are not only ambushing security forces but also attempting to establish checkpoints along key economic routes, including those vital to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This is not simply a law-and-order challenge it is an existential threat to Pakistan’s stability and its economic future.
Operationally, Pakistan’s security forces have carried out nearly 190 operations in the last month alone, with significant successes in Bajaur, Khyber, and North Waziristan. While collateral damage has reduced compared to earlier phases of the war, the nature of guerrilla warfare ensures that risks to civilians cannot be eliminated entirely. Yet, it would be dangerous to assume that kinetic operations alone can bring lasting peace. Militancy has deepened its roots socially, politically, and strategically; defeating it requires far more than military might.
The political leadership must recognize that counterterrorism is not solely the military’s responsibility. The government must engage in genuine consensus-building through forums such as the Apex Committee and ensure that civil institutions rise to the challenge. Unfortunately, successive governments have relied on short-term deals and half-hearted negotiations with groups like the TTP, only to face renewed violence later. The Prime Minister’s recent statement about fresh negotiations raises more questions than answers: under what framework, at what level, and with what safeguards? Pakistan cannot afford a repeat of failed experiments that only allow militants to regroup.
The controversy surrounding Imran Khan’s alleged offer to go to Afghanistan without possessing a valid passport is a distraction from the real issue. What matters is not political point-scoring but developing a coherent state policy. The failure to issue a passport to the former prime minister reflects institutional dysfunction, but such episodes only weaken Pakistan’s bargaining position by projecting disunity. Instead, the government must focus on strengthening coordination between civil and military institutions, revisiting the National Action Plan, and ensuring that policies are consistent and enforceable.
At present, militant groups do not control territory in the way they once did in Swat or Waziristan, but their frequency of attacks has increased alarmingly. This resurgence demonstrates that Pakistan’s counterterrorism approach must evolve. We cannot afford complacency or fractured responses. The Afghan government must be held accountable diplomatically, regional partners must be engaged meaningfully, and domestic institutions must operate with clarity and unity of purpose.
The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who have suffered the most in this prolonged war, deserve nothing less.
