When he surrendered, he did more than lay down his weapon. Jahanzeb’s account; raw, regretful and detailed, offers a rare inside view of how anti-state networks in Balochistan have been grooming a new generation for violence.
“My name is Jahanzeb Ali,” he told investigators in a recorded confession. “In the group I was known as Ali Jan. I worked with Zubair Ahmed. For two years I helped plan operations.” Those are Jahanzeb’s own words, given after a security operation in Chagai that left two suspected militants dead and prompted his decision to give himself up. What he describes is a pipeline: recruitment, radicalisation, operational training and, finally, the impulse to strike at public installations.
His testimony lays out three elements that, taken together, help explain why otherwise ordinary youngsters are drawn into extremism: emotional manipulation, false narratives of honour and victimhood, and the promise of belonging and identity.
The recruitment script: grievance, glory, belonging
According to Jahanzeb, recruiters first latch onto young people’s grievances, real or perceived injustices over jobs, land, or the treatment of families. “They talked about injustice all the time,” he said. “They told us our only answer was to take up arms.” Next comes a reframing of violence as heroic and necessary: targeted attacks are described as sacrifices for the nation or the community. Finally, recruits are folded into tight social networks with intense peer pressure and rewards for obedience.
Jahanzeb singled out certain campus and civic groups, naming local student organisations and committees, as playing confusing or “misleading” roles: presenting themselves as defenders of rights while, he alleges, channelling young activists into militancy. His claim should be read as an allegation that needs independent verification by investigators and civil-society monitors. Still, the pattern he describes, where civic rhetoric becomes a veneer for recruitment, is a recognisable tactic in many conflict zones.
Regional dimension and outside backing
Pakistani security officials and independent analysts say Jahanzeb’s story fits into a wider regional pattern.
The United States has formally designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its Majeed Brigade wing as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
Pakistani authorities maintain that these and other violent factions have exploited safe havens across the Afghan border and benefit from covert external support, particularly from India, allegations now echoing in United States, and Canada like countries, and leading to global concerns expressed on UNGA like forums. Security briefings also describe how such groups overlap with or seek cover through student and civic platforms, including Baloch-based organisations, to spread anti-state propaganda and recruit young men and women.
How propaganda travels: classrooms, coffee shops and smartphones
One striking detail in Jahanzeb’s confession is how recruitment no longer waits for a dusty madrassa classroom or a secret meeting. It travels fast and informal: through student circles, parties, informal “study groups,” and, above all, social media. “We used to meet in houses,” he said. “Now it’s easier, you watch a few videos, read a few posts, feel you are part of something big.” That combination of offline influence and online reinforcement accelerates radicalisation and makes it harder for families and authorities to identify early warning signs.
Turning point: when ideology meets reality
The operation in Chagai became Jahanzeb’s turning point. Faced with an armed confrontation where two of his companions were killed, he says he realised the human cost and futility of the path he had chosen. He claims Zubair shot himself to avoid capture and that Nisar was killed by responding forces, details Jahanzeb has given to investigators and which they are verifying. For Jahanzeb, the deaths of comrades forced a painful reappraisal: “When I saw them fall, I understood this was not the solution.”
Building a case without stigmatising communities
A constructive counter-narrative must thread a careful needle: it needs to delegitimise violent groups and their recruiters without alienating the broader communities whose trust is essential to durable peace. Jahanzeb’s testimony provides three lines of argument authorities and civil society can use:
Expose the mechanics, not just the rhetoric. Publish verified accounts (testimonies, intercepted recruitment materials, finance trails) that show how young people are groomed. Concrete, factual evidence makes it harder for recruiters to hide behind vague slogans.
Humanise the costs. Use stories like Jahanzeb’s and those of victims’ families to show the human toll of violence. Personal narratives undercut the abstractions recruiters use to glorify sacrifice.
Target the vectors. Map recruitment pathways, campus factions, online channels, local “facilitators”, and prioritise interventions there. That means better campus counselling, monitored online counter-messaging, and community watch programmes that respect rights.
Practical countermeasures: prevention, not repression
Experts say effective prevention blends security action with social policy:
• Early-warning and outreach: Train teachers, religious leaders and student counsellors to spot signs of radicalisation and refer youth to counselling and job-placement services rather than only to law enforcement.
• Credible counter-messaging: Fund local voices; teachers, former recruits like Jahanzeb, community elders, artists, to produce locally relevant messages that debunk myths and offer alternative paths to dignity.
• Economic options: Expand vocational training and legitimate employment channels in border districts so young people have real alternatives to joining armed groups.
• Transparent investigations: Where civic groups are accused of wrongdoing, ensure swift, transparent inquiries that protect due process. Public confidence grows when allegations are addressed openly rather than buried.
• Rehabilitation and reintegration: For low-level recruits who surrender, offer deradicalisation programmes that combine counselling, family support and economic reintegration. Jahanzeb’s own remorse suggests the potential value of such second-chance pathways.
A witness who could help change the narrative
Jahanzeb’s testimony is important not only as evidence, it is a tool. When responsibly verified and paired with community outreach, it can be used to educate young people about recruitment tactics and to show that many recruits end up disillusioned. That kind of inside voice is precisely what counters the glamour that recruiters sell.
Also Read: Brother Nations, Enduring Rivals: Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Unfinished Story
Ending the cycle will not be quick. But if security operations are matched by transparent policing, civic accountability and sustained social investment, the same communities that once provided cover for recruiters can become the first line of defence against them. Jahanzeb’s choice to speak, whatever his motives, offers a fragile but usable opening. Turning that opening into lasting change will require steady, rights-respecting work by authorities, civil society and the communities themselves.
