In a deeply alarming development, Syria’s interim government has formally integrated a Central Asian jihadist group closely tied to Al Qaeda into its national army, despite repeated warnings from Washington. The group, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), is composed primarily of Uighur militants and maintains close operational and ideological ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The move signals an emboldening of transnational jihadist networks that have flourished in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and now threaten to entrench themselves within the structure of the new Syrian state.
On May 18, Syria’s Defense Ministry announced the incorporation of the TIP into its regular forces under the newly created 84th Division. The decision came shortly after Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra declared that all major armed factions, many of them foreign jihadists, would be absorbed by the Ministry of Defense.
The integration came just four days after U.S. President Donald Trump met with Syrian interim President Ahmad al Sharaa—himself a designated global terrorist by both the U.S. government and the United Nations and the former head of Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. During the meeting, President Trump delivered a series of demands, chief among them the expulsion of all foreign terrorist fighters from Syria. The Syrian regime’s defiance highlights the growing influence of Taliban-aligned militant factions in post-war Syria.
TIP’s Deep Roots in Al Qaeda and Taliban Networks
The Turkistan Islamic Party, though framed by its leadership as a separatist group fighting for Uighur independence, has long been a component of Al Qaeda’s global network. Based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the group receives ideological guidance, logistical support, and battlefield coordination from the Taliban, with whom it has fought alongside for decades.
TIP’s leader, Abdul Haq al Turkistani (real name: Maimaitiming Maimaiti), is a seasoned jihadi who serves on Al Qaeda’s executive leadership council. He was first given command of TIP following the death of its founder, Hassan Mahsum, in a 2003 Pakistani military operation at an Al Qaeda training facility in South Waziristan. Before that, Turkistani operated Al Qaeda’s light-weapons training camp in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, with direct support from Osama bin Laden.
Following the collapse of the Taliban’s first regime in 2001, Turkistani helped relocate and reestablish TIP training camps in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In 2005, he was appointed to Al Qaeda’s top advisory body and was sanctioned by both the U.S. Treasury and the UN Security Council. According to U.S. intelligence, he remains a senior strategist within Al Qaeda and oversees TIP operations in Syria from Afghanistan.
TIP played an instrumental role in supporting the Taliban’s violent return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Turkistani and other TIP leaders were seen publicly celebrating the Taliban’s military victory during Eid al-Fitr in May 2022, underlining the enduring alliance between the two jihadist movements.
Zahid’s Role in Syria’s Islamist Militarization
The integration of TIP into Syria’s army was preceded by the December 2024 promotion of six foreign jihadists, including TIP’s senior commander in Syria, Abdulaziz Dawud Hudaberdi, known by his nom de guerre Zahid, to the rank of brigadier general. Zahid has served as TIP’s top military commander in Syria since 2012 and has led thousands of operations targeting Russian, Iranian, and former Assad regime forces.
Zahid’s record includes leadership roles under the banners of the Al Nusrah Front and its successor, Hayat Tahrir al Sham—both of which are listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. State Department. Ahmad al Sharaa, now interim president of Syria, previously led both groups and remains under global terrorism sanctions. In 2021, Zahid graduated from a military institution in Idlib, further institutionalizing his role within Syria’s insurgent command structure.
The Threat of a Wider Jihadist Consolidation
The integration of TIP fighters into the Syrian army raises the likelihood that other Taliban- and Al Qaeda-affiliated foreign militant groups could be granted similar status. Among those considered likely to follow are the Katibat Imam al Bukhari, Mujahidin Ghuroba Division, Islamic Jihad Union, and Ajnad al Kavkaz—all of which have established operational footprints in Syria and maintain direct links to the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus.
The TIP alone fields thousands of fighters within Syria, making it one of the largest foreign terrorist contingents in the country. The formal inclusion of these jihadist elements into the Syrian military structure not only grants them state protection but also provides them with increased access to weaponry, logistical resources, and legitimacy.
U.S. Pressure Rebuffed by Damascus
The decision to integrate the TIP starkly contradicts U.S. foreign policy objectives. Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the United States made the expulsion of foreign jihadist fighters a key condition for lifting sanctions. In March 2025, a formal diplomatic note was sent to Damascus reiterating this demand. However, Sharaa has repeatedly delayed compliance, defending the continued presence of foreign fighters as a reward for their role in ousting Assad.
The Taliban’s growing influence in Syria’s jihadist landscape presents a direct challenge to counterterrorism efforts. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has reemerged as a global hub for training and coordination of jihadist groups. Now, with the TIP entrenched in Syria’s formal military apparatus, the threat has gone transnational.
A Growing Global Jihadist Bloc
The empowerment of Al Qaeda-linked factions under the Taliban’s patronage and their integration into the security structures of foreign governments such as Syria’s interim regime marks a new and dangerous phase in the global jihadist movement. The TIP, acting as a bridge between Central Asian, Afghan, and Levantine jihadist theaters, exemplifies the evolving nature of the Taliban’s international influence.
The Syrian interim government’s choice to empower such groups not only undermines the country’s post-conflict legitimacy but signals a broader realignment in favor of Taliban-Al Qaeda ideology. Left unchecked, this could result in the institutionalization of global jihadist networks within state militaries—a development that threatens regional and international security.
