Reeling from a crushing defeat in Afghanistan and the near-total collapse of its leadership and military infrastructure, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) has shifted its strategy from armed insurgency to criminal survival. With its operational capabilities decimated, the group is now relying on cybercrime, kidnappings, and extortion as primary means to fund its dwindling activities.
Once known for orchestrating brutal militant attacks, IS-K’s recent focus has pivoted almost entirely to financial desperation. Its official magazine Al-Azaim has increasingly featured appeals for donations, regularly publishing bank account details and cryptocurrency addresses in a plea for funds from sympathizers worldwide.
In a troubling escalation, IS-K’s fatwa division recently issued a religious ruling unilaterally authorizing the hacking of non-Muslims’ bank accounts and the theft of their funds. This so-called theological sanction aims to provide cover for cyber theft, reflecting the group’s growing reliance on digital crime and its willingness to abandon ideological boundaries in pursuit of survival.
At the same time, the group has ramped up on-the-ground criminal activities in both Afghanistan and Syria. Businessmen and their relatives have been abducted for ransom in a string of coordinated kidnappings that now serve as a core revenue stream. These operations are seen as low-risk, high-reward, and require minimal resources—making them ideal for a militant group in retreat.
Planning for these schemes predates the current crisis. In 1443 AH (2021–22), ISIS’s Syrian leadership issued confidential directives to local commanders to independently manage economic operations. The instructions included securing logistical assets such as vehicles, safe houses, and operating funds, with an emphasis on secrecy and decentralization.
Despite orchestrating these crimes, ISIS deliberately avoids claiming responsibility. The group conceals its involvement to protect its fragile reputation among remaining supporters and to obscure the criminal nature of its financial strategy.
As per Al-Mirsaad, credible internal documents and verifiable intelligence confirm that IS-K’s financial wing has carried out multiple kidnappings in recent months, with further disclosures expected in the near future.
Stripped of manpower, territory, and legitimacy, ISIS now stands exposed not as a revolutionary force, but as a crumbling network increasingly indistinguishable from an organized crime syndicate.
