Afghanistan’s reported invitation to the United States to return and explore the country’s vast mineral resources may appear, at first glance, to be an economic proposition. But given the history of the past two decades, it deserves to be examined through a much wider geopolitical lens.
The United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan. It supported successive governments in Kabul, helped build the Afghan National Army and fought a prolonged war against the Taliban and other resistance groups. Yet, after years of conflict, Washington eventually negotiated directly with the Taliban in Doha, leading to the agreement that paved the way for the American withdrawal.
The Taliban now describe themselves as the rulers of an independent Afghanistan, free to establish economic and diplomatic relations with whichever countries they choose. From that perspective, inviting American companies and specialists to explore Afghanistan’s reported mineral wealth can be presented as a sovereign economic decision.
But economics rarely exists in isolation in this region.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian states sit on a potentially enormous resource base, yet they lack many of the financial, technological and corporate capabilities required to fully explore and develop those resources. This creates an obvious opening for major international companies.
The question, therefore, is not simply whether American companies could invest in Afghanistan. The bigger question is what would have to accompany such an investment?
If American mining companies, engineers and technical specialists enter Afghanistan in significant numbers, they will require security. Large-scale projects will require logistical infrastructure, communications and protection. The United States would have to determine how its personnel and investments would be protected in a country where security remains a major concern.
That is where the economic invitation acquires a strategic dimension.
America and the Taliban: Enemies, Negotiators or Something More Complicated?
It would be simplistic to describe US-Taliban relations as permanently hostile.
The two sides fought a long war, but they also negotiated for 18 months in Doha. Prisoners have been exchanged, American delegations have maintained contact with the Taliban, and Washington has continued to deal with the realities created by the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan.
There is therefore a difference between formal political recognition and practical engagement.
The Taliban may remain outside the conventional international diplomatic framework in many respects, but that does not prevent countries from dealing with them on security, economic or humanitarian matters.
The invitation to the United States could consequently be viewed as another step in this pragmatic engagement.
Yet Washington will also have its own calculations. Afghanistan remains under intense international scrutiny because of concerns over militant organizations operating from or around its territory. The Taliban’s internal challenges, pressure from neighboring countries and resistance movements in parts of the country add further complications.
For the United States, therefore, any return would not simply be about minerals.
The Weapons Left Behind
One of the most consequential legacies of the American withdrawal was the vast quantity of military equipment left in Afghanistan.
The argument that this was merely an unavoidable consequence of a hurried withdrawal deserves scrutiny. Whatever the original calculations, the subsequent circulation of American- and NATO-origin weapons created a serious regional security concern.
Weapons and equipment that were intended for Afghan security forces ended up circulating through different channels, with concerns that some ultimately reached militant organizations and black markets.
For Pakistan, this is not an abstract problem.
Pakistan has faced militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, while the presence and activities of militant organizations operating from Afghan territory have remained a central point of friction between Islamabad and Kabul.
This is why Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan should not be reduced to a demand that Kabul adopt a particular foreign policy.
Afghanistan is an independent country and has the right to develop relations with India, the United States or any other country. Pakistan’s fundamental concern should be much narrower and much clearer: Afghan territory must not be used against Pakistan.
That principle should remain at the center of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
The CPEC Question
There is another dimension that cannot be ignored: regional connectivity.
Pakistan has repeatedly spoken of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its ambition to connect Pakistan with Central Asia. But connectivity requires more than roads and agreements. It requires an environment in which investors believe their people, projects and capital will be safe.
Consider the situation in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In areas such as Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Tank, persistent insecurity makes investment difficult even for domestic businesses.
If a Pakistani investor is reluctant to establish a small business in an area because of the security situation, expecting a foreign corporation to commit billions of dollars there becomes even more unrealistic.
Investment follows security.
If insecurity drives away investors, it also undermines development. And when development disappears, unemployment and poverty become more entrenched, creating conditions in which militancy can find further space.
That cycle must be broken.
Pakistan Cannot Afford to Lose the Region
The regional economic picture is changing.
Afghanistan is geographically positioned between Pakistan, Central Asia, China and Iran. If one route becomes unreliable, trade does not necessarily stop. It moves.
Central Asian states can develop alternative routes through Iran. Afghanistan can redirect commercial activity through other border crossings. International investors can choose different corridors.
Pakistan therefore risks losing not only current trade but also future strategic relevance if its connectivity routes remain unreliable.
For decades, Pakistan has talked about using its geography as an economic advantage. But geography is an opportunity only when infrastructure, security and policy work together.
Closing borders may address an immediate concern, but prolonged closures can also push businesses, supply chains and investment towards competing routes.
A Different Approach to Internal Security
The experience of local peace committees in parts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also deserves serious consideration.
The objective should not be to encourage civilians to operate outside the law or to create parallel armed structures. That would undermine the state’s authority and the discipline of its security institutions.
But where local communities have legitimate concerns about insecurity, they should be heard.
The reported understandings involving peace committees in Bannu and Lakki Marwat contain an important principle: civilian participation and local knowledge can coexist with formal security structures, provided everyone operates within the law and under proper command.
There is a significant difference between a community demanding security and civilians taking security operations into their own hands.
The former should be encouraged. The latter should not.
If police, CTD, FC, Army and local communities can work within a coordinated legal framework, the state gains something it cannot manufacture from Islamabad or Peshawar alone: local knowledge.
People know their villages, their communities and the networks operating around them.
That knowledge, combined with professional intelligence and disciplined security operations, can make counterterrorism more effective.
The Real Choice
The question before Pakistan is not whether Afghanistan should be allowed to engage with America.
Nor is it whether Afghanistan should be allowed to exploit its mineral resources.
The real question is whether Pakistan will understand the rapidly changing economic and strategic landscape around it and respond intelligently.
If Afghanistan succeeds in attracting international investment, develops its mineral resources and connects itself more deeply with Central Asia, Pakistan can either become an important economic partner in that transformation—or watch those opportunities pass around it.
If regional connectivity is the goal, Pakistan cannot simultaneously allow insecurity, mistrust and unpredictable border policies to make its own territory the least attractive route.
Security is essential.
But security and economic policy cannot operate in separate worlds.
Pakistan needs an Afghan policy that protects its national interests without permanently closing the door to trade, connectivity and regional economic integration.
The alternative is a region that moves forward through other routes while Pakistan remains trapped behind its own barriers.
