Pakistan was among the first and most vocal supporters of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan when the Taliban retook Kabul in August 2021. Islamabad viewed the fall of the Ashraf Ghani-led Republic as an opportunity to enhance its strategic influence after two decades of war, believing that a friendly government in Kabul could counter India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan. Pakistan kept its embassy operational when most countries left, assisted civilians during the NATO withdrawal, and lobbied the international community for humanitarian support in Afghanistan.
Four and a half years later, Pakistan has seen few tangible benefits from these efforts. Instead, it has borne the brunt of cross-border terrorism as the Taliban have shown limited willingness or capacity to prevent Afghan soil from being used for attacks against Pakistan.
Terrorism has long exacted a heavy toll on Pakistan. Since the beginning of the “War on Terror,” over 80,000 people, including security personnel, civilians, and children, have lost their lives, with incidents like the Army Public School attack in 2014 claiming 132 students. Economic losses, including damaged infrastructure and disrupted investment, are estimated to exceed $150 billion.
Following the Taliban’s return to power, Islamabad had anticipated a reduction in violence. The reality has been the opposite. A new wave of cross-border attacks, largely attributed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has emerged. International reports, including those from the United Nations and the US SIGAR, indicate that militant groups continue to operate in Afghanistan, enabled by the Taliban’s appeasement policies and ideological proximity. Current estimates suggest approximately 6,000–6,500 TTP fighters remain in Afghanistan, alongside elements of al-Qaida and Islamic State Khorasan Province.
Another major concern for Pakistan is the growing participation of Afghan nationals in attacks. In 2025 alone, Pakistan conducted over 75,000 intelligence-based operations, eliminating 2,597 terrorists, of whom 220 were Afghan nationals. Afghan involvement now accounts for roughly 70 percent of all attacks, up from single-digit percentages in 2022.
Initially, Pakistan adopted a cautious, engagement-focused approach to avoid confrontation with the Taliban government. This included bilateral dialogues, religious mediation, and regional diplomatic initiatives. Senior Pakistani officials repeatedly raised security concerns with Kabul, while multilateral forums—including China, Russia, and Gulf states—were leveraged to urge the Taliban to honor commitments made in Doha. The UAE also mediated agreements for the relocation of TTP fighters away from Pakistan’s border regions.
Efforts extended to tribal and religious intermediaries, such as the 2022 delegation led by Mufti Taqi Usmani, aimed at persuading both the Taliban and TTP to cease attacks. While some assurances were received, most promises remained unfulfilled. Pakistan alleges the Taliban have not taken credible action to move TTP fighters from border regions, eroding Islamabad’s confidence in dialogue as a stand-alone tool.
The Taliban’s growing international presence has added to Pakistan’s unease. While formal recognition remains limited—Russia being the only country to date—the Taliban have steadily expanded diplomatic and economic engagements, now maintaining a presence in 39 capitals. Pakistan views this normalization as emboldening the Taliban to disregard Islamabad’s security concerns, creating a perceived imbalance in regional priorities.
Pakistan’s strategic anxieties are further compounded by warming Taliban-India ties. India has re-established a diplomatic presence in Kabul, increased humanitarian support, and expanded high-level political contacts, including recognition of a Taliban-nominated ambassador. These developments are perceived in Islamabad as a form of strategic encirclement reminiscent of historical patterns, intensifying concerns about Afghanistan becoming an arena of regional competition.
In response to repeated failures in dialogue, Pakistan has evolved its Afghan policy toward a “2-D strategy” of deterrence and dialogue. While diplomacy remains central, Islamabad has signaled readiness for precise, limited airstrikes against TTP targets. Between September and October 2025, airstrikes targeted TTP hideouts, training facilities, and command structures, including an attempt to decapitate senior leadership. Dialogue continues through direct and indirect channels, with facilitation from countries such as Turkiye and Qatar.
Pakistan’s approach reflects a calibrated attempt to safeguard security while maintaining diplomatic avenues. The challenge remains whether the combination of deterrence and dialogue can compel the Taliban to take verifiable action against the TTP without escalating conflict. Balancing these elements is critical to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a destabilizing factor for Pakistan’s internal security.
