For years, global concern regarding the Afghan Taliban has taken a near-uniform shape. From Western capitals to regional forums, the refrain has been familiar: the Afghan Taliban have broken promises, violated the Doha Agreement, backtracked on commitments to human rights, especially women’s rights, and refused to fulfil counter-terrorism assurances. The deeper explanation, according to Afghan media and security sources, lies in a secret pact formed long before Kabul’s fall.
This document, confirmed by sources linked to regional militant networks, outlined a clear understanding: once the Islamic Emirate returned to power in Afghanistan, it would actively support allied groups under the banner of jihad and facilitate the establishment of a Sharia-based order in Pakistan. For the Taliban leadership, this ideological commitment outweighed any dealings with non-Muslim powers or those seen as violators of faith. Analysts argue that this secret accord explains the Afghan Taliban’s dual behaviour toward Pakistan and the international community, particularly as India’s overt support for Kabul has grown, positioning New Delhi as a beneficiary of this arrangement.
In Khost province, where Taliban checkpoints are often symbolic rather than functional, Ikramullah Mehsud operates with near-total freedom. Officials greet him as the killer of Benazir Bhutto, while his vehicle is kept perpetually fueled by Taliban fighters — a mix of obligation and local hospitality. Nearly two decades earlier, he had been involved in the assassination plot against Bhutto in Liaquat Bagh, a role he publicly acknowledged only after 2021 while moving freely across eastern Afghanistan.
Ikramullah’s mobility is not unique. Senior Pakistani Taliban leaders, including Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Azmatullah Mehsud, Akhtar Mohammad Khalil, and Mufti Sadiq Noor Dawar, routinely move between Kabul, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, slipping back into Pakistan’s tribal districts as needed. Their presence has produced an informal geography of militancy, shaped by quiet understandings with local Taliban authorities. Gul Bahadur, like Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, remains largely unseen, his invisibility reinforcing authority. In Khost province, entire villages along the frontier have adapted to the presence of Pakistani Taliban fighters, with local practices reflecting this influence.
After Pakistani airstrikes in Spera district in April 2022, Gul Bahadur relocated to Paktika but retained influence through madrassas, safe houses, and tribal networks. Afghan officials, including the interior minister and deputy defence minister, met with him and other Taliban-linked figures. Tribal elders report that assurances, such as the potential creation of a new district for the Madakhel tribe, were offered to militants, but Pakistan pressured Kabul to stall the move. The Taliban responded by establishing a checkpoint as a show of authority.
Since the fall of the Afghan Republic, compounds of former Khost Protection Force battalions have been occupied by Gul Bahadur’s deputies. Weapons stored in these posts were seized by Pakistani Taliban commanders, some of whom travelled by air between Kabul and Kandahar before being killed in mysterious attacks. By mid-2025, tensions escalated as Pakistan warned tribal leaders to negotiate or face military operations, especially after a deadly suicide attack on Pakistani troops in North Waziristan. Bahadur’s faction, the United Mujahideen Council, claimed responsibility, reaffirming its focus on Pakistan’s tribal districts.
Multiple battalions aligned with Bahadur, including Jaish Umari, Fursan Muhammad, and Ghazian Caravan, continued cross-border operations. Pakistan formally added his group to its list of proscribed organizations in July 2024, marking a dramatic reversal from 2006, when Bahadur’s faction was considered pragmatic and negotiable. After Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, his fighters relocated to the Afghan side of the Durand Line and rebuilt networks there.
The Mir Ali Agreement
Before Kabul fell in August 2021, a significant gathering in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, solidified the framework behind these operations. Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda figures, and leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur signed a document promising that once the Islamic Emirate regained power, it would support allied groups and facilitate the establishment of a Sharia-based order in Pakistan. After Pakistan’s airstrikes in Khost in 2022, the Afghan Taliban defence minister summoned TTP and Bahadur in Kabul. When pressed to halt attacks on Pakistan, Bahadur reportedly presented the Mir Ali document as a reminder of their earlier commitment, underlining the pact’s continuing influence.
Following the killing of al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul, senior Taliban leaders advised TTP and al Qaeda figures to relocate to border provinces. Mufti Noor Wali moved to Kunar while continuing to travel to Kabul. Afghan media reported his visits to hospitals and other locations, shortly before Pakistani strikes targeted the city, highlighting persistent operational links between Afghan Taliban units and TTP militants operating inside Pakistan.
Relocation and Operations
Under Pakistani pressure, the Afghan Taliban attempted to relocate TTP fighters away from the border to northern and central provinces. The fighters rejected the plan, arguing that it would sever ties to their tribal homeland. By early 2025, only limited numbers of families were moved to Ghazni and Kandahar under pseudonyms, receiving stipends and residing in secured compounds. Many eventually returned to Khost and Paktika, maintaining the cross-border operational footprint. Afghan Taliban fighters were also observed joining TTP operations and dying in Pakistan’s northern districts.
Weapons and Resources
Despite a 2024 decree centralising weapons under Taliban supreme authority in Kandahar, black-market arms continued to flow. Regional security officials noted TTP fighters gaining access to advanced weapons, including M4 rifles and commercial quadcopters, further bolstering cross-border operations.
