As Sudan’s devastating civil war enters its third year, hopes for resolution are dimming. Far from winding down, the conflict is escalating geographically, militarily, and politically. The Sudanese army’s recapture of Khartoum in March 2025 marked a dramatic turning point, but instead of opening a path to peace, it has emboldened both sides to dig in for further confrontation. Unless a concerted regional and international push is made to de-escalate the war and jump start peace talks, Sudan risks fragmentation, and its neighbours could be pulled into a broader conflagration.
The roots of the current war lie in the power-sharing arrangement following the fall of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir. Bashir’s attempt to coup-proof his regime by empowering the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) a paramilitary militia drawn largely from Darfur created the foundation for today’s disaster. After ousting Bashir in 2019, the army and RSF jointly ruled Sudan until a failed transition to civilian governance broke down into open warfare in April 2023. Since then, the capital, Khartoum, and much of Sudan’s periphery have become battlegrounds.
For much of the war, the RSF had the upper hand. It besieged military holdouts in Khartoum, seized most of Darfur (except North Darfur), and gained control over parts of Kordofan and Sudan’s riverine centre. But the tide turned in mid-2024 when the Sudanese army launched a broad counteroffensive. In early 2025, the army reclaimed major parts of greater Khartoum, including the presidential palace in March—a symbolically potent victory. RSF fighters fled west, some to Omdurman and others to strongholds in Darfur and Kordofan.
This shift in battlefield momentum has brought a dangerous sense of triumphalism to the army, whose leadership sees the capture of Khartoum not just as a tactical win but a conclusive one. However, this perception is misleading and dangerous. Although the RSF has been weakened, it remains capable and well-armed, still receiving external support, especially from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its leadership is not inclined toward surrender; instead, it seeks to expand the war to new fronts.
Indeed, February saw a new RSF alliance with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North), a historic rebel group operating along the South Sudanese border. The two groups have since launched joint offensives in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The RSF has also declared intentions to move north, targeting regions that had so far remained insulated from direct fighting. These offensives are poised to further tear at Sudan’s fragile ethnic and communal fabric. Meanwhile, the Sudanese army’s strategy of arming local militias to counter the RSF is also sowing the seeds of future instability. These militias, if left unchecked, could turn eastern Sudan into a lawless zone. In trying to vanquish one rival, the army may be creating several more.
The international dimension of the war only deepens its complexity. Sudan has become a theatre for power projection among Arab and African capitals. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have supported the Sudanese army; the UAE has backed the RSF. These rivalries set against the strategic importance of Sudan’s Red Sea coastline threaten to prolong the war and spread it beyond Sudan’s borders. Chad and South Sudan, in particular, are at risk. Accusations that Chad has become a conduit for RSF arms could reignite proxy wars reminiscent of the early 2000s. South Sudan, facing its own brewing internal tensions, could see its fragile stability shattered by spillover conflict.
To prevent a regional implosion, a new diplomatic strategy is urgently needed—one that goes beyond humanitarian appeals and insists on political resolution. The path forward begins with leverage. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as key patrons of the Sudanese army, must urge General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to use the momentum gained from Khartoum’s recapture to pivot toward negotiations. A reconstruction package, possibly spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and contingent on a ceasefire, could offer a powerful incentive. Venues such as Jeddah or Manama already host to previous talks could provide a neutral stage for dialogue.
Meanwhile, the UAE must recalibrate its approach. As the RSF’s most influential external supporter, Abu Dhabi bears a responsibility to encourage its ally to come to the table. Existing back channels between the RSF and the army have failed, but renewed efforts at détente could help break the impasse. Without Emirati cooperation, any peace process is likely to falter.
In parallel, Egypt and the African Union should coordinate more closely to harmonise their efforts with Sudanese civilian groups. A unity civilian government acceptable to a wide cross-section of Sudanese society must be part of the political horizon. Mediators must work now to make that vision credible and viable.
Western actors cannot afford to sit idly by. While the Trump administration has thus far shown little interest in Sudan, its diplomatic weight remains significant. The United States, through its ties with Riyadh, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi, is uniquely positioned to catalyse a peace initiative. If President Donald Trump wishes to bolster his credentials as a global peacemaker, Sudan offers a worthy and urgent stage.
European diplomacy also has a role. The United Kingdom should use its upcoming second-anniversary conference on the war, scheduled for 15 April in London, to push for new strategies for conflict resolution. This meeting should build on last year’s humanitarian pledging conference in Paris. Britain must coordinate closely with the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland—especially given the current ambiguity in U.S. foreign policy.
Time is running out. If peace talks stall or never materialise, Sudan faces the real risk of de facto partition, with rival governments forming in Khartoum and rebel-held areas. Such an outcome would render Sudan ungovernable and destabilise an already volatile region for years to come.
The opportunity still exists for diplomacy to silence the guns. But it will require the coordinated will of those with influence over the warring parties, a willingness to compromise, and a shared commitment to preventing the further disintegration of Sudan. The world’s worst humanitarian crisis cannot be allowed to spiral into an uncontainable regional war. Peace, however fragile or delayed, must be given a chance.
