The Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sohail Afridi, has issued new policy guidelines on peace and security while chairing his first cabinet meeting. These guidelines repeat the demand that the federal government implement KP’s resolutions on law and order, a demand earlier voiced during what was termed an Aman Jirga in the provincial assembly. Although called a jirga, it resembled more of an all party conference. Still, since the government insists on calling it a jirga, let it be so.
In that jirga’s declaration, the provincial government placed responsibility for the security of settled and inland areas on the KP administration, and claimed that the Counter Terrorism Department would lead the fight against terrorism. Yet, in contrast, the Chief Minister has now announced the withdrawal of action in aid of civil power, a measure invoked under Article 245 when the Awami National Party government summoned the Pakistan Army to fight militants. Since then, the army has remained deployed, conducting intelligence based operations, and as highlighted by the DG ISPR, carrying out tens of thousands of counter terror actions this year alone.
By terminating action in aid of civil power, the KP government clearly seeks to restrict the army’s operational role and to push forces back to the border belt. Under this proposed arrangement, policing and counter terrorism responsibilities inside KP would fall solely on the CTD and the police. The question is whether the provincial government truly wishes to expel the army from the battlefield, and if so, what cost this decision will carry.
Political Claims Versus Ground Realities
If the army is removed from counter militancy operations, the consequences are predictable. The only reason militant activity remains confined to certain pockets is because the army acts as a wall of resistance, preventing further territorial spread. Major attacks in South Waziristan, Bajaur, Wana Cadet College, Islamabad and elsewhere demonstrate that militancy remains organised, determined, and deeply embedded. If the army is pulled back, there is little room for doubt. The Taliban will move forward, and they can eventually take over the entire province.
The CTD and the police do not have the capability to deter this advance. Their current strength, preparedness, and training do not match the demands of fighting hardened militants who have waged a structured war for two decades. The heavy campaigns of previous years required artillery, jets, drones, and sophisticated equipment. Whole regions were evacuated during operations in Swat, Malakand, North Waziristan, Tirah, Kurram, Orakzai and other areas. Taliban groups retreated across the border during these offensives only to return once civilians resettled. Today they maintain a full presence inside KP and beyond, with administrative structures of their own.
The IG himself has acknowledged that the police force cannot confront this threat. The police cannot even contain local mafias operating openly in Peshawar, from land mafias to drug and adulteration networks. How then can they withstand trained militants equipped with advanced weaponry. The mismatch is total.
Given this situation, the federal government is unlikely to accept the KP government’s decision to revoke action in aid of civil power. The jirga offered no strategy, no actionable plan, and no practical framework. It simply repeated demands while ignoring operational realities.
Regional Fault Lines and the Need for a Pashtun Jirga
The Pakistan Afghanistan issue needs negotiation, not confrontation. These are neighbouring countries with shared people, history, culture, and faith. War is not an option, nor should it ever be. If one wants genuine peace, the route runs through Peshawar. Any meaningful dialogue with Kabul must include a Pashtun jirga based in KP. Such a jirga can travel to the Afghan Taliban leadership and negotiate with credibility rooted in shared identity and respect.
Instead, Pakistan has engaged external channels such as Turkey and Qatar. At one point it even requested a fatwa from the Afghan Taliban’s Ameer ul Momineen. For a country with large armed forces and paramilitary strength, asking another state to issue a fatwa for national peace sends a message of weakness. Moreover, in the Afghan Taliban system, the Ameer ul Momineen does not issue fatwas, he issues orders. His authority extends over the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, which has pledged allegiance to him. Depending on such measures reflects a diplomatic misstep rather than a strategy.
The Afghan Taliban leadership has already signalled that they no longer prioritise relations with Pakistan as before. They are diversifying trade and reducing dependency on Pakistan. This inevitably means friction will increase, and they are unlikely to assist Pakistan in tackling militancy. If anything, they may encourage actors like the TTP, who are giving Pakistan a difficult time.
Expectation Versus Reality in Cross Border Security
Expecting Afghanistan to guard Pakistan’s security is unrealistic. No country protects another. Pakistan must secure itself. Law enforcement agencies must perform their responsibilities, yet the political leadership is absent from this effort. Neither federal nor provincial governments have shown any capability, whether in warfare or diplomacy. They occupy seats without fulfilling obligations. Assemblies described even by political parties as rubber stamp institutions cannot deliver peace or reform.
Pakistan needs leadership with integrity, accountability, and courage. Only individuals rooted in local realities, particularly Pashtuns with moral authority and clarity, can speak truth to institutions in Islamabad, negotiate with the Afghan Taliban, and confront the TTP honestly. Characterless people cannot solve this crisis.
As for why the Afghan Taliban support the TTP, the answer lies in understanding basic realities. The TTP and Afghan Taliban fought together for years, along with fighters from Al Qaeda, East Turkestan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Arab world, Africa, Bangladesh, and Burma. The Afghan Taliban did not fight the United States and NATO alone. The TTP played a major operational role, including attacks that killed high ranking CIA officers. Their loyalty to the Afghan Taliban is sealed by allegiance. Breaking that allegiance would not only weaken the TTP, it could destabilise the Islamic Emirate itself.
The Afghan Taliban therefore cannot and will not act against the TTP simply because Pakistan demands it. Understanding this basic truth is necessary. Misunderstanding it ensures failure.
What Comes Next
If Pakistan and Afghanistan continue drifting apart, tensions will rise. If Kabul focuses on alternative trade routes and distances itself from Pakistan, it will have no incentive to control militants targeting Pakistan. The TTP will remain emboldened. Pakistan must accept that only its own institutions and its own people can secure its territory.
Solutions require honesty, realism, and leadership with character. Until then, confusion will persist, goals will remain out of reach, and Pakistan’s security will continue to face grave challenges.
