Zahir Shah Sherazi
On April 27, 2025, Pakistan’s security forces conducted a major operation in North Waziristan, eliminating 71 terrorists. Among the dead was Ahmed Zubair, a Bangladeshi national with a past in Tablighi Jamaat, later recruited by Karatam faction of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). His presence in the tribal belt is not an isolated case. In fact, open-source social media accounts suggest at least eight more Bangladeshi nationals have joined TTP ranks in Pakistan.
This is not just a security breach — it is a serious geopolitical development. The presence of non-Pakistani nationals, including Bangladeshis and Azerbaijanis, within terror ranks operating inside Pakistan points to an international dimension of the insurgency. It also lends alarming credence to Pakistan’s long-standing claim: that TTP is not merely a domestic insurgent group, but a tool in a larger proxy war being waged against the Pakistani state.
The distance between Dhaka and North Waziristan is not trivial. Bangladesh shares no border with Pakistan or Afghanistan. Its only geographical adjacency is with India and therein lies the strategic question: how are Bangladeshi nationals entering Pakistan’s tribal areas to join the TTP? The route is not accidental. It is indicative of an organized international network aiding TTP with recruitment, logistics, finances, and weaponry — most likely orchestrated from across Pakistan’s eastern border.
The strategic purpose appears twofold. One, to enrich the anti-Pakistan proxy network by injecting foreign recruits, particularly those ideologically hostile to Pakistan. Two, to potentially sow the seeds of militancy within Bangladesh itself, expanding the footprint of extremist ideologies regionally a move that could destabilize South Asia far beyond Pakistan.
Earlier incidents also lend weight to this evolving trend. In 2024, two Bangladeshi nationals Shamim Mahfooz and Faisal were arrested by Bangladeshi authorities after returning from TTP training camps in Afghanistan. Their network was growing then, and now, it is manifesting operationally inside Pakistan.
The presence of foreign fighters is not limited to Waziristan. In Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali, counterterrorism operations neutralised terrorists with names like Ibrahim and Ibn Tamimah individuals believed to have Bangladeshi origins. Similarly, the attempted attack on a GYF meeting included an Azerbaijani suicide bomber, whose involvement was confirmed by law enforcement officials. Such incidents confirm that Pakistan has become a central convergence point for transnational terrorist elements.
A social media handler operating under the pseudonym Saifullah has claimed, through shifting IP addresses across Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet, that more Bangladeshis are actively fighting under TTP’s umbrella in Pakistan. His open boasts point to an emerging digital recruitment hub, one that is ideologically exporting radicalism from South Asia’s eastern flank to its western tribal regions.
The Taliban government in Kabul repeatedly assures the world that Afghan soil will not be used against any country. Yet, the opposite continues to occur. Not only are TTP and ISKP camps thriving in Afghanistan, but there is also no action being taken against Al-Qaeda factions operating from provinces like Nuristan, Paktia, Kunar, and Kost. Nearly 20 Afghan districts are believed to be under the influence of ISK and Al-Qaeda, while TTP leaders openly command operations from Afghan sanctuaries.
Former Afghan official Umar Daudzai, who served as advisor to Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, candidly admitted that the current Taliban government lacks both the will and the moral credibility to act against these groups. He even warned the international community including Russia that embracing the Taliban diplomatically will result in long-term regret.
This duplicity is further complicated by India’s expanding soft-power initiatives in Afghanistan. Under the guise of humanitarian aid and medical programmes such as “Jaipur Foot,” India has been subtly expanding its footprint in Kabul a city that is geographically close to Pakistan but diplomatically distant. Pakistan’s own hospitals in Peshawar treat nearly 80% of Afghan limb-loss patients, yet Indian-run paraplegic aid projects are now being celebrated in Kabul a move viewed by many as symbolic posturing designed to marginalize Pakistan’s relevance.
The Afghan Taliban wants trade, access to CPEC, and Chinese development assistance. Yet it remains reluctant to curb the activities of TTP, ISKP, or even Uyghur militants threatening China. This selective inaction confirms that the Taliban is leveraging these groups as bargaining chips in its quest for international recognition and resources.
Pakistan must now recalibrate its regional posture. It can no longer rely on rhetorical assurances. A clear, actionable policy is needed one that includes realistic expectations, coordinated intelligence sharing, and if necessary, cross-border surgical strikes against non-state actors sheltering in Afghanistan.
The international community, too, must reassess. China, despite investing heavily in regional connectivity, has been cautious in dealing with the Taliban due to its concerns over Uyghur militants. Russia and Central Asian republics, eager to access warm waters via Pakistan, must also ensure that their routes are not compromised by insecurity emanating from Afghanistan.
Pakistan today faces not just a domestic insurgency, but a multi-front proxy war waged by actors who exploit ideological cover to pursue political sabotage. Be it TTP’s anti-Pakistan narrative, India’s strategic influence in Kabul, or the ambiguous silence of the Taliban regime, the writing is on the wall.
The time for policy ambiguity is over. Pakistan must lead from the front diplomatically, militarily, and ideologically to protect its sovereignty and regional standing. As the global axis of power shifts, a new security doctrine is no longer optional; it is imperative for national survival.
