Fida Adeel
The flames of militancy have returned to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and this time, they are fiercer, deeper, and more widespread than before. From Bannu, Lakki Marwat, and Tank to Dera Ismail Khan, Bajaur, Khyber, and even the distant valleys of Chitral, the province is witnessing a grave collapse in internal security. This is not a political crisis. It is a national emergency. Across these regions, incidents of targeted killings, kidnappings, and militant brutality are growing. Police and government officials are under attack, security forces avoid patrolling after sunset, and civilians are caught between fear and helplessness. The breakdown is so extensive that in many tribal districts bordering Afghanistan, even the basic writ of the state seems to have disappeared. Whether it’s Katlang in Mardan or the tribal belts of Mohmand and Khyber, insecurity is no longer limited to the peripheries it has become a province-wide phenomenon.
The state must answer: what are our institutions doing in response? We cannot continue to view this situation solely through a political lens. National unity, beyond party lines, is now a necessity. Instead of playing politics, leaders must focus on solutions solutions that involve the people, that consult the parliament, and that revisit the very foundation of our Afghan policy.
Russia’s recent recognition of the Afghan Taliban is a seismic shift in regional diplomacy. Moscow, facing the growing threat of Daesh-Khorasan following the deadly concert hall attack in which nearly 150 civilians were killed, has decided to rely on the Afghan Taliban to neutralize that threat. This has major implications for Pakistan. If Russia can pragmatically engage with Kabul’s rulers to secure its own interests, why is Islamabad still indecisive?
China, too, has not stayed on the sidelines. It hosts the Taliban’s ambassador in Beijing, has facilitated meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials, and remains fully engaged in shaping the region’s security framework. India, sensing diplomatic space, has attempted to warm relations with the Taliban government as well though for now, China and Pakistan’s diplomatic positioning has prevented New Delhi from gaining ground. Amid these realignments, Pakistan must act swiftly or risk being strategically isolated in a region where we once held influence.
Pakistan’s engagement with the Taliban must be recalibrated. The Afghan government cannot continue to harbor anti-Pakistan militants or allow its soil to be used for cross-border terrorism. Any future talks must be conducted state-to-state. The era of negotiating directly with militant groups must end. If Pakistan is to reinitiate any peace process, it must be with Kabul and with full consensus of the elected parliament.
Within KP, anger and resistance are rising. In Mirali, North Waziristan, a massive protest was held recently. Thousands offered Friday prayers on the road and issued a collective warning: any resident who migrates due to future operations will be fined. The message is clear people want peace, not displacement. They are not against operations, but they reject the repeated cycle of destruction, migration, and abandonment that has followed every large-scale military campaign. They are demanding accountability from both militants and the state.
Their call is not without precedent. From Swat to South Waziristan, from Rah-e-Raast to Zarb-e-Azb, entire populations have been displaced in the past. Over 3.5 million people were uprooted from Swat alone. Affluent families ended up in camps, schools were shut down, businesses collapsed, and futures were stolen. Those who never had to migrate still witnessed the trauma of others enough to never want to live through it again. These scars remain fresh in KP’s collective memory.
At the same time, we must confront a painful truth: local communities are often accused of supporting militants, but in many cases, this “support” is coerced. Armed groups, often in large numbers, arrive at homes demanding food and shelter. Refusal results in violence. Acceptance, under duress, is later labeled as facilitation. These people are trapped. The same communities are now speaking up, marching in thousands, demanding peace and protection. The state must acknowledge their suffering and recognize their resistance as its greatest asset.
Meanwhile, the state’s frontline forces remain shamefully under-equipped. KP police, despite their bravery, lack armored vehicles, modern weapons, and night-vision capabilities. How can they fight militants armed with modern warfare tools when they are ordered not to patrol after dark due to safety concerns? The outdated structures of police stations, the lack of tactical gear, and the sheer vulnerability of personnel are not just logistical failures they are an invitation to militants.
Intelligence-based operations are being discussed, and rightly so. But intelligence without political consensus and ground-level understanding is ineffective. Whether it is the reimplementation of the National Action Plan or a new strategic framework, decisions must be rooted in the experiences of those who suffer those in Bannu, Tank, Dir, Khyber, and Chitral not those who issue orders from Islamabad’s drawing rooms.
It is encouraging that there have been efforts to re-engage Kabul diplomatically. The 19 April visit by Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar to Afghanistan, followed by increased diplomatic activity, shows a willingness to repair ties. Both Pakistan and the Taliban have elevated diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level, which reflects serious intent. But diplomacy must now translate into results. If militants continue to operate freely from Afghan soil, Islamabad must call for regional pressure perhaps in coordination with China and other actors to ensure Kabul fulfills its responsibilities.
The Afghan Taliban leadership itself has issued fatwas against attacks outside Afghanistan. Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada has declared that violence beyond Afghan borders is not Jihad. If this fatwa is ignored by militants, it directly questions the Taliban’s control. And if they do not act against these elements, then the legitimacy of their governance and their international commitments must be challenged.
Ultimately, the question facing Pakistan is not just about launching or avoiding an operation. It is about confronting reality with clarity. Should we launch another military campaign? Should we negotiate with Kabul? Should we reinvest in diplomacy or double down on security? These questions require one precondition: unity.
There must be a national consensus, backed by parliament, supported by the people, and rooted in facts not political calculations. The Afghan policy must be revisited. The security apparatus must be modernized. And above all, the voices of the people in KP must be heard, not ignored.
Time is running out. Inaction now will come at a cost far greater than we can afford.
