It is remarkable how many self-declared experts on security operations, as well as those self-proclaimed political experts, suddenly appear in public debates. Even when they have no familiarity with the terrain or the operational environment, they speak as if they are seasoned military planners. This produces strange explanations, often presented with complete certainty.
There is no dispute that intelligence-based operations have been conducted before, including in Bajaur, where militants were phased out village by village. Action was taken where terrorists were identified, and areas were cleared in stages. That same model of intelligence-based operations exists across the country.
The first and most basic question is whether there is an operation in Tirah or not. The posturing by both the provincial and the federal governments has created confusion. The federal government has repeatedly stated that an operation will take place. Statements to this effect have been made on the floor of the house, by government spokespersons, and by the defence minister, all insisting that action will be taken against terrorists.
At the same time, the provincial government insists it has not been taken on board. It claims to be the main stakeholder and says consultations should take place. How that consultation is meant to occur remains unclear, but the political posturing by both sides has placed the people of Tirah in the middle of this uncertainty. This is evident on the ground.
To understand the situation, one must first understand what Tirah Valley actually is. It is not a flat field where bulldozers, tanks, or large formations can be deployed. Tirah consists of multiple small mountain valleys, including Rajgal, Spin Ghar, Waran, and Mastura. These are high-altitude settlements, with communities living at elevations between seven and eight thousand feet.
Bagh Maidan is the main gathering point where tribal jirgas are traditionally held. Prior to the current situation, jirgas were convened there to discuss how to respond to the presence of militants. Terrorists were acknowledged to be present, a fact confirmed publicly by the chief minister himself when he stated that militants knock on doors asking for food and tea. The population faces an impossible choice. If they provide food, the army questions them. If they refuse, the militants threaten or kill them.
This was not hearsay. The chief minister spoke about his own village. IDPs arriving from the area said the same thing. The presence of militants was not in doubt. The question was how to operate against them.
Large-scale operations involving tanks, aircraft, and heavy mobilization are not feasible in Tirah. Such operations were carried out in South and North Waziristan, Darra Adam Khel, and elsewhere, where artillery, gunship helicopters, and large troop movements were used. Tirah is different.
Tirah Valley and the wider Khyber district form a complex network that serves as a hub not only for terrorists, but also for human smugglers, traffickers, and narcotics routes. This is an international corridor for opium, marijuana, and other drugs produced in Afghanistan. It is also a transit point for human trafficking and militant mobilization. The operational complexion here is therefore entirely different.
Terrorist activity has increased in this belt, alongside smuggling and trafficking networks. These groups use the area for short stays before moving people into Pakistan. This is an international nexus, not a conventional battlefield.
Can a full-scale operation be conducted in Tirah? The answer is no. Villages are scattered across separate hills at extreme altitudes, with caves and tunnels embedded in the terrain. Access routes are limited. One can reach Tirah via Mandi Kas, through Siransar, Mastura, Arhanga Valley, Orakzai district, or from the Khyber side. The valley is linked to Peshawar, but it is not operationally accessible in the way plains or settled districts are.
There is also a misconception about seasonal movement. Historically, Afridi tribes would descend to Peshawar during winters and return to Tirah in summer. This pattern is documented as far back as the late nineteenth century. While weather patterns have changed somewhat, winter migration still exists. However, what occurred recently was not routine seasonal movement.
In October, the district administration informed the provincial government that tribal elders had confronted militants and asked them to leave for Afghanistan. The militants refused. They were asked to disarm and declined. When local maliks attempted to resist, they stopped due to the risk of bloodshed.
The population found itself trapped between militants and security forces. Providing food invited scrutiny from authorities. Refusing support invited retaliation from militants. Faced with this coercion, many families decided to leave temporarily. The timing coincided with a weather shift, which worsened the situation.
When more than one hundred thousand people move, this cannot be dismissed as routine seasonal migration. This was a full-scale displacement.
In November, the provincial cabinet approved a mechanism under which registered families would receive financial assistance, rent houses in areas such as Mandi Kas, Mela, or Bara, and stay for two to three months until operations concluded. This approach was designed to avoid the problems associated with tent camps, which clash with social norms of purdah and household privacy.
If this arrangement existed, the question then becomes who is responsible for the suffering people faced during movement. The federal government disclaims responsibility. The provincial government does the same. Did the army force people out? Did soldiers threaten civilians with batons? There is no evidence of that.
Intelligence-based operations are ongoing across Pakistan. Data suggests thousands occur daily. Both governments acknowledge the presence of terrorists. Yet both avoid responsibility for governance failures.
The real issue is political incompetence. Provincial representatives are elected to represent their constituents, raise issues in assemblies, and confront crises. This is not the job of generals or soldiers. If the chief minister was unaware, elected MNAs and MPAs should have informed him.
The federal government, too, has long acknowledged that Tirah and surrounding areas suffer from drugs, illegal markets, and militant presence. These admissions imply that some form of operation was inevitable and part of the National Action Plan, revised in 2021 with consensus from all major political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
Intelligence-based operations are explicitly part of that plan. Opposition parties agreed to this framework. Refugee issues and counterterrorism have since become tools of political conflict between provincial and federal governments.
PTI’s anger is directed at both the federal government and the establishment. Forced displacement has become part of its narrative. But this appears to be political posturing rather than a reflection of operational reality.
Legal mechanisms exist. Apex Committee meetings can be convened. Briefings can be sought from corps commanders, IG FC, chief secretaries, and police leadership. These forums exist precisely to avoid governance chaos.
Instead, disputes are played out through media statements and press conferences. Pro-government media reflects official narratives. Opposition media amplifies counter-narratives. Social media brigades inflame tensions. Dialogue is replaced by confrontation.
Meanwhile, the people suffer. Funds remain disputed. Letters to the prime minister reveal shortfalls in allocations, including counterterrorism and former FATA funds. This vacuum, created by administrative paralysis and financial dispute, is now being filled by a more dangerous distortion.
The real danger in misrepresenting Tirah is not merely factual distortion; it is strategic erosion. When Intelligence-Based Operations are framed as a hidden full-scale offensive, public trust weakens, local confidence erodes, and militants gain breathing space. Terrorist groups thrive in confusion, rumor, and political noise. Every exaggerated claim creates panic among civilians, disrupts livelihoods, and diverts attention from the actual threat, embedded militant networks sustained by facilitation and cross-border sanctuaries.
Equally damaging is the deliberate blurring of responsibility. Governance failures, aid mismanagement, and political opportunism are being repackaged as military excesses. This inversion does not protect civilians; it leaves them exposed. When false narratives dominate, legitimate grievances are drowned out, and real administrative accountability is postponed indefinitely.
Success in Tirah does not, and cannot, resemble the imagery of past large-scale operations. It lies in denying militants territorial control, dismantling facilitation networks, and maintaining pressure through precision, not spectacle. This requires sustained coordination between civil administration, local jirgas, and security forces, not alarmist rhetoric designed for political mileage.
Those insisting on portraying Tirah as a war zone are not revealing hidden truths, they are manufacturing instability. And in regions like Tirah, where geography, climate, and history impose hard limits, such manufactured crises do more harm than any operation ever could.
