(Fida Adeel)
For decades, Pakistan has been the primary battleground of terrorism radiating from Afghanistan. From suicide bombings to cross-border infiltration, the country has carried the heaviest burden of instability caused by militant networks that found sanctuary next door. But recent developments make one thing unequivocally clear: this menace has spilled far beyond Pakistan’s borders. It is no longer confined to South Asia. Terrorism rooted in Afghan soil is now striking with disturbing precision across multiple regions from Central Asia to the very heart of the United States.
Only a few days ago, the world watched in shock when a lone attacker carried out a violent incident near the White House. The injured suspect, later identified as Rehmanullah Lakanwal, was an Afghan national. This attack, though isolated, triggered a disproportionately strong political reaction in Washington, with sweeping generalisations about Afghans and Afghanistan before any formal investigation was completed. It demonstrated how even individual acts can weaponise public opinion and shape foreign policy in emotional and damaging ways.
Before the United States could process this shock, another tremor came this time from Tajikistan. First, a drone attack killed three Chinese engineers working on development projects. Then, in another incident, two more Chinese citizens were killed, once again with the attack traced back to Afghan territory. These incidents mark a dangerous shift: the increasing targeting of Chinese nationals and Chinese investments in the region. The question that now arises is no longer Pakistan-specific it concerns the entire region, from China to Central Asia.
Why are Chinese experts being targeted so consistently? The answer lies in the geopolitical undercurrents at play. Anti-CPEC forces, hostile intelligence networks, and militant groups opposed to regional connectivity have long viewed China’s development footprint whether in Pakistan, Central Asia, or Afghanistan as a strategic threat. They oppose regional integration, infrastructure expansion, and Chinese-supported growth corridors.
The Afghan Taliban themselves cannot ignore this crisis. The President of Tajikistan recently convened a major security meeting, demanding an urgent review of the country’s 1,000-kilometre border with Afghanistan. Intelligence briefings exposed gaps in surveillance and border monitoring, leading the Tajik government to order immediate corrective measures. Meanwhile, Badakhshan’s Taliban leadership claimed they had arrested two suspects linked to the attacks an acknowledgment that militant networks are still able to use Afghan territory to stage cross-border violence.
Militant organisations like Jamaat Ansarullah, ETIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement), Daesh-Khorasan (ISIS-K), TTP, the BLA, and others remain active in this vast tri-border region that connects Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and China. The Wakhan Corridor — a narrow strip connecting Afghanistan to Xinjiang has emerged as a particularly sensitive flashpoint. China fears that opening this corridor could give ETIM militants easier access to Xinjiang, where Beijing already faces domestic security concerns. For this reason, Beijing has refrained from opening its border with Afghanistan, despite the Taliban’s desire to enhance trade ties.
The Afghan Taliban have expressed willingness to cooperate with Tajikistan after the recent attacks, yet this cooperative tone is sharply absent in their dealings with Pakistan. Despite multiple incidents in which Afghan nationals or Afghan soil were linked to terrorism in Pakistan, the Taliban leadership has usually responded with denial, counter-accusations, or claims that Pakistan is harbouring ISIS-K elements. This blame-shifting has worsened relations to the lowest point seen since 2021. Diplomatic engagements in Doha, Istanbul, and most recently Riyadh have ended inconclusively, with the trust deficit only widening.
The irony, however, is that Afghanistan’s relations are not deteriorating with Pakistan alone. Iran has repeatedly voiced concerns about Afghan-based militant groups, water disputes, and the presence of wanted individuals sheltered in Afghanistan. Now Tajikistan and China are facing their own crises with Kabul. When three Chinese workers were killed in Tajikistan, and later two more in another attack, it became clear that the threat is no longer localised it is structural, coordinated, and aimed at undermining regional connectivity.
When a pattern emerges, it cannot be ignored. The repeated killing of Chinese nationals in Pakistan and Tajikistan suggests a broader agenda. China’s deep involvement in CPEC and its long-term plans including potential CPEC-2 routes extending into Afghanistan and Central Asia — threaten multiple actors who fear losing strategic influence.
If China succeeds in securing land routes to Central Asia through Pakistan and Afghanistan, its reliance on distant sea routes will shrink, while Pakistan’s economic position will be strengthened. Such an outcome is unacceptable to states or non-state actors that view China and Pakistan as strategic rivals. It is therefore not surprising that India often surfaces as a possible beneficiary of destabilisation in these corridors. While concrete evidence is yet to emerge, the possibility cannot be ruled out something the Afghan Taliban must investigate thoroughly.
While these regional shifts unfold, Pakistan faces its own grim situation. In North Waziristan, Assistant Commissioner Shah Wali Wazir and two police officers were brutally killed in a targeted attack on the Bannu Miran Shah Road. Their vehicle was set ablaze a tactic reminiscent of earlier operations by extremist networks.
This corridor, once cleared repeatedly through military operations, is slipping back into a cycle of insecurity. Local populations have protested against the destruction of orchards used by militants as cover, arguing that the state should enhance security instead of demolishing livelihoods. Meanwhile, curfews, white-flag protocols, and heavy restrictions have returned, demonstrating the complexity of administering these regions.
The recent attack on the FC Headquarters in Peshawar, preceded by similar attacks in Bannu Cantonment, signals growing operational sophistication among militant groups. Whether they deploy suicide bombers, female operatives in Balochistan, or walking attackers in KP, the pattern reflects a unified strategy: destabilise security institutions, intimidate local governance, and exploit political divisions.
The Pakistani state maintains that it will negotiate only with states, not with non-state militant groups. This was the basis of discussions in Doha, Istanbul, and Riyadh. But while Pakistan holds firm on principle, internal political instability is giving militant networks space to regroup.
Parties cannot even agree on a unified national security policy. Some demand negotiation; others demand full-scale operations. Some accuse the federal government; others blame the provincial administration. Militants exploit this discord, presenting themselves as more coherent and decisive than the political class.
The tragedy is that Pakistan has failed to develop a long-term counter-terrorism framework. Operations clear areas temporarily but do not prevent militant returns. A child who grew up in an IDP camp in 2010 is now a 20-year-old adult. What did he see during these years? Displacement, ration lines, and a future devoid of education or employment. Such youth become easy recruits for organisations offering money, purpose, and identity. Until Pakistan invests in long-term reconstruction, education, economic alternatives, and community integration, military operations alone will remain insufficient.
The Taliban administration cannot distance itself from these realities. Afghanistan borders not only Pakistan but also Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. If Afghan soil becomes a launching pad for attacks across all these fronts, the Taliban will face diplomatic isolation far worse than today.
Already, Afghan refugees are facing deportations from multiple countries. Reactions in Tajikistan are heating up. Iran is losing patience. And China a country that invested heavily, supported Afghanistan diplomatically, and explored economic partnerships is now suffering losses of its citizens. If Afghanistan’s neighbours turn hostile, the Taliban will find themselves surrounded diplomatically and economically.
The fires burning across Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and even the United States are not isolated sparks they are part of a larger chain reaction. A new arc of terrorism is emerging, fuelled by militant sanctuaries, geopolitical rivalries, and political fragmentation.
For Pakistan, the path forward requires unity, long-term vision, and political maturity. For Afghanistan, it requires sincerity, enforcement, and a willingness to act against all groups operating on its soil. For China and Tajikistan, it demands coordinated intelligence cooperation. And for the broader region, it demands one realisation above all: no country will remain untouched if Afghanistan continues to be used by militants as a base for cross-border destabilisation.
Stability is no longer a bilateral issue it is a regional imperative.
