Pakistan is confronting yet another severe phase of security strain. Terrorist attacks have become a near-daily occurrence, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bearing the heaviest brunt, while sporadic incidents continue to surface across the rest of the country, including the federal capital. The spread, frequency, and persistence of these attacks raise fundamental questions about preparedness, prevention, and institutional capacity.
Every government carries an inherent responsibility to train, equip, modernize, and resource its law enforcement and security institutions. Police, Counter Terrorism Departments, paramilitary forces, and intelligence units must be provided the tools necessary to perform their duties. Where institutions lack strength or resources, maintaining internal security becomes an unrealistic expectation.
Across the world, security operates through layered institutional responsibility. Police manage law and order, intelligence agencies gather information, and armed forces respond to escalated threats. Pakistan possesses these structures, and each institution understands its mandate.
For nearly two decades, however, the country has faced sustained security challenges. The arrival of foreign forces in Afghanistan deeply affected Pakistan’s internal environment. Suicide bombings spread across cities and institutions alike. Military headquarters were targeted. Media institutions such as the Peshawar Press Club were attacked. Hospitals, funerals, mosques, and even weddings were not spared. The scale and indiscriminate nature of violence transformed terrorism into one of Pakistan’s most serious national security crises.
Over time, governments and law enforcement agencies improved coordination. Investigations became more structured. Attack patterns were studied, operational mistakes were examined, and intelligence-based responses expanded. Yet institutional limitations persist.
Police, CTD, and Special Branch departments continue to face staff shortages and resource constraints. Population growth, technological expansion, mobile communications, and internet penetration have fundamentally changed the crime and militancy landscape. Despite this transformation, investigative and intelligence methods often remain outdated. Institutions must become smarter, technologically equipped, and operationally adaptive.
Pakistan’s regional environment compounds its vulnerability. Situated alongside India and Afghanistan, the country cannot afford complacency. Yet a recurring pattern emerges after major attacks, politicians issue premature and incomplete statements before investigations conclude, creating confusion rather than clarity. Investigative agencies must be allowed to perform their work without political interference.
Recent incidents demonstrate investigative capability. Attack networks have been traced and suspects arrested swiftly. But tracing attackers after an incident is not enough. The primary responsibility is prevention. Intelligence-based operations do intercept threats before execution, though many such successes never reach public visibility.
Public cooperation remains essential. Trust between citizens and law enforcement strengthens preventive capacity. Without that coordination, disruption becomes harder.
Institutional Capacity and Modernization
Compared to two decades ago, Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies are better equipped. Vehicles, weapons, and operational exposure have improved. Yet the gap with advanced countries remains wide due to financial limitations. Pakistan cannot match Western resource levels, but responsibility persists regardless of economic constraints.
Rather than creating new agencies, strengthening existing ones is more practical. The Special Branch serves as a key example. It remains one of the most effective intelligence-gathering institutions, relying on human networks and field information. Yet many personnel operate with minimal technological support, often limited to basic communication tools.
If provided modern equipment, professional training, educated recruitment, and operational incentives, their effectiveness could multiply. Training, equipment, salaries, job security, and institutional incentives directly shape performance. Without these, outstanding results cannot be expected.
Militant groups, meanwhile, continue advancing. Their access to modern equipment and tactical skills has grown. There are militants with specialized expertise, highly trained and operationally sophisticated. Security institutions must learn, adapt, and compete at that level.
Weapons Flow and Regional Dynamics
Advanced weaponry circulating in the region has altered the threat environment. Equipment left behind in Afghanistan following foreign military withdrawal has entered militant supply chains. Historically, weapons from earlier conflicts, including the Soviet war, also spread into Pakistan through smuggling networks.
Even during the presence of foreign forces, weapons leakage into black markets was documented. Afghan personnel themselves were involved in illicit sales. While the current Afghan authorities have imposed stricter controls, weapons, night-vision devices, and modern gear remain accessible through underground markets, albeit at higher prices.
No country operates on permanent friendship. States pursue interests, install influence, and maneuver strategically. The accumulation of weapons in Afghanistan over two decades has inevitably impacted Pakistan’s security landscape.
Procurement, Spending, and Accountability
Pakistan invests heavily in security. Significant funds are allocated to equipment and arms procurement. However, procurement controversies undermine these efforts. Reports of overpriced acquisitions and substandard weapon supplies have surfaced periodically. In some cases, outdated weapons were allegedly supplied at inflated prices.
Security strengthening is necessary, but exploitation within procurement processes is dangerous. Accountability is essential. Past scandals have rarely resulted in punishment, weakening deterrence against future irregularities.
Globally, arms procurement is universal, even in regions not facing immediate conflict. Wealthy states accumulate advanced arsenals as strategic insurance. In the Muslim world, countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar rank among the largest arms buyers despite relatively stable security environments. Pakistan, by contrast, faces acute threats while operating under economic constraints and debt pressures. Geography ensures that regional militarization will continue influencing its defense posture.
Governance, Public Welfare, and Political Capacity
Security cannot be separated from governance. Citizens face poverty, unemployment, and economic hardship. Educated youth continue leaving the country in large numbers. These socio-economic pressures weaken national resilience.
Leadership quality also matters. Governance requires competence and experience. When individuals lacking administrative capacity assume leadership roles, institutional outcomes suffer. Decision-making must reflect expertise, not merely political positioning.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, political continuity has not translated into proportional developmental transformation. Beyond healthcare initiatives, broader sectors, education, infrastructure, youth empowerment, women’s advancement, remain underwhelming relative to public expectations built over more than a decade of governance.
Political rhetoric has often outpaced delivery. Opposition confrontation has consumed energy that could have been directed toward public welfare.
At the same time, a perceptible shift has emerged in the provincial leadership’s posture. Exposure to ground realities has prompted engagement with federal authorities and security institutions. Recognition is growing that provincial challenges cannot be resolved in isolation from federal coordination.
Yet internal party dynamics complicate this recalibration. As soon as pragmatic engagement surfaces, resistance emerges from within party ranks, particularly from ideological activists and digital supporters. Instead of reinforcing governance alignment, internal campaigns begin targeting their own leadership.
This internal friction reflects a recurring misfortune. When political maturity begins to develop, partisan contestation resurfaces. Rather than consolidating governance and security cooperation, energies are diverted inward.
In the end, the burden falls not on parties, but on the people of the province, who continue to endure insecurity, underdevelopment, and political turbulence simultaneously.
