The recent statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Office, linking the conspiracy behind the Islamabad attack to elements operating from Afghan soil, has once again highlighted a painful and persistent reality: Afghan territory continues to be exploited against Pakistan. For years, Islamabad has submitted dossiers, shared intelligence, and raised concerns at bilateral and multilateral forums. Yet the cycle endures. Suicide attacks, targeted killings, and cross-border assaults still trace back to sanctuaries beyond the Durand Line. The question now is not whether Pakistan has evidence. The question is how long this pattern can continue without fundamentally altering the regional equation.
The Islamabad suicide bombing is not an isolated incident. Investigations revealed that while the attacker was a Pakistani youth, the mastermind operated from Afghanistan. Arrests and subsequent interrogations pointed toward cross-border facilitation. This is not a new tactic. Militant groups have increasingly exploited vulnerable Pakistani youth—often unemployed, disillusioned, and exposed to extremist narratives—as operational assets. The handlers, planners, and financiers, however, frequently operate from safe havens in Afghanistan.
At the center of this problem is the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose leadership relocated to Afghanistan following military operations in Pakistan’s tribal districts. The TTP’s operational architecture has evolved, but its strategic intent remains unchanged: destabilize Pakistan through sustained low-intensity warfare. Border closures and tighter security have restricted direct infiltration, but they have not dismantled the command-and-control structures that operate from Afghan territory.
International scrutiny has also intensified. Reports by United Nations monitoring teams have repeatedly flagged multiple militant groups operating in Afghanistan. While the Afghan authorities have taken selective action against groups that threaten them directly—such as certain factions linked to IS-K and domestic insurgents—they have shown reluctance or incapacity in dealing decisively with groups targeting neighboring states.
The TTP, elements of the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), including its so-called Majid Brigade, and other anti-Pakistan outfits operate with varying degrees of freedom. This selective enforcement has fostered a perception—and increasingly, a conviction in Islamabad—that the Afghan interim administration pursues a dual policy: confronting groups hostile to Kabul, while tolerating that hostile to Pakistan.
Pakistan has repeatedly sought resolution through engagement. Trilateral and regional meetings involving Afghanistan, China, and regional partners have seen Islamabad present evidence of cross-border militancy. Bilateral channels remain open. Even trade and transit frameworks were viewed as confidence-building measures. Yet repeated attacks in Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, and other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa demonstrate that dialogue without enforcement has limited deterrent value.
Afghan authorities publicly deny allowing their soil to be used against any country. They have also expressed displeasure at Pakistan’s occasional cross-border responses and sought diplomatic interventions from international partners to prevent escalation. This outreach underscores a paradox: Kabul requests restraint from Pakistan yet fails to convincingly address Islamabad’s security concerns.
Pakistan’s patience is not infinite. No sovereign state can indefinitely absorb attacks traced to another territory without recalibrating its response. International law recognizes the right of self-defense when a state is unwilling or unable to prevent its territory from being used for attacks. Islamabad has so far exercised restraint, preferring diplomatic pressure over unilateral escalation. But repeated high-casualty incidents—including attacks on mosques, police stations, and security convoys—strain the space for strategic patience.
The domestic dimension cannot be ignored. Pakistan’s police and counterterrorism departments face capacity challenges. While allocations are announced, bureaucratic delays and political distractions often impede implementation. Thousands of police personnel remain assigned to protocol duties for politicians and senior officials, diluting operational strength. Counterterrorism requires specialized training, technology, intelligence integration, and rapid-response capabilities. Without institutional reform, the burden continues to fall disproportionately on the military.
The Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary, operating between civilian policing and full-scale military deployment, require modernization and strategic clarity. Intelligence agencies must integrate data across provincial and federal lines to detect recruitment pipelines and logistical nodes. In several recent cases, attackers had traveled to Afghanistan or border districts such as Bajaur. Monitoring such movements demands coordinated surveillance and community-based intelligence networks.
Socio-economic factors also play a role. Militancy thrives in environments of unemployment, marginalization, and ideological vacuum. Young men are recruited not only through religious rhetoric but also through financial inducement and narratives of grievance. Without addressing these root causes—through education reform, employment generation, and community engagement—security operations alone will not suffice.
Yet, to attribute the crisis solely to domestic weaknesses would be incomplete. Strategic sanctuaries across the border remain the core enabler. Without dismantling safe havens, Pakistan will continue to face an asymmetrical threat. Afghan authorities must decide whether regional integration and economic revival are compatible with the continued presence of armed non-state actors targeting neighbors.
Trade disputes and rhetorical exchanges further complicate the relationship. Accusations about substandard goods or economic coercion reflect a breakdown of trust. Border closures hurt both sides but disproportionately impact landlocked Afghanistan. Despite this leverage, Pakistan has not fully weaponized trade as a coercive tool, perhaps to avoid humanitarian fallout. Yet economic interdependence cannot replace security guarantees.
There are also allegations of external financial support to anti-Pakistan groups. While regional rivalries shape perceptions, the primary responsibility rests with the state exercising territorial control. No sovereign government can disclaim accountability by pointing to third-party interference while failing to neutralize armed actors operating within its borders.
As Ramadan approaches, intelligence assessments warn of possible escalation. Last year saw attacks even during the holy month, undermining the notion that religious symbolism restrains militancy. Militant organizations often deny responsibility for attacks on mosques or civilians while claiming assaults on security forces. This tactical ambiguity complicates attribution but does not obscure the broader infrastructure from which these networks function.
Pakistan faces a dual imperative: strengthen internal resilience and intensify calibrated external pressure. In the short term, security must be hardened. Intelligence-based operations, rapid-response units, and enhanced surveillance at vulnerable sites—particularly mosques and public gatherings—are essential. Evidence gathered from each incident must be systematically documented and shared with international partners.
In the long term, engagement with Afghanistan must continue, but with conditional clarity. Dialogue cannot be open-ended or detached from measurable benchmarks. Kabul must demonstrate verifiable action against the TTP and allied groups. Regional powers, particularly China, Russia, and influential Middle Eastern states, can play constructive roles by linking economic engagement with counterterrorism commitments.
The United States, though no longer militarily present in Afghanistan, retains diplomatic and financial leverage. A coordinated regional framework that ties humanitarian assistance and economic normalization to counterterrorism compliance may create incentives for behavioral change. Without such linkage, the status quo will persist.
Pakistan must also depoliticize internal security. Counterterrorism cannot become collateral damage in partisan contestation. Provincial and federal governments must align priorities, expedite resource allocation, and professionalize law enforcement. Police must be insulated from political deployment and reoriented toward public protection.
The broader strategic calculus is stark. A stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest. Millions of refugees, cross-border trade, and shared ethnic linkages bind the two countries. But stability cannot coexist with proxy militancy. If Afghan soil continues to serve as a launchpad for attacks, bilateral relations will deteriorate further, undermining regional connectivity projects and economic revival.
Pakistan does not seek confrontation. It seeks reciprocity. The principle is simple: neither country should allow its territory to be used against the other. This was a commitment reiterated repeatedly in diplomatic exchanges. Implementation, however, has lagged behind rhetoric.
The coming months will test both sides. If attacks intensify, pressure within Pakistan for decisive cross-border action will mount. If Kabul acts credibly against anti-Pakistan militants, space for cooperation could reopen. The choice lies primarily with the authorities in Kabul.
For Pakistan, complacency is not an option. Strategic patience must be accompanied by strategic preparedness. Institutional reform, economic resilience, and regional diplomacy must converge. At the same time, Islamabad must make it unequivocally clear that sovereignty is not negotiable.
History has shown that unresolved sanctuaries perpetuate conflict. The international community learned this lesson over decades of war in Afghanistan itself. It would be a tragic irony if the post-2021 order reproduced the very dynamics that once destabilized the region.
The path forward requires courage, clarity, and consistency. Afghanistan must translate assurances into action. Pakistan must balance restraint with resolve. And the region must recognize that unchecked militancy anywhere threatens stability everywhere. Until that equation changes, Pakistan’s patience will continue to narrow, and the cost of inaction will continue to rise.
