(Shamim Shahid)
The simmering tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have entered a new, perilous phase. What began as a bilateral dispute has now morphed into a complex regional and security challenge, drawing the attention of major powers like Russia and Iran, and threatening stability across South and Central Asia. The stakes have never been higher. Recent developments underscore the gravity of the situation. Russia has formally offered to play a mediating role in the escalating tensions, signaling that the conflict is no longer merely between Islamabad and Kabul. Maria Zakharova, the Russian spokesperson, affirmed Moscow’s readiness to engage diplomatically, leveraging its long-standing relationships with both nations. Russia’s involvement, alongside Iran’s ongoing mediation efforts, marks a significant shift: the conflict is evolving from a local security challenge to a regional concern with potential global repercussions.
Meanwhile, the security situation on the ground in Pakistan is deteriorating rapidly. In Lakki Marwat and Bannu, direct threats from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have triggered a wave of fear, kidnappings, and violence. Reports indicate that several people, including a soldier from the Frontier Corps, have been abducted, highlighting the TTP’s capacity to destabilize not just border districts, but the broader region. North Afghanistan, too, has witnessed curfews and disruptions, suggesting that insurgent networks are increasingly emboldened.
The TTP itself appears fragmented. There are effectively two TTP factions: one operating from Afghanistan, the other within Pakistan. While the Afghan Taliban appear to have constrained the insurgents diplomatically and politically, the Pakistani faction is becoming more aggressive. These dual pressures, both domestic and cross-border, complicate Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts.
In response to this escalating threat, the government is considering amendments to its Civil Power Act, aiming to empower the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) and police to act decisively in previously militarized zones. Historically, the Act has shifted between civil and military oversight, with limited success in eradicating terrorism. Critics argue that without cohesive political leadership and coordination between the civil administration and security agencies, any such policy adjustment will fall short.
The core challenge is political: there is a persistent disconnect between Islamabad and Peshawar, as well as within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s governance structures. Without unified political ownership, even well-intentioned security measures risk inefficiency and conflict. The experience of past initiatives, such as the Civil Action Plan of 2012-2013, demonstrates that fragmented approaches, inconsistent execution, and lack of public trust undermine anti-terrorism strategies.
The stakes extend beyond security. Pakistan’s trade and economic interests are increasingly imperiled by the deteriorating bilateral environment. Trade routes through Afghanistan and Turkey are disrupted, forcing Pakistan to rely on longer, costlier alternatives via Central Asia and Iran. These inefficiencies threaten livelihoods, exacerbate shortages, and could heighten social unrest in already vulnerable communities. Analysts suggest that while both countries will suffer, Pakistan’s economic exposure is particularly acute given its reliance on regional trade corridors.
Looking ahead, the path to stability is fraught. Regional mediation may provide temporary relief, the gap between Islamabad and Kabul continues to widen. Distrust, political jealousy, and competing domestic agendas complicate diplomacy. Any meaningful resolution will require the alignment of multiple actors: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and even China and India, given their strategic stakes.
The human dimension of the crisis cannot be overlooked. Communities in the tribal districts, long traumatized by conflict, bear the brunt of both insurgency and counterterrorism operations. Restoring security will require not only military and police action but also political commitment, public trust, and socioeconomic support. Citizens must see that the state is capable, cohesive, and responsive to their needs; without this legitimacy, counterterrorism efforts risk alienating the very populations they aim to protect.
Ultimately, the Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions underscore a broader lesson: regional security cannot be compartmentalised. Insurgency, terrorism, and political instability in one country inevitably ripple across borders, affecting trade, diplomacy, and civilian life. As external actors like Russia and Iran engage, the opportunity for constructive dialogue exists but only if domestic actors in both Islamabad and Kabul can rise above parochial politics and coordinate effectively.
The coming months will be critical. If political and security actors fail to synchronise efforts, the consequences will be dire: intensifying terrorism, economic losses, and regional instability. Conversely, if the government can harness the powers of the CTD and police under unified political ownership, foster cross-border dialogue, and rebuild trust with local communities, Pakistan may finally begin to turn the tide against a resurgent TTP insurgency.
For Pakistan and Afghanistan alike, the choice is stark. The path of confrontation promises unrest and loss; the path of coordinated action offers the hope of security, stability, and regional cooperation. The question now is whether political will, regional diplomacy, and strategic foresight can converge before the crisis escalates further and before the consequences are irreversible.
