Last evening’s skirmishes on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were both surprising and regrettable, especially when delegations from both countries are sitting in Turkey for high-level negotiations. This is the third round of talks after the initial meetings in Doha, Qatar, where a ceasefire was declared between the two neighbors, followed by the understanding that subsequent meetings would be held at the working-group level in Turkey.
While peace talks continue, the Afghan side accused Pakistan of violating the ceasefire by targeting Spin Boldak, though no casualties were reported. On the other hand, Pakistan stated that Afghan Taliban or Islamic Emirate forces had fired into its territory. When such incidents occur while negotiations are ongoing, they cast a deep shadow over the already deadlocked process.
At present, Pakistan’s delegation, led by DG ISI and National Security Advisor Lt Gen Asim Malik, sits across from Afghanistan’s team headed by Abdul Haq Wassiq, the chief of the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). Despite their presence, talks are limited to statements and formalities. No tangible results have emerged because both sides remain fixed on opposing poles of the issue.
Pakistan maintains that its deteriorating security situation stems from Afghan soil being used for terrorism. Islamabad claims that TTP militants operate from training camps inside Afghanistan and infiltrate Pakistan to carry out attacks. The Afghan Taliban, however, deny this entirely, arguing that no TTP fighter resides in Afghanistan and that those present are merely refugees who fled Pakistan during Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Each side rejects the other’s version of events, and both stand firm in their narratives.
To move forward, both sides must show flexibility and reduce rigidity in their positions. Standing on extreme poles can never yield progress. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to bridge their distance, adopt a cooperative approach, and seek a middle ground that can lead to peace.
The Stalemate of Proofs and Counter-proofs
Both sides continue to present “evidence” against each other. Pakistan has provided videos and reports showing militants crossing from Afghan territory, while the Islamic Emirate has countered with its own claims. This exchange of proofs and counter-proofs, however, leads nowhere. As long as both countries remain trapped in this blame game, no diplomatic progress can occur.
There is no denying that Taliban infiltration from Afghanistan has been visible in recent attacks across Bajaur, Tirah, and elsewhere. Pakistan’s evidence in this regard may be disputed, but it cannot be ignored. Similarly, Afghanistan’s counterclaims must also be addressed with seriousness rather than dismissal.
If both countries truly wish to move forward, they will have to cooperate, not compete. The rigid positions of Islamabad and Kabul must be softened through dialogue rather than confrontation.
The Road to Peace Runs Through Peshawar
Pakistan and Afghanistan are two neighbouring Islamic countries and, by faith, two brotherly nations. Historically, Afghanistan has been deeply dependent on Pakistan for trade, healthcare, and mobility. From medical treatment to education, countless Afghans have found opportunities in Pakistan.
Given this shared history, both must now rediscover the lost path of trust. In my opinion, the real breakthrough will not come from meetings in Qatar or Turkey, but from steps taken in Peshawar. If the Peshawar route is revived as a channel of communication between Kabul and Islamabad, trust can be rebuilt.
Right now, both countries suffer from a deep trust deficit. Pakistan no longer trusts the Islamic Emirate, and the Islamic Emirate has grown even more suspicious of Pakistan. This was not always the case; when the Taliban first came to power, many foreign delegations would first visit Islamabad before heading to Kabul. But now, that goodwill has evaporated.
For sustainable peace, Kabul and Islamabad must adopt Peshawar as their bridge of dialogue. The road to peace, quite literally, runs through it.
The Inseparable Link Between the Taliban and TTP
Expecting the Afghan Taliban to break ties with the TTP is unrealistic. Both fought shoulder to shoulder against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. During that time, the CIA consistently alleged that attacks against NATO forces were being planned from Pakistan’s tribal belt by TTP militants. In reality, TTP and the Afghan Taliban shared logistics, ideology, and battlegrounds.
Now, if the Taliban turn against the TTP, they would face severe internal resistance within Afghanistan. Such a move could trigger a civil backlash they cannot afford. This explains their continued denial of TTP’s presence and activities.
If mediation is to work, it must be regional and rooted in proximity. The involvement of distant countries like Qatar and Turkey adds prestige but not practicality. The solution lies closer to home, through a localized framework of cooperation centred around Peshawar.
Negotiation, Not Force, Is the Way Forward
The rise of the TTP is not new. Militancy in Pakistan began in 2002, after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, and took organized shape in 2007 after the Lal Masjid operation. That single event galvanised militants across Swat, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Waziristan under the umbrella of the TTP.
In Swat, Maulana Fazlullah declared jihad against the state. Khalid Umar Khurasani did the same from Mohmand. The operation of Lal Masjid was the catalyst that united these splinter factions.
Pakistan’s response to terrorism, therefore, must be rational, not emotional. Wars and negotiations can run side by side, but the doors to dialogue should never be closed. The Jirga system of the Pashtun belt embodies this philosophy. If peace is the ultimate goal, then negotiations, not force, must be the main instrument to achieve it.
The Growing Threat of Narco-Terrorism
Narco-terrorism is another challenge that demands serious attention. The issue is neither new nor limited to one region. Reports of opium cultivation on 10,000–12,000 acres in Khyber’s Tirah valley have raised alarms. But here again, there is confusion: opium is used to produce heroin, not hashish. Hashish (chars) is a derivative of cannabis, an entirely different plant.
Opium-derived heroin remains one of the most dangerous drugs, and its production has deep links to financing terrorism. Yet, heroin factories continue to operate in parts of Khyber and beyond. This has also fueled the spread of synthetic drugs like “ice,” which is devastating Pakistan’s youth, including students of medical and engineering backgrounds.
If the government truly wants to counter narco-terrorism, it must act with both capacity and will. The capacity exists; what is missing is the will. Until that will is shown, drug networks and terror financing will continue to thrive.
A Burden Too Heavy for the Police Alone
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police have borne the brunt of counter-terror operations, even though their original role was to counter conventional crime. Now, they are expected to simultaneously fight terrorism, control narcotics, and curb street crimes.
Forces fighting extremists must be properly equipped and supported. Modern weapons, bulletproof vehicles, and training are essential, yet reports suggest that ”outdated” equipment is being supplied. This negligence must be condemned, given the sacrifices of the KP police.
If the government wants the police to focus on counter-terrorism, it should establish a separate force to handle social and criminal offences. Otherwise, both terrorism and crime will continue to rise side by side, as the police cannot effectively combat both at once.
Pakistan’s security, peace, and social stability depend on political will, institutional reform, and regional cooperation. Without these, both the war on terror and the war on drugs will remain unfinished.
