The events of recent weeks have laid bare an uncomfortable truth: Pakistan is not merely confronting sporadic cross-border incidents but appears to be entangled in a sustained, multi-directional campaign of coercion and destabilisation. The pattern is too consistent to dismiss as coincidence; attacks originating from Afghanistan’s soil, the deliberate sabotage of border commerce and infrastructure, and an intensifying information war aimed at undermining Pakistan’s legitimacy. Against this backdrop, it is vital we adopt a posture that is at once clear-eyed, disciplined and rooted in constitutional process. Anything else would risk converting a defensive imperative into avoidable chaos.
First, the strategic context. There are, broadly speaking, two vectors of pressure on Pakistan today. From the east, a sophisticated campaign, part diplomatic, part clandestine, has sought to exploit fissures within Pakistani society and politics. From the west, there is a more immediate and kinetic threat: extremist groups and factions operating from Afghan territory that have launched attacks against Pakistani posts and civilians. These twin pressures are not unrelated. The same hostile architectures and malign actors that back destabilizing narratives online can also fuel, finance and shelter the very militias that carry out kinetic attacks. The result is a classic proxy dynamic: a foreign hand seeks to weaken Pakistan indirectly by arming, enabling and propagandising local proxies.
This is not to paint Afghanistan’s entire populace or its people with one brush. On the contrary: Pakistan and Afghanistan share deep cultural, economic and familial bonds. Millions of Afghans have lived in Pakistan, studied in our schools and contributed to our economy. That shared human tapestry must not be sacrificed to strategic dispute. But sentiment and sympathy notwithstanding, a sober assessment must recognize that a factional and often belligerent element within the Afghan polity — emboldened by external patrons and ideological arrogance — has behaved in ways that threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty and the safety of its people.
What has been striking in recent rhetoric is the brazen refusal of some Afghan leaders to act against the extremist groups operating inside their territory. Earlier pretexts — that such groups “do not exist” on their soil — have given way to a more confrontational posture that even appears to own or protect those elements. That shift raises an essential question: is Kabul merely unable to control these groups, or is it complicit — either by design or under pressure from other state and non-state actors? Either possibility should be intolerable to regional stability.
Moreover, the public narrative being circulated — often magnified by foreign social-media brigades — paints an alternative reality in which Pakistan is the aggressor and its forces the transgressors. This is a rhetorical staple of hybrid warfare: create plausible-seeming lies, amplify them, then use the fog of disinformation to erode internal consensus and international sympathy. But the world is changing. Audiences are more sceptical; fact checking is more accessible; and visual evidence can be cross-examined. Manufactured narratives require more than slogans — they require coherence with observable facts. Pakistan’s transparency in showing evidence of precision strikes and seized materiel undercuts simplistic claims made by opposing propagandists.
Domestically, the political response matters enormously. Politics in a constitutional order follows certain arenas and procedures: parliament, senate, national security forums, provincial affairs committees and the judiciary. When a major political party chooses to bypass these mechanisms and pursue dramatic, confrontational theatrics on the assembly floor — or mobilises popular sentiment in ways that risk undermining state policy — it is not merely performing politics; it is eroding the norms that hold a plural democracy together. If a party is serious about foreign policy alternatives, the route is institutional engagement, not spectacle.
This is especially true for provincial-level actors. Provincial governments play crucial roles in governance and development, but foreign policy and national defence are the domain of the federal state. To conflate provincial authority with decisions on border security, refugee policy and strategic posture invites confusion and undermines coherent policy. If disagreements exist — and they will, in a healthy democracy — address them through the relevant constitutional forums, present evidence, debate policy and, if necessary, litigate. Democracy’s strength is its procedures; its weakness is theatrics presented as principle.
We must also remember that any defensive reaction by Pakistan is not merely a matter of pride; it is a duty. A state’s primary responsibility is the protection of its citizens. When enemy forces attack border posts, civilian convoys, or critical infrastructure, the state has a legitimate right to respond and to deny sanctuary to those who would use neighboring territory as a launchpad for terrorism. This is not adventurism but restraint: Pakistan has exercised significant restraint in the diplomatic phase, engaging regional partners and advisers, and even waiting while international interlocutors urged de-escalation. Yet deliberate attacks continued, including sabotage of trade gates and targeting of civilians. There comes a point when protecting the state and its people compels robust action.
At the same time, we cannot let the security response eclipse our humanitarian, economic and legal responsibilities. Border closures and disrupted trade inflict real pain on ordinary families who rely on cross-border commerce and transit. The long queues, the traders without food or water, the fractured livelihoods — these are not statistics; they are human catastrophes. A balanced policy must couple security action with rapid, targeted measures to relieve humanitarian strain and to keep channels open where feasible, safe and verifiable.
Finally, the international dimension. Pakistan should continue to seek diplomatic avenues and multilateral engagement. The UN Security Council and formats like the Moscow consultations have repeatedly warned about terrorist safe havens. If Afghanistan cannot or will not act against groups that threaten regional security, the matter merits serious international scrutiny and action. Regional partners—China, Iran, Gulf states, even Afghanistan’s own civil society and intellectuals—have a stake in preventing their soil from becoming a weapons depot for extremist groups. We should relentlessly build a coalition of fact-based pressure, not only to delegitimize false narratives but to compel practical steps on the ground: identification, disruption and dismantlement of terror networks.
In short, the prescription is threefold: be strategic, be legal, be humane. Be strategic by recognising and countering the proxy dynamic that seeks to erode Pakistan through both kinetic and informational means. Be legal by insisting on constitutional procedures at home; debates in parliament, recourse to courts, and reliance on established forums for foreign policy, so that politics does not become a substitute for governance. And be humane by protecting civilians, sustaining trade where possible, and continuing to offer refuge and assistance to those who truly deserve it.
History will judge countries not only by how bravely they repel attacks but by how wisely they navigate the aftermath. Pakistan’s aim must be to restore security and stability while preserving the democratic institutions and humanitarian values that define us. That balance is difficult, but it is not optional. The alternative, an endless cycle of provocation and spectacle, benefits only those who profit from regional chaos. We owe our citizens, our neighbours and future generations better than that.
